
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



Chap. Copyright No. 

Shelf_.B_Fj3^^ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 




CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 



A 
TREATISE ON THE HUMAN SOUL 



Rev. JOHN T/JDRISCOLL, S. T. L. 



JUN 101898 




of^^ 



ALBANY 
JAMES B. LYON, PRINTER 



1090 ^p-. ^^ 

398. 



t>1 



-^^ 



^ 



\ 



H228 

I have carefully examined Father Driscoll's philosophical 
treatise, and hereby testify as to its orthodoxy and thorough 
Catholic soundness. The quotations are numerous and ex- 
cellent. The entire work reflects great credit on its author 
and will be productive of instruction and edification to our 
Catholic community. 

F. X. McGOWAN, O. S. A., 

Cen. Lib, 

Christian Philosophy by Rev. John T. Driscoll, S. T. L., 
alumnus of the Catholic University of America, has been duly 
examined by our Censor Librorum, who has declared it to be 
orthodox and thoroughly Catholic. 

We, therefore, most willingly grant our imprimatur, 

+ THOMAS, 

Bishop of Albany, 



Copyright, 1898. 
JAMES B. LYON. 



1 



TO THE 

AMERICAN STUDENT 

in the hope that its reading will rouse to the 
dignity and value of a life 

THIS VOLUME 

is 

RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY 

INSCRIBED. 



PREFACE, 



This treatise is an attempt to set forth the main lines of 
Christian Philosophy, as enunciated in the catechism and as 
systematized by the schoolmen, especially S. Thomas. 

At the present time philosophical studies occupy the atten- 
tion of very many. This is true in a special manner of Psy- 
chology. The mind instinctively craves the knowledge of its 
nature and destiny. Unfortunately, the theories proposed in 
the name of philosophy bring confusion not precision, ob- 
scurity not light. In our schools and colleges text-books on 
Psychology are put into the hands of students with the result 
that false notions are implanted and the true value of our 
dignity is blurred or lost. In certain quarters the physical 
sciences have been popularized and extended beyond just 
limits. To answer this need of the soul for a knowledge of 
itself, to set forth briefly the principles of a true and sound 
philosophy is the aim of this work. 

The method followed is comparative. The question is pro- 
posed; various solutions are classified; the theories are con- 
trasted; that one is held which is the best able to answer the 
facts. 

As far as possible the questions have been treated for the 
ordinary student. Henc^ the uninterrupted text, the division 
into paragraphs and sections. At the same time any one who 



VI PREFACE. 

desires more extensive information need only look up the 
notes at the foot of the page. 

Some special questions, e. g., sense and intelligence, the 
faculties, etc., have been omitted, inasmuch as they pertain 
more directly to other departments, e. g., the Philosophy of 
Mind. 

If this small volume awaken in a reader the consciousness 
of his nature and dignity; if it strengthen a faith weakened by 
erroneous notions; if it lead one to embrace that religion of 
which it is the handmaid, the writer will consider his labor 
more than repaid. 

Watervliet, N. Y., 

Feast of Pateon^age of S. Joseph, 1898. 



CONTENTS. 



I. Notion and subject-matter of Psychology. 

II. Sources: 

(a) Introspection: S. Augustine, S. Thomas; Compte, S. Mill, 

Spencer, Maudsley, James, Sully, Hoffding. 

(b) Objective aids. 

III. A science: ' 

Proper object, means and method: Hoffding, Lewes, Spencer, 
Bain, James, Ladd. 

IV. Difficulties: 

Subject-matter; method; phraseology, inadequate conceptions 
of man. 

V. Relation to other sciences: 

Logic, lethics, pedagogics, politics. 

VI. Division: 

(a) Psychology of soul, of mind, of ("will. 

(b) Psychology of soul and modern writers, e. g.. Sully, James, 

Murray, Davis, Koelpe, Hoffding, Ladd and Bowne, 

VII. Scholastic philosophy: 

Historical importance; its interest to-day; failure of modern 
philosophy. 

PROEMIUM. 
Question stated; method followed. 

CHAPTER I. 

Substantiality of Soul. 
I. Theories: 

(a) Transcendental view, e. g., Kant and Wundt. 

(b) Phenomenal view, e. g., Hume, Mill, Davis, Hoffding, Sully, 

Murray, James. 

(c) Agnostic view, e. g., Locke, Thomson, Spencer, Laing, 

Hamilton, Bowen. 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

I. Theories — Continued: 

(d) Materialistic view, e. g., Tyndall, Huxley. 

(e) Scholastic theory, e. g., Aristotle, S. Thomas, S. Augustine. 

II. Proof: 

(a) From analysis of notion of substance: Its elements are: 

Being, potency, stability, subject of modifications. 

(b) Application to the soul. 

(c) Concept more clearly defined. 

III. Errors: 

(a) Transcendental ego, i. e., the / is not a real, but only a 

logical subject. 

(b) Phenomenal ego; the contention of the school of Associa- 

tionists; examination of S. Mill. 

(c) Buddhist theory. 

CHAPTER II. 
Materialism. 

I. History: 

(a) Ancient and modern materialism. 

(b) Origin and leaders of modern materialism, e. g., Moleschott, 

Vogt, Buchner. 

(c) Scientific materialism, e. g., Tyndall, Huxley. 

II. Doctrine: , 

(a) Inorganic world, organic world, man. i 

(b) Spencer's attempt. 

(c) Two diverging tendencies: (i) Logical position; (2) double- 

aspect theory, e. g., Clifford, Bain, Spencer. 

III. Arguments drawn: 

(a) From fact that soul is only known in matter. 

(b) From mental processes. 

(c) From dependence of mind on body. 

(d) From evolution. 

IV. Criticism: 

(a) One-sided and partial. 

(b) Based on confusion of concepts. 

(c) Method not scientific. 

V. Influence: 

(a) Reason of its influence. 

(b) Opponents in France, England, America. 



CONTENTS. IX 

. CHAPTER III. 

Simplicity of Soul. 

I. Soul a unity. 

II. The soul a simple unity: 

(a) Not a collective unity, e. g., Hume, Mill, Spencer, Bain, 

Davis, Koelpe. 

(b) Not a potential unity, e. g.. Prof. Ladd, Hegel. 

(c) Soul not a result, i. e., Positivist position, e. g., Taine, Ribot. 

(d) Proof of simple unity: 
(i) From consciousness. 

(2) Ab absurdo. 

(3) Criticism of Kant. 

III. An immaterial simple unity: 

(a) Mind and matter differently known. 

(b) Mind and matter known as different things, 

(c) From deaf-blind mutes. 

CHAPTER IV. 
Positivism, 

I. History: 

(a) A philosophy, a sociology, and a religion. 

(b) Origin, author, and different schools. 

II. Doctrine: 

(a) Fundamental tenets: Positive method, denial of what is 

above sense, idea of humanity. 

(b) Law of historic filiation. 

(c) Classification of sciences. 

(d) Man and the science of man. 

(e) Relation to Agnosticism explained: 
(i) By interdependence. 

(2) By their common source in Hume. 

III. Influence: | 

(a) In general. 

(b) In England, France, Germany, America. 

(c) Adverse criticism. 

IV. Criticism: 

(a) Fundamental law is false. 

(b) Not a philosophy. 

(c) Doctrine of man is false. 

(d) Proofs are assumptions. 

(e) Positivism a misnomer. ; 



X CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER V. 

Spirituality of Soul. 

I. Explanation of terms: 

(a) Spirit, pure spirit, spirit and soul. 

(b) Question stated. 

II. Argument: 

(a) From acts of intelligence: 

(i) Superorganic notions and abstract sciences. 

(2) Manner of conceiving material objects. 

(3) Self-consciousness. 

(b) From acts of will: 

(i) Tendency to abstract classification. 

(2) To superorganic objects. 

(3) From conscience. 

(4) From free-will. 

(c) From human speech. 

CHAPTER yi. 
Spirituality of Soul and Modern Science. 

I. Correlation of thought to structure of the brain: 

(i) From quantity of brain-matter: 

(a) Weight: absolute, relative, of races and of individuals. 

(b) Measurement. 

(2) From quality of brain-matter: 

(a) Chemical qualities. 

(b) Physical qualities, e. g., convolutions and gray-matter. 

II. Localization of function: 

(i) Theory of Gall. 

(2) Cerebral physiology: 

(a) Sensation. 

(b) Nervous movement. 

(c) Reason. 

III. Psycho-physics: 

(i) Origin and basis. - . 

(2) Criticism: 

(a) Intensity. 

(b) Duration. 

(c) Extension. , 



CONTENTS. XI 

CHAPTER VII. 
Pantheism. 

I. Sources of modern Pantheism; 

(i) Spinoza. 

(2) German Pantheism of Kant, Fichte, Sclielling, Hegel, Schof- 

fenhauer, Hartman. 

(3) The VedaVta. 

II. Influence: \ 

(i) In England, e. g., Coleridge, Carlyle, Arnold, Wordsworth. 
(2) In America, e. g., New England Transcendentalism: Emer- 
son, Dr. Royce. 

III. Neo-Hegelian School: 

(i) Its beginnings. 

(2) Its leaders in England and America. 

(3) Professor Green's teaching. 

IV. Criticism. , 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Soul and Body. 

I. Question stated. 

II. Theories: 

(i) Exaggerated Spiritualism, e. g., Des Cartes, Malebranche, 
Leibnitz. 

(2) Accidental union, e. g., Plato, Locke, Lotze, Ladd, Rosmini. 

(3) Monistic theory, e. g.. Prof. Clifford, Bain, H. Spencer. 

(4) Scholasticjtljeory, i. e,, matter and form. 

(a) A duality in every substance as shown by science and 
by ordinary observation. 1 

(b) Hence the inference to a duality in its composition. 

(c) " First matter " and " substantial form." 

(d) Hierarchy of forms. 

(e) Duality in man: hence body and soul: and place of soul 

in human body. 

CHAPTER IX. 
Brain and Thought. 
I. "Thought produced by the brain:" 

(i) Battle-ground between Christian and non-Christian philos- 
ophy. 



XU CONTENTS. 

I. " Thought produced by the brain " — Continued: 

(2) Meaning of word " thought." 

(3) Meaning of word " produced." 

II. Brain and sensation: 

(i) Simple subject necessary. i 

(2) Sensation is quantitative. 

(3) Hence animated organism is subject of sensation. 

III. Brain and thought: 

(i) Mind essentially different from sensation. 

(2) Cerebral activity a condition for thought. 

(3) Hence body not organ of thought. 

IV. Thought not cerebral motion: 

(i) Opinions of Spencer, Tyndall, Clifford, Bain, James. 

(2) Criticism. 

(3) Testimony of Du Bois, Reymond, Ferrier, Tyndall, Ladd. 

CHAPTER iX. 

Origin of Soul. 
I. Theory of emanation, i. e.. Pantheism. 
II. Theory of traducianism, i. e., Tertullian. 
III. Theory of manifestation, i. e.. Prof. Ladd. 
IV. Theory of evolution, i. e, Mr. Spencer. 
V. Theory of creation, i. e.. Christian philosophy. 

CHAPTER XI. 

Immortality. 

I. Theories: 

(i) Materialistic, e. g., vulgar and scientific materialism. 

(2) Pantheistic. 

(3) Sceptical, e. g., S. Mill, Emerson, Arnold, G. Eliot. 

II. Substitutes: 

(i) Indestructibility of material elements of the body. 

(2) Conservation of energy. 

(3) Doctrine of Karma. 

(4) Immortality of Glory. 

III. The fact: 

(i) Belief in future life is universal. 
(2) Exceptions: 

Early Jews. 

Buddhists. 



'> 



CONTENTS. ^ , xm 

IV. Reasons for the belief: 

(i) Psychological, e. g., S. Thomas, criticism of Prof. Ladd. 

(2) Moral. 

(3) Philosophical: 

(a) From intellect. 

(b) From will. 

(c) From fundamental desires. 

(4) Analogical — no such word as annihilation. 

CHAPTER XII. 

Personality. 

I. Definition of personality the task of Christian philosophy. 

II. Theories: 

(i) Memory, i. e., Locke and Mill. 

(2) Consciousness, i. e., Kant. 

(3) The Bampton Lecturer of 1891. ; 

(4) Of evolution, e. g., Ribot. 

III. Christian philosophy: 

(i) Definition of S. Thomas. 

(2) Person embraces: 

(a) Rational nature. 

(b) Individual substance. 

(3) Illustrated: 

(a) In Incarnation. 

(b) In civil law. 

(c) In human speech. 



INTRODUCTION. 



I. 

§ I. Psychology, from the Greek ^'o^ij- and /^o^'o?, 
means a disputation or treatise about the soul. 
Taking the word in its widest signification it means 
a philosophy of the soul, in contradistinction to Cos- 
mology, which is the philosophy of the external world.^ 
By the soul is meant the principle of life, the principle Notion. 
which animates and vivifies an organism. We can 
distinguish three grades of life: vegetative, sensitive 
and intellectual. Plants possess vegetative hfe; i. e., 
they grow; animals possess vegetative and sensitive 
life; i. e., they grow and feel; man possesses vegetative, 
sensitive and intellectual life; i. e., he grows, feels, 
thinks. Man, therefore, possesses life in all its fullness. 
With the plant he grows and nourishes; with the ani- 
mal he grows and feels; but over and above he has 
what is characteristic of his nature, marking him off 
from other living beings; i. e., thought and will.^ Psy- 
chology, therefore, means the philosophy of the soul 
of man, of the soul as the principle and source of sen- 
sitive and especially of intellectual operations, and has 
been designated the " science of mental life." ^ 

^ Dr. Ward says Psychology cannot be defined because we 
cannot limit its subject-matter, i. e,, we cannot distinguish 
at the outset between internal and external experience, cf. 
Encyc. Britt. art. Psychology. This is not true. Conscious- 
ness testifies to the contrary. 

2 S. Augustine De Lib. Arb. 1. II, n. 13. 

3 For history of the term " Psychology," cf. Sir W. Hamil- 
ton's " Metaphysics," I, p. 130. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, 



Subject 
matter. 



Conscious- 



§ 2. The subject-matter of Psychology is set forth 
in its definition. By mental life is miderstood con- 
sciousness, our states of consciousness, the sum-total 
of our conscious experience. In this sense we speak 
of mind as subjective in relation to the external world 
which is objective. However, Psychology employs 
objective methods, as we shall see. It does not con- 
sider the mind as personal, but as the endowment of 
the human race; it does not view the mind as inde- 
pendent and apart, but treats of the phenomena of con- 
sciousness in themselves as such, in their relations to 
the principle producing them, i. e., the soul, and to 
what conditions their actual exercise, i. e., the bodily 
organs. Hence its complete subject-matter is ani- 
mated body or a " sound mind in a sound body." It 
places before our view all the operations and phe- 
nomena of our conscious life. Thus it investigates 
sensations, thoughts, wishes, desires, feelings, imagi- 
nations, memories, afifections and emotions. It formu- 
lates the laws which rule their working, and finally 
from these, as data, determines what we are to hold 
concerning their source or internal cause, and the rela- 
tion of this principle to the bodily organism. 

§ 3. In employing the term consciousness we must 
guard against ambiguity. The word has more than 
one meaning, (a) In the most general and widest 
signification it is used to designate mental life as a 
whole, i, e., our states of consciousness, as opposed 
to unconsciousness. In this sense, as we have seen, it 
includes emotions, volitions, etc., and forms the sub- 
ject-matter of Psychology, (b) It designates immedi- 
ate and direct knowledge which the mind has of its 
own acts or of something external acting upon it. In 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

this sense it includes only cognitive acts of a special 
kind, and is opposed to mediate and reflex knowledge, 
(c) Finally, it signifies the reflex and deliberate act 
by which the mind attends to its own operations 
or states, and recognizes them as produced by its own 
activity. In this sense it is more properly called self- 
consciousness. It is thus a special kind of mental 
activity which investigates and studies the working 
of our minds, brings out clearly and distinctly what 
we have directly experienced. In the second and 
especially in the third meaning consciousness becomes 
the chief method and instrument of Psychology. 

§ 4. By keeping in mind the different meanings 
which the word consciousness has, we can easily under- 
stand the position of writers who at first sight seem to 
disagree. The mistake of confounding different 
things shall thus be avoided. Thus Rabier^ distin- 
guishes two theories and two schools divided 
on the nature of consciousness: (a) Those who 
hold that consciousness means the very essence of 
psychical phenomena, the common form of all the 
faculties of the soul, and is to them as light is to color. 
This view, he says, is the opinion of Aristotle.^ (b) 
Those who consider consciousness as an accident, an 
additional phenomena, somewhat as light is to objects 
without which they cannot be conceived. Thus it 
becomes a distinct faculty and its function is to per- 
ceive the acts of inner life. It is the open eye of the 
mind, the witness of our psychic phenomena. This, 

^ Psychologic, p. 52. 

^ '' The interior hght that illumines everything that takes 
place in the soul." Cousin History of Mod. Phil, xi, p. 247; 
Stuart Mill Logic, BI, ch. i, §§ 3, 5. 



4 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

he says, is the opinion of Reid, Stewart/ Royer- 
Collard, Hamilton. But on a close examina- 
tion there is no real opposition. Consciousness 
is both one and the other. In the first mean- 
ing it is the common form of all our mental activi- 
ties. In the second it is the eye and witness of our 
mental life. In the former it is what we study; in the 
latter it is the chief source and instrument of our 
knowledge. For we not only are conscious of mental 
states, but we also have the power of viewing self as 
the subject and agent of our mental states. This per- 
fection is the crown of our intellectual life just as the 
power of self-determination is the crown and glory of 
the acts of volition. 

II. 
Sources. 
intro-^ § 5. The subject-matter of Psychology is conscious- 

method, ness. The states of consciousness are only observed 
by the act of self-consciousness or introspection, i. e., 
by " looking within." This is the subjective or intro- 
spective method. It is the primary, direct, immediate 
source through which a knowledge of mental life is 
obtained. Socrates was the first to make self-examina- 
tion a philosophical method. His principle was 
** know thyself."'' The science he elaborated by its 
aid was more moral than mental. With St. Augustine 
this principle and method was of great value. 'T de- 
sire," he says, "to know God and the soul; nothing 

^ Cf. Hamilton Met. Lect. xii, p. 145. " It is the recog- 
nition by the mind or, ego, of its acts and affections." 
Hamilton Met. Lect. xi, p. 133; yet the same author 
writes " The fundamental form, the generic condition 
of all modes of mental life." Met,, p. 127; cf. Porter, the 
Human Intellect, p. 83. 

7Cf. Phaedros. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 5 

more."^ For this it is necessary to enter into one's self. 
From the knowledge of self man can rise to a knowl- 
edge of God.^ With St. Thomas introspection is the ^^j^ethod^ 
basis of a beautiful and profound exposition of the gpiJuon. 
virtues and vices.^° 

§ 6. Compte ^^ maintains that direct observation Compte. 
by introspection is impossible. To him direct 
contemplation of the mind by itself is an illu- 
sion for two reasons: (a) The thinker cannot 
divide himself in two, of whom one reasons while the 
other observes him reason. " The organ observed 
and the organ observing," he says, *' being, in this 
case, identical, how could observation take place? 
This pretended psychological method, therefore, is 
null and void." (b) Internal observation gives almost 
as many divergent results as there are individuals who 
practice it. This objection is well met by J. Stuart 
Mill, who holds " that a fact may be studied in two 
ways, either by direct knowledge at the very time or 
through the medium of memory a moment after." 
And, he adds, " Mr. Compte would scarcely have 
observed that we are not aware of our own intellectual 
operations. This simple fact destroys the whole of his 
argument. Whatever we are directly aware of, we 
can directly observe." ^^ 

^ " Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil 
omnino." Soliloq. 1. I, 7; cf. Trin. xiv, 7; Confess, x, 17, 
24, 25; de Ordine, n. 47. 

^ " Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi, in interiore homine 
habitat Veritas; et si tiiam naturam mutabileminveneris, trans- 
cende et teipsum. Sed memento cum te transcendis, ration- 
antem animam te transcendere. Illuc. ergo tende unde ipsum 
lumen rationis accenditur. De vera relig. 72. 

i<^ Cf. Sum. Theol. 2a, 2ae. 

11 Positive Philos., London, 1875, vol. i, pp. 381-389; Cours 
de Phil., Posit. I, 34 sq. 

12 Aug. Compte & Posit., p. 64; cf. Sully Illusions, pp. 
208-211. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Maudsley. 
James. 



Spencer. § y^ ]\ji-_ Spencer holds that no one is conscious of 
what he is but of what he was a moment before. His 
reason is that it is impossible for the mind to be at the 
same time subject and object.^^ We admit that it 
may be difiFiCult to thus conceive the mind; never- 
theless it is a fact. Dr. Maudsley/* and Mr. 
James/^ say that in observing our mental states, 
we lose them or modify them so that they 
are no longer the same. Mr. James is unre- 
served in praising Compte's reasoning. He' writes 
'* that a feeling to be named, judged or perceived must 
be already past; that no subjective state while present 
is its own object, e. g., when I say ' I feel tired/ 'I feel 
angry/ the present conscious states are not the direct 
feelings of fatigue or of anger. It is the state of say- 
ing-I -feel-tired, or of saying-I-f eel-angry , entirely dif- 
ferent matters, so different that the fatigue and anger 
apparently included in them are considerabe modifica- 
tions of the fatigue and anger directly felt the previous 

Hoffding. instant." ^^ So Hoffding: ''In the moment when I 
wish to observe a state of consciousness, that state is 
already past, or has blended wdth other elements. 
What has been fully and clearly experienced will 
remain in memory and by means of memory can be 
examined." ^^ 

§ 8. Thus introspection becomes retrospection. 
This position cannot be held. It is true that I can 
recall past states in order to observe them; but it is 



^2 Cf. Spencer's First Principles, p. 65. 

1^ Physiology of Mind, ch. i. 

15 Psychol. I, pp. 189, 190. 

1^ Vol. I, pp. 189, 190. Mr. Hamilton also says that the 
phenomena can only be studied through it reminiscence. 
Met. xix, p. 263. 

1" Outlines of Psychology, p. 17. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 7 

also a fact verified by the conscious experience of 
every one that I can directly observe my own 
thoughts and emotions; or, in the language of Mr. 
Mill, " Whatever we are directly aware of, we can 
directly observe." Mr. James again falls into an error 
in his reflection upon the value of introspection. He 
holds that the only grounds on which the infallible 
veracity of the introspective judgment might be main- 
tained are empirical. " If we had reason to think it 
has never yet deceived us," he \xrites, " we might con- 
tinue to trust it." ^^ The mistake is in confound- 
ing the primitive testimony of consciousness with a 
judgment formed by associations of ideas or habits, 
e. g., consciousness of a sensation and the localization 
of the organic part affected. These are found joined 
together. The former is a fact immediately known in 
consciousness; the latter is a judgment based on the 
association of ideas and whose correctness depends on 
bodily sensibility and the development of acquired 
sense-perceptions. The judgment may be erroneous, 
as we shall see. 

§ Q. To establish a science of the mind, introspection intro- 

-^ . '■ spective 

emplovs objective means of verification and of control, method 

'^ ' ■^ aided by 

Hence the external, indirect and mediate source which objective 

sources. 

embraces all those means of acquiring a knowledge of 
mental life which are outside of and beyond the imme- 
diate observation of my own mental states. In obtain- 
ing material from this source w^e reason by analogy, 
i. e., we reason on the ground that other persons have 
like motives and acts. By the testimony of my own 
consciousness I might write Confessions, as St. Augus- 
tine, Memories as Rousseau, an Apology pro Vita Sua, 

18 lb. I . , . 



8 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



These 
sources 
are (a) 
ordinary 
observa- 
tion. 



(b) Science 
literature 
and art. 



(c) Study 
of mental 
develop- 
ment in 
the indi- 
vidual. ' 



as Card. Newman; bint the result would not be Psy- 
chology. It would be an important contribution to the 
study of mental life, but not a scientific treatise. My 
own individual experiences as such, however beautiful 
and valuable, are only personal; whereas Psychology 
is the science of the human mind, and treats not of the 
individual but of the species, of mankind. Introspec- 
tion, therefore, calls to its aid the object ire method. 
This method consists : (a) In the observation of others. 
We watch their words and actions, their looks and 
gestures. From these we strive to learn their mental 
states, their habits and tendencies. In the class-room, 
on the street, in society, we study Psychology. This 
can be done indirectly, as when we infer the condition 
of mind from an ordinary conversation or behavior; or 
directly when another in words makes known his de- 
sires, thoughts, sentiments or passions, and sets forth 
their interdependence or the part they play in his men- 
tal life, (b) The products of the mind in science and 
in art furnish rich stores of information. Science is 
the effort and proof of intelligence. Art is nature as 
mirrored in the human soul. Poetry, literature and 
the fine arts are the highest and most perfect work of 
the soul. They reflect the noblest sentiments, they 
express the most delicate thoughts. The man is 
revealed in his work, (c) Great assistance is derived 
from the study of the mind, in its various stages of 
development. Thus, a new department of Psychology 
has been opened up by investigations into the child- 
mind. The information gained is put to account 
in devising the best means of education. Action 
of environment, influence of home, religion, so- 
ciety, education are taken into account. Not 
only the development of the individual is of 



! CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 9 

value. The records of civilized life and growth of J? J^'^^^'^^' 
nations contain rich stores. History is the world's 
stage. The customs, institutions, laws, civil and politi- • 
cal annals, religion, traditions — all these express the 
efforts of the human soul. There imagination, taste, 
genius in war or in the peaceful avocations, the great 
and noble faculties, expand and bloom. Side by side 
we behold heroic and sublime resolves which uplift 
and ennoble, and low and fatal passions wdiicli bring 
degradation and ignominy. Man appears before us at 
his best and at his worst, (d) Animal Psychology, as ^^^/^'J? 
it is called, brings light from another quarter. It pre- f^}^^^^ 
sents the results of studies concerning the instincts, 
habits and activities of the lower animals. Care must 
be taken, however, not to apply these conclusions to 
human life with too much rigor. Man is an animal 
and shares with the animal, sensation, instinct and 
lower sensitive feelings. Thus their action can be illus- 
trated to a certain extent from animal life. But man is 
more than a mere animal. He possesses intelligence 
and free will. These must be taken into account in the 
analogies drawn from the lower forms of life, 
(e) Physiology and Anatomy supply us with much g^^|^,^^ 
useful information. They explain the structure and ^"^y^*^ 
functions of the different parts of the nervous system. 
They give the physical bases of the operations of 
sense. Psychology studies the human mind working 
in the body. Hence, brain and nerve Physiology is 
necessary. It shows that phenomena of thought 
are accompanied by phenomena of the nerv- 
ous system. Formation of habits, transmission of 
hereditary tendencies are questions for the solution of 
which we depend more or less on these studies.^^ 

1^ Cf. Aristotle's Psychology by E. Wallace, Introd., pp. 
XXX, cxxvii. 



10 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

parati^e (^) Another source is langauge and the study 
philology. Qf language. The connection between language and 
thought is intimate. The one is the expression of the 
other. The thinker may pass away and his place taken 
by another, but his thought has a permanent embodi- 
ment in the written word, and lives on for the instruc- 
tion and delight of future ages. The study of lan- 
guage is the study and discipline of mind. Its words 
reveal the nicer shades of thought, the endless variety 
of conceptions, as in the Greek or Latin, or the 
imagery and comparative poverty, as in the speech of 
savages.^" Its structure shows the forms of thought, 
the characteristic turn and traits of their minds. The 
labors of Whitney,^^ of Muller,^^ are of great value to 
the Psychologist. Sufficient attention has not been 
given to the help which these studies afford. " It is 
remarkable," writes M. Ribot,^ " that EngHsh con- 
temporary Psychologists, who have profited so largely 
by the recent progress of physiolog}^, have borrowed 
nothing from linguistics." He expresses a belief that 
comparative philology will reveal things to us of much 
more intimate and delicate bearing upon the mechan- 
ism of the soul and its rariations than physiology. 
dfseSes*^^ (g) Finally, we have recourse to Pathology, the 
science of organic disease. Criminals, persons- under 
hypnotic influences, the deaf and dumb, eccentrics, the 
insane, are examined and studied with a view to illus- 
trate mental activities. Abnormal mental operations, 
e. g., dreams, illusions, somnambulism, hallucinations, 
are explained and traced as far as possible to their 

20 Cf. Quatrefages the Pigmies. 

21 Cf. Language and Study of Language. 

22 Science of Language. 

23 Engl. Psych., pp. 50, 51. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. II 

causes. It is wise to avoid the mistaken notions of 
some writers, e. g., Dr. Maudsley, '^^ E. W. Cox in Me- 
chanism of Man, Ribot,^^ who lay too much stress on 
this study. These activities are abnormal and must be 
so regarded. They therefore furnish no positive data on 
which to build the science of Psychology. Nor are 
they to be considered as constituting the proper and 
direct subject-matter of our study. Psychology inves- 
tigates " the sound mind in the sound body," and ab- 
normal phases or states should be viewed in this light. 

§ 10. By uniting the results obtained in these various 
ways to the subjective method a normal psychology of 
introspection is established. By it we study the mental 
phenomena in each human being, and study them in 
each condition. Psychology, therefore, does not treat 
of what is personal, accidental or particular, but of 
what is essential and universal. 

§ II. It is true that introspection is the real basis, 
just as an anatomist by dissecting one human body, 
finds there materials to construct a science of the struc- 
ture of every human being. So, when I know myself, 
I know human nature. But comparison of knowledge 
thus acquired with the other sources, help me to sepa- 
rate the particular from the universal, the personal 
from what is part of our human nature. Philosophers 
as Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas; moral- 
ists as Seneca, Pascal; poets as Homer, Euripides, 
Horace, Shakespeare; novelists as Goethe, Scott, 
Dickens, Thackeray; preachers as St. Chrysostom, Bos- 
suet, Newman, did not speak of the individual simply, 
but of man; not of man in one countr}- and time, but 
of universal man. In studying them we study human 

^ Cf. Physiology of mind. 
25 Diseases of Personality. 



12 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

nature. We see reflected in a masterly manner the 
thoughts, sentiments, wills which throb in our own 
souls. Thus internal and external methods, both 
united, give a true scientific basis to Ps}xhology. 

III. 

A Science. 
§ 12. Psychology seeks to know the nature of the 
soul, the nature and laws of mental and moral phe- 
nomena. It claims to be and is a true science. The 
conditions and processes which go to constitute a 
(a) proper science are here found, (a) First of all it has a real 

object. , ^ ^ ^ ^ 

and proper object. It investigates sensations, senti- 
ments, ideas, memories, judgments, reasonings, de- 
sires, passions, etc. These are as true and as real as 
the circulation of the blood, as the existence of physi- 
cal or chemical forces. Even materialists who deny 
the existence of the spiritual principle in man, must 
admit that they think, and feel, and wall. This subject- 
matter is proper to Psychology, and constitutes a field 
apart where no other science enters.^ Thus, m.athe- 
matics studies the general properties of material bodies 
in a most abstract manner; physics deals with forces; 
physiology and anatomy with the functions and struc- 
ture of the human frame. Only Psychology claims as 

26 It is not true, therefore, to maintain that " Psychology 
must be regarded as a branch of general biology." cf. Hoff- 
ding Elements of Psychology, p. 25; G. Lewis cf. Ribot 
English Psychology, p. 287; also Problems of Life and Mind, 
1st Series, p. loi; or to hold, with H. Spencer, that there is 
no precise line of demarkation between physiological and 
psychological facts, cf. Ribot, p. 148 sq. ; or with Hoffding, 
that Physiology and Psychology " deal with the same matter 
as seen from two different sides, like, e. g., the convex and 
concave sides of the same curve." Outlines of Psychology, 
p. 69. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I3 

its own the varied phenomena of mental and moral 
life.2^ 

§ 13. (b) Again, it has an infallible means of know- ^^^^^^j. 
ing and investigating its subject-matter. This instru- sources. 
ment is self-consciousness or introspection. Intro- 
spection reveals the inner life with all its phenomena 
of sensation, of intelligence, of appetite and will. Care 
must be taken, however, not to attribute solely to self- 
consciousness facts which are the outcome of judg- 
ments in which an element of experience or of associa- 
tion of ideas is found, as, e. g., the localization of a 
sensation. 

§ 14. (c) It has a scientific method. Method is an re) a 

, T ^ ^ , . , , . . - scientific 

orderly process of arrangmg facts and reasonmgs with method. 
a view to form a compact and well-connected whole. 
It embraces the statement of facts, the formulation of 
laws which explain them, and finally their systematic 
classification. Now, Psychology acquires its facts by 
observation. The student enters into himself, views 
his own mind working, and notes down its processes 
and their results. To observation, experimentation is 
added. In this act we recall a past fact through mem- 
ory, analyze it, compare it with a present fact of con- 
sciousness. Having possession of facts which have 
stood the test, we then proceed to discover the laws 

^ Dr. Bain seems to hold that mental phenomena are not 
distinguished from material by any common character. This 
is the contention of Materialism, cf. Bain Sense and Intel- 
lect Intr., ch. I, 2. Prof. James holds that there is only one 
kind of conditions which the student of scientific Psychology 
cares to know about, and these are the brain-states; and that 
until some Gahleo or Lavoisier arises with a psycho-physic 
law that will govern all mental facts, we can have no science 
of Psychology, cf, "is Psychology a Science?" by Prof. 
Ladd, in Amer. Joun. of Psych., 1894, vol. i, p. 392, coll. 
p. 286. cf. also Philos. Rev., 1892, vol. i, pp. 24, 146. 



14 



CHRISTIAN -PHILOSOPHY. 



This 

method 

followed. 



which regulate their interaction, the faculties or prin- 
ciples whence they spring, the nature of the thinking 
principle which is the bond of their unity. This pro- 
cess is induction and seeks to formulate the principles 
and laws of the human mind. These laws are then 
subjected to a process of verification, for, by means of 
deduction, their practical application is tested. Our 
own personal experience is illustrated and confirmed 
by results drawn from the various other sources. The 
interrelation of facts, of principles and of laws is the 
basis for a true classification of mental phenomena 
and of the processes involved in their production. 
Finally, the conclusions thus established are thrown 
into a system in which facts are brought naturally into 
relation with their causes and with one another .^^ 

§ 15. This method is pursued in the following pages. 
As far as possible erroneous inferences or classifica- 
tions will be pointed out and contrasted with the 
natural and true processes of mental life. 



(a) the 
n iture 
of the 
phenom- 
ena. 



- IV. 

Difficulties. 

§ 16. Every science or department of study has 
special difficulties which must be understood in order 
to pursue investigations with a prospect of success. 
Psychology is not without them. A practical proof 
is seen in the many systems of mental philosophy 
which have in the past and do now hold the adhesion 
of thoughtful men. 

§ 17. (a) The main difficulty is found in the nature 
of the phenomena which Psychology investigates. 

28 Hoffding denies that Psychology can be a sharply defined 
science; to him there is not one Psychology but many Psy- 
chologies. Outlines of Psychology, p. 26. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ^ I5 

The facts of mental life are numerous, varied, rapidly 
passing, and complex.^^ Hence it is possible 
to confound the testimony of consciousness with 
a conclusion which is based on the associa- 
tion of ideas, e. g., a sensation of touch 
comes immediately from consciousness, its localisa- 
tion is determined by the development of sense- 
experience; or to confound consciousness with 
an inference from it, e. g., in the perception of an 
external object, I am conscious of the sensation, but 
I infer the distance or the magnitude of the thing per- 
ceived. Only by close psychological analysis we dis- 
tinguish what pertains to consciousness from what 
does not. Again a sensation or feeling is complex, 
difficult to analyze and take apart, e. g., motives. 

§ 1 8. (b) Another difficulty arises from the method J^etiuS 
of our study. The ordinary mind is engrossed with 
the external world. A difficulty is experienced in 
turning aside from the objects of sense to concentrate 
attention upon the facts of our inner life. Repeated 
attempts are necessary. Abstraction and introspec- 
tion are the employment of only the few. Even then 
there is a danger of superficial examination, of hasty 
and partial inferences, of an untrue classification. 

§ 19. (c) A third difficulty is found in the words and guage^.' 
language used to describe our mental life. By a neces- 
sity of our nature we must represent the phenomena 
of mental and of moral life by analogies drawn from 
the material world. Thus, perception, apprehension, 
i. e., a grasping, conception, judgment, etc. Here there 
is room for uncertainty and ambiguity.^" 

29 Cf. Hamilton Met. Lect. xix, p. 264. 

30 Cf. Leibnitz Nouv. Ess. Ill, i, 5- 



i6 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, 



vfews^of^^^ § 20. (d) Finally, inadequate conceptions of mental 
mental jjfg ^^d development throw a stumbling block in the 
path of many. If I do not realize what man is, if my 
conceptions of him are partial, if I omit from consider- 
ation his mental capacities in whole or in part, or con- 
ceive of him from analogy of mere mechanical combi- 
nations and movements, I shall meet countless diffi- 
culties, and fall into many serious and vital errors. 
Thus, Materialists fail to distinguish in man the 
rational from the animal; or others as Leibnitz and 
Des Cartes exaggerate his spiritual nature; or others 
with our modern Sensists confound intelligence with 
sensation; or finally, like the Determinists, deprive 
man of his noblest faculty, the crown and glory of his 
rational nature — free-will. 



(a) regu- 
lative 
sciences. 



(b) educa- 
tional 
sciences . 

Peda- 
gogics. 



V. 

Bearings on Other Sciences. 

§21. Psychology is a theoretical science. Its sub- 
ject-matter and methods show this. Nevertheless, it 
has relations to a number of practical sciences in as 
much as it furnishes a basis on which they rest. 

§ 22. Thus (a) It supplies rules and laws for the 
regulative sciences, so called because they determine 
the rules of human thought and action. Hence, Logic 
and Ethics are based on Psychology, and take their 
starting point therefrom. 

§ 23. (b) Again, it is the basis for those sciences and 
arts which aim at influencing the minds of others. 
Hence, Education learns from Psychology the nature 
of the mind, of its laws and processes, and with this 
knowledge is enabled to estimate the value of the 
agents or means employed to gain the desired results. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. \J^ 

Oratory is another illustration. The speaker addresses Oratory, 
his audience with a purpose to convince their minds 
and commit them to the acceptance of certain truths 
or of a certain line of conduct. His arguments, 
examples, words, are all directed to gain this control 
over them. He must know how to appeal to reason, 
how to incite the passions, how to gain the sympathies 
of his hearers. All this supposes the knowledge of the 
mental processes. Finally, Psychology has a practical 
bearing on the arts of Politics and Government. As 
such it may be termed the science of Human Nature, 
and is the foundation of what St. Gresrory calls " The Govem- 

-. , r „ ment. 

art of arts, the government of men." 

VI. 

Division. 

§24. The division of Psychology is based upon its 
definition. Psychology is the science of the soul. The 
soul exerts its activity in two great channels : The cog- 
nitive acts., e. g., intellect and sensation, and the appe- 
titional acts, e. g., volition and desire. Hence, the 
existence and nature of the soul are first to be investi- 
gated and established; this is (a) "Psychology of 
the soul." With a definite conception of the thinking 
principle we can examine the nature and modes of its 
activities ; (b) " Psychology of Cognition " or " Psy- 
chology of the Mind." Finally, the nature of the Will 
and of the emotions are set forth in (c) " Psychology 
of the Will,'' or, in common speech, " Psychology of 
the Affections." Thus, the Soul, the Mind and the 
Will form the logical and natural divisions of a com- 
plete knowledge of man's rational nature. 
3 



l8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

inJ?of'a ^ ^5- ^^^^ following treatise is proposed as the initial 
oKhe'^souL ^^^P ^^ ^^^ effort to obtain a philosophical knowledge of 
bllS'Jf ourselves, (a) It treats of the existence and the nature 
nfe."^^^^^^ of the soul. These questions underlie all our studies 
in mental and moral life. As a logical necessity they 
require a previous treatment. To investigate the oper- 
ations of the soul in a scientific manner without know- 
ing its existence and nature is to build without a foun- 
p)iieg-^ dation. (b) Because of its neglect by contemporary 
modern writers on Psychology. Sully, James,^^ Murray, 
Psychol- Davis, Koelpe, Hoffding and others, rigorously 
exclude it as not pertaining to Psychology as a 
science. Hence, the phenomena of a " Psychology 
without a soul," so universal in our day, and the con- 
sequent tendency of those studies to approximate to 
Physiology.^^ 
oi^pke-^*^^ § 26. In view of this tendency in modern thought it 
ps^ikS- is interesting and instructive to read the vigorous pro- 
test against such teaching made by one of the leading 
contemporary professors on Psychology. " In the 
universal estimate, whether poptilar or scientific," 
writes ]\Ir. Ladd, " the character of the connection 
which exists among psychic facts is somewhat peculiar. 
At the outset of our investigation we wish to assume 
this connection in a manner as free as possible from all 
debatable metaphysical tenets. In some manner, how- 

^^ It may, however, be said that the assumption of such an 
ego or subject is, after all, extra-psychological. No psycholo- 
gist seeks to explain the phenomena of thought and feeling 
by the aid of such a conception, which consequently becomes 
a purely formal one. Sully " The Human Mind," vol. I, p. 9. 
James considers the soul-theory to be " the line of least logi- 
cal resistence," yet feels the necessity of assuring his readers 
that he is not guilty of accepting it, but considers a phenom.e- 
nal Psychology amply sufficient. Psych, i, pp. 181, 182. 

22 Cf. Hofifding Outlines of Psychology, pp. 14, 25, 29; Mur- 
ray Psychology; Davis' Elements of Psychology; Koelpe. 



ogy 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 19 

ever, we are obliged to assume it in order to study Psychol- 
ogy at all. For this universal estimate assigns all 
psychic facts to some psychical individual, some so- 
called ' mind ' or ' self.' Indeed, the character of 
the consciousness from which this estimate springs is 
such that nothing seems more absurd, more inconceivable, 
than the assumption of psychic facts which belong to no 
one. The phenomena of human consciousness, in gen- 
eral, can be observed and studied only on the popular 
assumption that they always appear as phenomena of 
some so-called human being. All phenomena of con- 
sciousness are facts either of your mental life or of 
mine, or of some other so-called ' person ' in the popu- 
lar sense of the word." ^^ 

VII. 
Scholastic Psychology. 
§ 2y. The principles set forth in the following pages Historical 
are the principles of scholastic philosophy. Histori- schoiasti- 
cally Scholasticism has many claims to a careful con- 
sideration. It is the product of the most intellectual 
era the world has ever seen. It is the greatest monu- 
ment of carefully reasoned and connected thought that 
the human mind has produced. It gave precision and 
scientific form to the great system of Christian theol- 
ogy. In its best and purest form it lives in the teach- 
ing of the Catholic church. Her doctrines are worded 
in the phraseology of St. Thomas. When we teach 
" matter and form of the Sacraments ;" when we main- 
tain that " the soul is the substantial form of the body,*' 
we propose truths which can only be understood after 
learning a fundamental tenet of Scholastic Philosophy. 

^^ Ladd Psych. Descrip. & Explan., p. 5; cf. also, Prof. 
Bowne in " Metaphysics, a Study of First Principles," p. 351. 



20 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tanc?ar" § ^^' Furthermore, the problems which occupy the 

tlme^^^^°* time and thought of the present day were not unknown 

to St. Thomas. He discusses them with clearness and 

vigor .^* Mr. Huxley sees in it " an open country which 

is amazingly like his dear native land." ^^ 

§ 29. (c) Finally, a brief review of modern Phil- 
modem osophy shows that it has failed in the attempt to estab- 
p 1 osop y j.gj^ ^ scientific theory of the world and of man. Des 
Cartes is its founder. His definition of substance is 
the basis of Spinoza's Pantheism; his theory of the 
union of soul and body gave rise to the doctrine of 
exaggerated spiritualism formulated by Malebranche 
and Leibnitz and developed in the materialistic reaction 
of the eighteenth century which, in its inception, was a 
vindication of the unity of man. His greatest disciple 
was Locke. The veiled empiricism of Locke became 
sensism with Condillac, and thus furnished a source of 
materialism. The phenomenalism of Locke was the 
source of Berkeley's IdeaHsm, and through Berkeley 
of Hume's specticism. Hume's influence was great. 
Kant wrote the *' Critic " in the hope of putting philos- 
ophy again on a sound basis. His work is judged by 
results. In Germany Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, 
taught idealistic pantheism and gave rise to the materi- 
alistic revolt of the past generation. Hamilton 
attempted to reconcile Reid and Kant. He broaches 
theories which have produced the agnosticism of Hux- 

34 Cf. I., q. 45; q. 67, a. 4; q. 71, q. 72, a, I; q. i8;cf. Azarias 
Philosophy of Literature, p. 97, sq. 

^ Scient. & Pseudo-Scient. Realism, in Essays Upon Some 
Controv. Quest., p. 186, sq. On the objection that Schol- 
astic Philosophy is unintelligible, cf. Fr. Harper S. J. 
" Metaphy of Schools," Vol. I, intr.; " Lectures by a Certain 
Professor." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 21 

ley. In the hands of Mill, Hamilton was an easy vic- 
tim. Coming from Hume in direct line we have the 
school of French and English positivists, the materi- 
ahsm of Priestly, the associationism of Mill, Bain and 
Spencer. The failure of modern Philosophy is shown 
in the recent attempt to reconstruct a system, in the 
cry of " Back to Kant," and in the " Neo Kantian " or 
" Neo Hegelian " teaching of our day. But this teach- 
ing is only ephemeral. With that intimate knowledge 
of men which marks the statesman and the philosophic 
mind, with that wisdom which guides the elect of the 
Holy Spirit, our great PontifT, Leo XHI, has per- 
ceived the intellectual anarchy of our time and has 
found a remedy. This is the study of Scholastic Philos- 
ophy as proposed by St. Thomas, its greatest teacher.^ 

^ Cf. Encyc. Aeterni Patris. 



PROEMIUM. 

psychor^ § I. Psychology of the Soul treats of the existence 
souUs*^*^ and the nature of the soul, of its union with the body, 
necessary, of its origin and duration. These problems are at the 
basis of our conscious life. They are assumed in every 
treatise of Experimental or Descriptive Psychology. 
To the inquisitive mind of the youth who learns in the 
catechism that he has a soul, and that his highest aim 
is to mould its life on the principles of Christian faith, 
these questions rise, it may be, in simpler form. The 
thoughtful student, hampered by erroneous meta- 
physical notions, or frightened by the exaggerated 
claims of physical science, sees them in all their depth 
and perplexity. He despairs of a sound solution, and 
tries to satisfy himself in tracing the development of 
mental life, or faces the question manfully, and pro- 
poses an explanation which is at variance with known 
facts of individual experience. There is not one who 
has not felt the demand made upon himself to explain 
the nature of his own being, and who has not, with 
more or less persistence and success, attempted its 
solution.^ 
^?^ . ^ § 2. The g-eneral line of reasoninof is from effect to 

method of ^ fc> ^ 

reasoning cause, from phenomena to their subject and agent. In 
lowed. the operations of mind and of will revealed in indi- 
vidual conscious life, is found existence of their 
source or principle, which is called the human soul. 
From the kind of activity and the nature of the action, 
is inferred the nature of the agent; from the perfec- 

iCf. Brownson's Quar. Rev., 3d Series, vol. Ill; "Ques- 
tions of the Soul," S. Augustine de Quant. An. n. i. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 23 

tion of the effect is ascertained the perfection of the 
cause. The conclusions follow one after the other in 
logical sequence; united they unfold what is sought for. 

§ ^. A distinction is drawn in Logic between the pescrip- 

^ «^ ^ , tion and 

definition and the descripton of a thing. We are said definition. 
to describe a thing when we separate it from other 
objects in a general way, by calling attention to the 
function it performs, to the manner of its production 
or to some general characteristic. We define a thing, 
however, when we reveal its constitution and nature. 
The former logically and naturally leads up to the lat- 
ter. A description presents to the mind an object dis- 
tinct from others, and invested with one or more 
attractive marks. The mind is aroused and stimulated 
to examine more minutely, to penetrate the outer form 
and lay bare its intimate constitution. This it does by 
the acts of analysis, of comparison, of classification, 
etc., but not always with the same success, e. g., in 
physical objects. The result is the definition. 

§ 4. It would, therefore, be contrary to the rules of Descrip- 

•1 . . . \ . , \ ^ . . , , tion of the 

right reasonmg to give in this place a definition of the soui. 
soul. The aim of the work is to do that. One quality 
after another is taken up and examined. Only at the 
conclusion, therefore, can we have that knowledge of 
the soul which would justify a definition. Neverthe- 
less, we cannot speak of something which we do not 
know. Some notion is necessary, even though it be 
vague. Here we ask for that knowledge which is suffi- 
cient to mark the soul as the definite object of our 
thoughts, and distinct from all others. This is attained 
by saying that the soul is the principle by which we 
live and move, perceive and understand.^ 

2 St. Thomas Qiiaest. de an II, 2; Aug. Enarr, in Ps. 137 
n. 4; Lib. de Beata Vita n. 7. 



24 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

assSSp^° § 5. In thus telling what the soul is, we state a fact. 

tion. j^s truth is attested by individual experience. We 

know that we have the life of the body, of sensation 
and of thought. This life is manifested in certain 
forms of activity. A body deprived of life is 
dead.^ Accepting the fact of life, we conclude 
that it must have a cause. There is no ne- 
cessity to make assumptions with " the right 
reserved, as the result of the process of investigation, 
to criticise, to adopt or to reject, to modify and to 
restrict or expand — this very same assumption with 
which the investigation began." ^ Such a standpoint 
is illogical, produces confusion and a dissatisfaction 
for the subject treated.^ 

2 Cf. Aug. Serm. 65, n. 6. 

^Ladd Phil, of Mind, p. 55. 

5 Utrum aeris sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, intelligendi, 
volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, judicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, 
an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quattuor ele- 
menta quinti nescio cujus corporis, an ipsius carnis nostri 
compago vel temperamentum haec eifficere valeat, dubitave- 
runt honimes; et alius hoc alius alind affirmare conatus est. 
Vivere tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et cogi- 
tare, et scire, et judicare quis dubitet." Aug. de Trin. Ix, 
n. 14. 



SUBSTANTIALITY OF SOUL. 

§ I. All things exist either as substance or as modi- 
fications of substance; they have either a substantial 
reality or they are activities, qualities, dispositions of 
that reality. Aristotle enumerates nine classes of acci- 
dents, or, as they may be called, substantial modifica- 
tions; these, with the one class of substance, make up 
the ten categories of real beings.^ The discussion of 
the soul's reality, therefore, is primarily resolved into 
the question: Is the soul a substance or only a modi- 
fication of a substance, i. e., of the body.^ 

I. 

Modern and Scholastic Teaching. 

§ 2. At this initial point of our investigation modern ^?derii^^ 
Philosophy separates from Scholasticism. Erroneous ^^un|°J^^ 
opinions on the notion of substance lead to fatal J^J-qI ^f 
errors in its applications. It is impossible to have a substance, 
true conception of the Soul's substantiality, if the 
wrong notion of substance itself is held. Unable, 
then, to know what the soul really is, how can I speak 
with correctness of its properties or of its relation to 
the body? My thought and language are vitiated 
throughout. Such is the condition of those who have 
followed Modern Philosophy. 

§ 3. Modern writers, who have eiTed on the sub- Sof^^' 
stantiality of the soul, may be classed into (i) those ^Sters 

^ Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics i, 5. 

2 Cf. Prof. Bowne, " Metaphy, a Study of First Principles," 
p. 352; Aug. de Trin, x. n. I5.. 

4 



2^ CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

logica?^^ who hold the soul is not a reality but only a logi- 
subject cal subject of our mental acts, e. g., Kant, 
(2) Soul is Wundt. (2) Those who contend that the soul 
bundfeof ^^ ^^^^ ^ bundle of qualities, e. g., the school 
sensations q{ Associationists, e. g., Hume.^. (3) Those who 
unknown^ affirm that the soul is unknown and unknow- 
knowabie ^^^^' ^^^ Y^t postulate it as the subject of our con- 
scious states, e. g., Locke,^ Thomson,^ Spencer,^ S. 
Laing,'' and James.^ " The term soul may be re- 
garded as another synonym for the unknown basis of 
mental phenomena."^ Prof. Bowne says that we 
m)souf^ ^^ know nothing of the nature of substance.-^" (4) Those 
who deny its existence altogether, i. e.. Materialists, 
ex gr. Tyndall, Huxley. 
teidlfng!° §4- Scholastic Philosophy, with Aristotle and the 
Christian Fathers, vindicates the true dignity of man 
by proclaiming the soul to be a substantial principle. 

3 Human Nature, p. i, § 6; Mill. Davis: "It will 
be better, however, to exclude all consideration of 
substance and use the word mind to stand merely 
for a complement of activities." Elem. of Psych., 'pp. 
52, 132. Thus Hoffding: By mind we mean nothing more 
than the sum of all those inner experiences, viz., sensations 
and ideas, feelings and decisions, cf. Outlines of Psychology, 
pp. 12, 29; cf. Sully, Human Mind i, p. 134. Hence, the mod- 
ern school of Phenomenal Psychology or " Psychology with- 
out a soul," e. g.. Sully, Hoffding, Murray, James, cf. Jowett's 
Plato, vol. IV, p. 175. 

* " Our specific ideas of substances are nothing else but 
a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered 
as united in one thing." Ess. on the Human Understanding, 
B II, ch. 23, § 14; cf. also B I, § 18; B II, ch. 13, § 19, c. 23, 
§ i; ch. 23, §§ 2, 4. 

5 System of Psychology, vol. i, p. 114. 

6 Princ. of Psych., p. 2, ch. i. 

^ A Modern Zoroastrian, p. 126. 

8 Vol. I, pp. 355, 338. 

9 Hamilton Metaph. Bowen, ch. VI, p. 88; cf. Hamilton in 
Reid nA, § 2; Metaph., p. 97. 

10 Cf. Metaph., p. 7. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2*^ 

St. Thomas refutes Alexander, who said the soul was a 
determinate mode of mixture of the human body. 
Empedocles, who held that the soul was a certain har- 
mony.-^^ Those who maintained that the soul was a 
bodily substance; Galen, who contends that the soul 
was a temperament of the body,^^ and defends the 
teaching of Aristotle.^^ 

II. 
Proof. 

§ 5. The proof is drawn from an analysis of the con- Proof, 
cept of substances. Substance is defined as '' id quod ^f^^];^^ 
per se stat," i. e., a being which exists, per se, in the stance. 
sense that it does not need another being as a subject 
in which it may inhere, e. g., tree is a substance, 
whereas color is not, because it can only exist by inher- 
ing in some other thing. 

§ 6. A more searching examination of this definition Analysis 
reveals the simple elements which go to make it up. definition. 
In the concept of substance we distinguish : (a) Being, (a) being, 
for it is a real existing entity of which the mind has 
the intuition, (b) Potency, for every being possesses (b) po- 
activities which flow from its essence, the knowledge of 
which enables us to form some conception of its nature. 
It was this potency, inherent in substance, which Leib- 
nitz emphasized in defining substance as " being 
possessing active power." The definition is correct as 
far as it goes, but is insufficient and incomplete, (c) (c) stabu- 
Stability: The fundamental element in the notion of ^ ^* 
substance. As we look out into the world about us, 

11 Cf. Aristotle's Psychology, by E. Wallace, BI, ch. iv. 

^2 Complexio, cf. Aug. de Trin. x, n. 9, 10, 11. 

^ Cf. S. Thomas Contra Gentes III, ch. 61, 62, 63, 64, 65. 



28 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

two great facts are presented to our intelligence: The 
changes and the permanence of things. Everywhere 
changes take place; there is a constant flux and reflux; 
what is now was so in the past. Heraclitus based his 
philosophy on this fact; his fundamental principle was 
Travra ps'tv. Every individual object takes on new 
appearances under the influence of weather or of 
other natural causes. Nevertheless, amid these con- 
stant changes there is observed at the same time a cer- 
tain stability. The tree, e. g., buds in early spring, is 
soon covered with foliage, it flowers, the fruit appears, 
grows to ripeness, the leaves assume the many rich 
hues of autumn, slowly drop, the branches are bare and 
bleak; yet the tree abides and will, year after year, go 
through the same round without ceasing to be what it 
is. So you, e. g., have changed very much in the 
course of years, from childhood to youth, to manhood, 
to old age; you have changed in your disposition, in 
your hopes and ambitions, in your joys and sorrows, 
but you remain the same. It is you who have under- 
gone all and suffered all. The hopes and fears, joys 
and sorrows come and go with varying intensity and 
duration like clouds that pass over the face of the 
heavens, some quickly flitting by, others moving low 
and heavy. What is abiding and stable is your own 
self. By stability, however, Ave do not understand the 
indestructibility of an object.^* God's power is infinite. 
Destruction is commensurate with creation. What 
He has made, the same He can destroy. Moreover, 

i^Thus Kant, "That I, as a thinking being, continue for 
myself and naturally neither arise nor perish is no legitimate 
deduction from the concept of substance." Kant Trans. 
Dialec, p. 285; Lotze also holds that the " conception of * sub- 
stance,' l)er se, contains the predicate of indestructibility." 
cf. Lotze Outlines of Psychology, ed. by Prof. Ladd, p. 112. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 29 

natural forces, either of themselves or under man's 
directing power, can cause the dissolution of many 
things. Hence the word has a relative not an absolute ^f^ac'jy®^* 
meaning, (d) This element of stability discloses ^®''*^- 
naturally the final element in the composition of sub- 
stance, viz., substance is viewed as subjectum acciden- 
tium, the subject of accidents. An accident is a change 
or modification affecting some object, e. g., the quali- 
ties as color, etc., the forms and appearances of a thing 
are called accidents. The thing itself, which abides 
constant and identical amid the variations of modifica- 
tions affecting it, is considered as the subject in which 
they inhere. Thus, e. g., I am variously affected in 
the course of the day by feelings of sadness, of indig- 
nation, of resentment, of confidence, of joy. They 
come and go and are said to modify me. I am, there- 
fore, the subject which suffers them; they exist in me 
and affect me.^^ 

III. 

Application to the Soul. 

§ 7. The analysis of the notion of substance into the Ss bSJd^" 
elements of being, potency, stability, subject of accidents y <^^^^<^*s- 
is not fanciful deduction from abstract thought; nor 
is it an unwarranted assumption; nor a substance 
unknown and unknowable with Locke and Spencer. 
Our conception of substance springs from individual 
experience, and its analysis is based on and verified by 

i^In being, per se, Ladd seems to conceive either " beings 
abstracted from all concrete attributes or modes of activity 
in relation to other beings, or being that exists totally Isolated 
in itself and by Itself (Phil, of Mind, p. 117), and " once and 
for all let it be tossed over into the death-kingdom of mean- 
ingless abstractions. And why should any one feel that real 
souls have suffered thereby the slightest loss." P. 123. 



30 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the same experience. We deal with facts in the world 
of facts.^^ 
such^a^^ ^^ § ^- Consciousness reveals our inner experience. It 
being. makes us aware of our thoughts and sensations, of our 
volitions and feelings. It tells me that I think, that I 
will, that I feel. In the one and same act, by which the 
thought or feeling is grasped, is apprehended the subject 
which thinks or feels. This subject is the /, the Ego or 
the Me, The Ego is not known independently of its 
modifications; nor are the modifications known inde- 
pendently of the Ego; but both are known in the one 
indivisible act. Just as in external nature substance is 
■ never perceived without qualities, nor qualities without 
substance; but in the one concrete act both are appre- 
hended.^'' Thus, the Ego, with its modifications, 
become the subject-matter of consciousness. In this 
It has the very fact the notion of substance is implied. In the 

elements of -^ ^ 

(a) being. Ego are revealed (a) the element of being. I am a real 

existing being.^^ The knowledge of the / is 

(b) po- an intuition of consciousness, (b) Potency. The 

activity of the Ego is a fact of consciousness. 
I act in many ways, and my activity is mani- 
fested variously. I am conscious of a source of 
energy within me which is never exhausted. Desire, 
ambition, divers motives, incite me to action. I reach 

i^Mr. James holds that the only positive determination of 
substance is Being. Psych., vol. I, p. 344. This is not correct, 
as the analysis shows. Balmes enumerates five elements of 
substance: Being, unity, potency, permanence, subject of acci- 
dents, cf. Fundamental Philosophy, vol. II. Dr. McCosh 
gives three: Being, unity, potency, cf. McCoch Intuitions of 
the Mind. But his analysis is not complete; the characteristic 
note of substance, i. e., its abiding power amid various modi- 
fications, is not mentioned. 

i^By this there is no desire to deny that accidents can exist 
without substance, e. g., as in the Eucharist the accidents of 
bread remain while the substance is changed. 

i^Cf. Spencer First Principles, p. 64. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 3I 

out in thought and in hope to objects beyond. The 
power within me is unfaihng and unHmited. It throbs 
within my brain.^^ It pulsates in every nerve and 
artery of my body; it pictures upon my imagination 
the most varied and striking objects; in my intellect it 
is busied with judgments, reasonings and inferences; 
it makes my will strong and unbending; it is mani- 
fested in love or hatred, in anger, pity or revenge. 
Hence, Mr. James' resolution of all I am and know 
myself to be, into mere passive content of feeling, is 
false.^° In all my conscious acts I am active and know 
myself to be active; I am conscious not only of 
passive impressions, but of doing something.^^ 
This activity working here and now within me, and 
conscious of its activity, is no figment of the imagina- 
tion, "no transcendental being of inflated meta- 
physics," but something real. It is a real energy 
revealed in the analysis of every conscious act."^ 

§9. Stability: Consciousness reveals a constant .^^^^ ^*^^^^- 
change in the world within us. Thought succeeds 
thought; emotion gives way to emotion. To-day I am 
oppressed with a feeling of sadness and despondency. 
Yesterday I was happy and joyous. To-morrow, per- 
haps care and responsibility will affect me. Neverthe- . 
less, in the midst of all these changes / remain the 
same. This Stability of the Ego enables me to look 

i^This meets the contention of Dubois Reymond that men- 
tal phenomena stand outside the law of causality, and show a 
breach in the principle of sufficient reason, cf. " On Limits 
to the Knowledge of Nature," Dubois Reymond, 1872. 

20Psychology, vol. I, ch. IX, X. 

2iCf. Spencer First Principles, § 26. 

22The failure to detect the elements of potency as having its 
source in substance has led Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 
Wundt, to consider the soul as activity only. cf. Davis Ele- 
ments of Psych., p. I32n. Hence the just criticism made of 
their writings as " Psychology without a soul." 



dents. 



32 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

back on the years gone by and collect all the chang- 
ing experiences of a life. Childhood, youth, manhood, 
are so many states through which I have passed. They 
appear different because of the difference in my 
thoughts and affections, in the circumstances and the 
duties in which I was employed. Yet they run into 
one another; there is no break in the continuity; and 
this is due to the self-same abiding Ego.^ 

of acc^^^°* § 10. This last element naturally follows from sta- 
bility. The fact that / abide amid the constant change 
of emotion, reveals the fact that these are only modifi- 
cations of the Ego. I am affected by them. They are 
referred to and centered in me as in a subject. They are 
manifold, but I am one; they are diverse, but I am the 
same; they come and go in constant succession, while 
I abide. Consciousness reveals the ego as the subject 
which receives, remembers, compares and combines or 
separates the ideas, voHtions and feeHngs which make 
up my life.^* 

Conciu- § II. The elements, therefore, which go to make up 

the notion of the substance are found realized within 
us. In each and every one there is a substantial prin- 
ciple which is the source and basis of his life. This 
substance is the soul. Hence we can say that the sub- 
stantiality of the soul is an intuition of consciousness. 
In face of this what can we say of James, who holds 
that the substantialist view of the soul has no standing 
in experience and is quite needless for expressing the 
actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they 

23Bp. Temple, from the knowledge of the stability of the 
Ego, draws an argument against the Relativity of Knowledge, 
viz., that we cannot know things in themselves, cf. Bamp. 
Lect. 1884, Lee. 11. 

^^Leibnitz Nouv. Ess. Hi, c. 27. 



sion. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 33 

appear.^^ " Or again Transcendentalism (i. e., of 
Kant) is only substantialism grown shamefaced and 
the Ego onl}^ a cheap and nasty edition of the soul."^^ 

IV. 
The Concept of Substance More Clearly 

Defined. 

§ 12. Here it is necessary to be on our guard Jf^^naivz- 
against confusion of ideas. Clearness and precision jjfjf^^|' 
in the elem.entary conceptions are ollen neglected, ^2>n?^" 
with the result that carefully reasoned conclusions and 
elaborate systems of knowledge are faulty throughout. 
So, too, in this question. At the basis of all our 
knowledge are found intuitions, i. e., self-evident 
truths.^^ The fundamental notions are intuitions. The 
primary principles are intuitions. Thus for example 
the concepts of being, of substance are intuitions. This 
is true of internal as well as external experience. A 
serious difificulty, however, is to give precise definitions 
to these elementary notions. They are so simple that 
we are inclined to accept them readily without pausing 
to examine in what way one differs from another. 

§ 13. Thus in the concept of substance I find the 
elements of being, of potency, of stability and of the between ^'^ 

substance , , 

25 Psych., vol. I, p. 344. Snce!' 

26 Prin. of Psych., vol. I, p. 365. " Nullo modo 
recte dicitur sciri aliqua res, dum ejus ignoratiir 
substantia. Quapropter, cum se mens novit, substan- 
tiam suam novit; et cum de se certa est, de substantia 
sua certa est." Aug. de Trin. x, n. 16. "Nihil enim tarn 
novit mens, quam id quod sibi praesto est: nee menti magis 
quidquam praesto est quam ipsa sibi." ib. xiv, n. 7. " Cog- 
noscat (mens) ergo semetipsam, nee quasi absentem se 
quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis qua per alia vagabatur, 
statuat in semetipsam, et se cogitet. Ita videbit quod num- 
quam se non amaverit, numquam nescierit." de Trin. x, 11, 

27 Cf. G. W. Ward Philos. of Theism. 



34 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

subject of accidents. All these are integral elements 
of the concept; the characteristic and distinctive ele- 
ments are stability and the subject of accidents. Now, 
any being, of which these are verified, is a substance, 
e. g., an angel, man, brute, tree, stone are substances. 
They are beings, possessing activities and abide in spite 
of successive changes. But when we try to find out 
what kind of substances these are, or in what way one 
differs from another, we have passed beyond the con- 
cept of substance and are occupied with that of essence. 
For the essence of a thing is that which makes it what 
it is. Thus it is evident that a distinction exists 
between the substance and the essence of an object. 
That a thing is a substance we know by intuition ; what 
however, is its constitution only comes to us after rea- 
soning on its properties, and very often, especially in 
physical substances, remains unknown, e. g., that a 
tree is a substance is evident; but what makes it a tree 
is an inquiry into its essence. In like manner the 
substantiality of the soul is an intuition. The confu- 
sion of the concepts " substance " and " essence " per- 
meates English Psychology from the time of Locke. 
Instead of a definition " of substance " in reality a defi- 
nition of ''essence" has been proposed; they have 
passed by the fact in the effort to explain the nature 
of the fact. Thus we have the '' unknown substance " 
of Locke, " the unknown something behind and under 
phenomena " of Hamilton, the " unknownable " of 
Spencer.^ 

28 The conclusion drawn was that the substantiality of the 
soul is an intuition of consciousness. By this I mean a self- 
evident truth. To explain: (i) We must distinguish between 
direct and reflex knowledge; direct knowledge is had from the 
immediate presence of the object; reflex is the act of the mind 
revolving the direct knowledge for the purpose of analysis 
or of clearer perception. (2) The elements of the notion 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 35 

14. But it is false to suppose that an intuition of the Sj^resuit 

of r> 
ing. 



substantiality of the soul should enable me to see into °^ ^^eason 



its intimate constitution; that I should detect at a 
glance and unfold its secret springs of action; that 
there should be no hesitation or doubt or discussion 
about it. This is a confusion of concepts and a logical 
fallacy. The concept of a particular essence or nature, 
which is essence viewed as a source of activity, is only 
obtained after reasoning from certain data.^^ 

§ 15. These data are, e. g., that it is a substance, that 
it acts in such a manner, that it has certain qualities 
or characteristics. Then by a process of reasoning 
we infer what must be the nature of the substance, after 
an analogy to our inference of a man's character from 
his words and actions. This is true of external and 
of internal experience. Thus an inquiry whether or 
not the soul is a substance, is not an investigation of its 
nature. The former is only preparatory to the latter. 
Of the one we have an intuition; the other is the pro- 
duct of discursive thought.^" It is evident that Mr. 

of substance are helng^ potency, stabilitij, subject of modi- 
fications; now the two former, i. e., being and potency are 
grasped by the act of consciousness alone; the other two, i. e., 
stability and subject of modifications are known by the pres- 
ent act of consciousness joined to the act of memory. In 
stating that the notion of the soul's substance is self-evident, 
I refer only to the direct and ordinary knowledge or convic- 
tion which every thinking being has, in holding that he is 
some being. The reflex knowledge or the analysis of this 
conviction is the work of the psychologist. Thus Fr. Har- 
per says that the conviction of the soul's substantiality is a 
" spontaneous judgment." cf. Metaphysics of the Schools, 
Vol. II, p. 405-407. 

29 The term '* intuition " is used in its scholastic sense as a 
" self-evident truth." It has no reference, therefore, to the 
" sense-perception " of Kant or the " innate idea " of Des 
Cartes; in both senses modern writers employ the word. 

2° St. Thomas expresses this distinction of concepts with his 
usual clearness: "Ad primam cognitionem de mente haben- 



certain. 



36 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

James does not refer to Scholastic Philosophy v/hen 
he writes : " The commonest spirtuaHstic opinion is 
that the soul or subject of the mental Hfe is a metaphy- 
sical entity, inaccessible to direct knowledge, and that 
the various mental states and operations of which we 
reflectively become aware are objects of an inner sense 
which does not lay hold of the real agent in itself, any 
more than sight or hearing gives us direct knowledge 
of matter in itself. From this point of view introspec- 
tion is of course incompetent to lay hold of anything 
more than the soul's phenomena. But even then the 
question remains. How well can it know the phenom- 
ena themselves ?^^ 
ciu^sion"' § 16. We may hold then, as certain that the soul is a 
substance.^^ The testimony of consciousness concern- 
ing the fact cannot be gainsaid. I hold it so, I am con- 
vinced because it is self-evident. We cannot, there- 
fore, admit the contentions: (a) Of Locke, who holds 
that the soul is a substance but that we know this with 
full certitude from Christian revelation alone and that 
reason can give us only some probability.^^ (b) Of 
Lewes, that the substantiality of the soul as well as its 
simplicity are assumptions.^ 

dam sujfficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium 
actus, ex quo mens percipit seipsam, et ideo dicitur se cog- 
noscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitio- 
nem de mente habendam non sufficit ejus praesentia; sed 
requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio: unde et multi nat- 
uram animae ignorant, et multi circa naturam animae erra- 
verunt." Sum. Theol, I. q. 87, a. i. 
21 James Psychology, vol. I, p. 187. 

32 We cannot agree with Hamilton, " We know nothing of 
mind and matter considered as substances; they are known 
to us only as a two-fold series of phenomena " in Reid, note 
A2; Met., p. 97; cf. Spencer's Prin. of Psych,, § 268, sq. 

33 Cf. Essay, BIV, ch. 3, n. 6; BII, ch. 27, Frazer's edition. 

34 Cf. Lewes Problems of Mind, ist series, p. 323. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 37 

§ 17. Having the conception of the soul's substan- Errors. 
tiaHty clearly defined and proved as a fact, we can, 
with profit, examine more closely into some false 
views which have exerted a great influence on the 
student of Psychology. These errors are not proposed 
only as the convictions of individual writers. They are 
indicative of certain streams or tendencies of modern 
thought. 

V. 

Erroneous Conceptions op the Soul's 
Substantiality. 
§ 18. During the last few years a strong reaction i^^^^^Jf® 
to Kant has been manifested among conservative non- 
catholic writers. It arose from the failure of Hegel's 
Idealism. A foothold was sought to stem the tide 
which threatened to carry men to materialism. The 
cry arose, " Back to Kant." There it was hoped a firm 
basis could be found. Thus, Max MuUer sees in the 
study of Kant, the best hope of a philosophical rejuve- 
nescence for England and America, even more than 
Germany. We see the leaning to Kant in Prof. 
Green, Prof. Ed. Caird, ^^ Mr. Courtney, of New Col- 
lege, Dr. Wallace, of Merton College, Dr. Watson, of 
Queens University, Canada, Max Muller's new trans- 
lation. Dr. H. Sterling Text-Book of Kant. 

The Transcendental Theory of the Soul. 
§ 19. Kant calls the substantiality of the soul the Pj^^^^^g^. 
first paralogism of Transcendental Psychology .^^ JfToif ^^^ 
He defines substance as " that the represen- 
ts The Critical Philosophy of Kant, 2 vol., 1889. 
36 Crit. of Pure Reason, Muller's Trans. Dialect BII c. i., 
p. 284. 



38 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tation of which is the absolute subject of our judg- 
ments, and cannot be used, therefore, as the determi- 
nation of any other thing." From this he concludes 
that the " I, as a thinking being (soul) am substance." 
His criti- § 20. Havingf stated the arg-ument in his own words, 

cism of the , ^ _ ... 

sourssub- he then subjects it to a severe criticism. He holds 

stantiality. •' 

" that pure categories, and among them that of sub- 
stance, have in themselves no objective meaning 
unless they rest on some intuition." ^'^ He 
expressly says that " sensibility alone supplies us with 
intuition; these intuitions become thought through the 
understanding, and hence arise conceptions," ^^ that 
" our intuition must at all times be sensuous;" ^^ that 
" we are so constituted that our intuition must always 
be sensuous, and consist of the mode in which we are 
afifected by objects;" ^^ that " the understanding is not 
a faculty of intuition ;" ^^ that ''the internal sense, 
by means of which the mind perceives itself or its 
internal state, does not give an intuition (Anschaung) 
of the soul (Seele) itself as an object." ^ 
o?thTcoS- §^^' What, then, he asks, is the value of the con- 
Bubstance ^^P^ ^^ substance? And the answer given is that it is 
to Kant^^ practically of no advlantage, and we could do very well 
without it. He maintains that the properties of per- 
manence, etc., cannot be drawn from the pure cate- 
gory of substance; nor in this case is there any expe- 
rience to lay hold of; " For though the I exists in all 
thoughts, not the slightest intuition is connected with 

37 P. 284. 

38 Trans. Aesth., p. i. 

39 PI, s. II, p. 28. 

40 P2, Intro., p. 41. 
^1 P. 56. 

42 P. I, S. I, p. 18. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 39 

that representation by which it might be distinguished 
from other objects of intuition. We may very well 
perceive, therefore, that this representation appears 
again and again in every act of thought, but not that 
it is a constant and permanent intuition in which 
thoughts, as being changeable, come and go." *^ 

§ 22. From this he concludes that " reason imposes Jt is the 

^ . logical, not 

Upon US an apparent knowledge only by representing the real 
the constant losrical subject of thoug-ht as the knowl- which 

^ . -^ ^ the mind 

edge of the real subject in which that knowledge grasps, 
inheres. Of that (i. e., the real) subject, however, we 
have not and cannot have the slightest knowledge. 
Besides this logical meaning of the I, we have no 
knowledge of the subject in itself; the proposition that 
the soul is a substance signifies a substance in idea 
only, and not in reality." *^ 

§ 23. (a) The difficulties which Kant attempts to Criticism 

of Kant s 

solve are not inherent in the question itself, but spring views (a) 

Kant s 

from his own peculiar principles. They are the logical difficulties 

, fliFG tn.6 

results of his theory of knowledsfe. Kant's attempt to conse- 

. , quence of 

reconstruct the philosophy of thouHit was a failure, his own 

^ ^ -^ ^ principles. 

We cannot be expected to admit, without protest, prin- 
ciples which led Fichte to absolute Idealism or Nihil- 
ism; developed into the pantheism of Schelling and 
Hegel ; *^ gave reason for the revolt against 
metaphysical reasoning led by Compte, and the sub- 
stitution of the positive philosophy;*® influenced 
Hamilton in the philosophy of the conditioned, and 

43 P. 285. 

4* lb. Hegel holds that the mind is a subject, not a sub- 
stance, cf. Wallace's Hegel Proleg., ch. VH. 

45 Cf. Ed. Caird the Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. II, 
p. 645. 

46 Cf. Chapter on Positivism. 



40 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



His mean- 
ing of 
" Pheno- 
mena " is 
false. 



through him gave birth to the Agnosticism of Mr. 
Huxley.*'' 

§ 24. (b) It is not true to say that we know only ideal 
appearances, i. e., phenomena. The meaning Kant 
gives to the word "phenomena" is false. With Kant 
a phenomenon is a thing, in as much as it is the object 
of thought. But he maintains that the mind in the 
act of knowing clothes the object with ideal forms. 
Hence, the mind grasps the ideal appearance, never 
the real appearance of the object. ' This ideal appear- 
ance is his " phenomenon," as distinguished from the 
" noumenon," i. e., the thing itself in its real concrete 
existence. Now this strange theory is contradicted by 
common sense; we know things manifesting them- 
selves; the phenomena which the sense grasps are 
concrete facts, e. g., my own existence. Again, this 
opinion of Kant is opposed to the data and methods 
of physical science. Science deals with real things. 
The axioms and rules of mathematical science must 
be verified in concrete objects in order that the calcu- 
lations founded upon them may have any validity.*^ 
The same is true of Chemistry,*^ and of Physics.^^ 



^''XIX Cent, Feb., '95. "There is absolutely," says 
Fichte, " nothing permanent, but only an unceasing 
change. I know absolutely nothing of any exist- 
ence, not even of my own. Images constitute all 
that apparently exists; images that pass and vanish without 
there being aught to witness their transition. I myself am 
one of these images; nay, rather a confused image of images. 
All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a 
life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream 
made up only of a dream. Perception is a dream, thought — 
the source of all the existence, and all the reality which I 
imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my des- 
tination — is the dream of that dream." 

48 Cf. Jevons Prin. of Science, p. 8. 

49 Cf. New Chemistry by Prof. Cooke. 

50 Cf. Tyndall " Light and Electricity," p. 60. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 4I 

Finally, Ontology is a science of real being. The first 
principles of reason,, e. g., the principles of contra- 
diction and of identity, etc., are not purely ideal. They 
have an objective value beyond the range of sense- 
experience. They can be expressed as logical or as 
ontological verities. If I say that " It is impossible to 
affirm or deny at the same time the same thing of the 
same subject, if the circumstances be the same," I 
formulate a rule which is our guide in the world of 
affirmation and negation, and has thus a logical force. 
But if I affirm that " the same thing cannot be and not 
be at the same time," I state an ontological truth which 
holds sway in the world of reality, and is verified of all 
existences, whether or not they be the objects of sense 
perception.^^ 

§ 25. (c) It is not true to say that intuition is purely [fon^g^ot 
a sensitive act. There is a higher order of truth than ^JJgltive 
that of sense; thoughts are not the transformation of 
sensitive impressions. We have pure intellectual ideas 
and principles, i. e., pure in the sense that they are not 
the product of sensation. In the Critic, Kant himself 
discusses pure intellectual concepts which exist as sub- 
jective facts. Now sensitive intuition cannot furnish 
these. Finally, if sensitive intuition were a condition x 

of reality, could I not contend that the pure idea of 
relation, the principles on which the phenomena of 
light, electricity, affinity, etc., depend, are nothing but 
empty words? I cannot represent these in sensitive 
intuition; yet, I cannot deny their real existence. 

§ 26. (d) It is false to say th^t the concept of sub- (d) sub- 
stance has no objective value, and that it is los:ical is not a. 

purely 
logical , 

siBalmes BIV, ch. 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22; Ward Phil, of ^^u'ty^^^^ 
Theism ; Prof. Bowne, "Metaphysics, a Study of First * • 

Principles," p. 371, sq. 

6 



42 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

only, not real. The logical subject or substance is 
something conceived of in the mind as a subject hav- 
ing attributes, whether or not it exist in reality, e. g., 
we form an abstraction or personification, and describe 
them as real beings, with qualities and attributes, thus 
"The quality of mercy, the redness of the rose," etc. 
The grammatical term " abstract noun " expresses the 
logical subject. But grammar teaches that there are 
concrete nouns, and that between the abstract and the 
concrete noun there is a vast difference. The latter 
expresses a reality existing as such. The former is 
only a generalization of an adjective. Now the adjec- 
tive expresses a real quality, and the abstract noun 
formed therefrom can only be understood and 
explained by this reality. This generalization from the 
concrete to the abstract is a process of thought. It 
goes on constantly within the mind, and is exemplified 
in ordinary conversation as well as in written dis- 
course. But it is false to hold that this process is, 
necessary for the formation of every concept which the 
mind employs as subject of a statement. The exist 
ence of concrete nouns shows that every subject is not 
a logical subject. And a careful analysis of the logical 
subject, and its mode of formation shows that the real 
distinction of real substance and of modfications, is 
presupposed. 
nSun^°^^ § 2y. (e) It is false to say that we infer from the pure 
from^the Category of substance that the soul is a substance, 
purecate- Such an inference would not take us out of the ideal 

gory. 

order. On the contrary the general idea of substance 
is warranted by a fact of experience. A close analysis 
of the data of consciousness reveals the elements which 
go to make up the concept. 
Revealed g 28. Consciousness shows the distinction between 



m con- 



sciousness, substance and accident by testifying to the distinction 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 43 

of the I and the thoughts or feehngs affecting the 
I as a primary fact of ni}^ inner Hfe. All my 
thoughts and feelings are referred to me; in me they 
are collected and united; and me they variously affect 
and modify. If the I were not a reality, how could 
it be an object of consciousness, or how explain the 
distinction between me and my thoughts, and the 
relation of the one to the other? In every thought 
and feeling the I is present as a real fact of inner 
experience. In thus asserting the real existence of the 
I, emphasis is laid upon an elementary truth. Any 
artificial system of thought which attempts to reason 
away its real worth, must inevitably fail. 

§ 2Q. Wimdt sets out with the contention that the Kant's 

■^ vie\\ re- 

" soul is not merely a subject in the lo^fical sense, but a P^'oduced 

-^ •' . ^' . m Wundt. 

substance, a real being as whose manifestations or trans- 
actions the so-called activities of the soul are appre- 
hended." Nevertheless the influence of Kant is appar- 
ent when in the development of the task he regards the 
soul as the logical subject of inner experience, e. g., the 
soul is an act of apperception which accompanies all our 
acts, or it is the sum-total of psychic acts. To the 
idealism of Kant he joins the Monism of the modern 
German school.^^ 

2°. The Phenomenal Theory of the Soul. 
§ 30. Phenomenalism is the doctrine of those who Phenom- 
hold that we know appearances only, not the nature of realism. 
things.^^ Its parent is Locke. He defined substance 

52 Cf. Ladd Phil, of Mind, p. 50. With Lotze and Wundt 
the term apperception means to discern the relation between 
objects and is had when by an act of attention mental data 
are unified into a related whole, cf. Baldwin Psych., p. 56. 

52 Phenomenalism treated here maintains that we know the 
real objective qualities; in this sense it must be distinguished 
from the ideal phenomenalism of Kant. 



44 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

as the unknown support of a heap of qualities.^* Ber- 
keley pushed this definition to extreme Idealism, con- 
tending that this unknown does not exist, and that the 
only realities are the ideas of the soul. Hume went 
even farther by denying the substance of mind and 
holding it to be only a group or series of states. 
assoSa-^^ §31. Hume's position has been adopted by the 
tion. English school of Associationism. They bid us look 

into our conscious mental life, where we find the ever-- 
present thought or sensation or emotion, which gives 
way to another, and so on while life lasts. The present 
thought or feeling thus appear as waves in the " stream 
of consciousness." '' The wave of consciousness con- 
stitutes the mind," is, according to ^Ir. Morgan, the 
answer of Empirical Psychology.^^ "The term 'mind' is 
applied not merely to the physical wave at any moment 
of consciousness, but to the wave of consciousness in 
its totality.^^ Thus, Mr. Bain glories in having 
destroyed forever the material principle.^^ To Mr. 
Spencer, mind is a synthesis or aggregate of many 
feeHngs, actual and nascent, and of many changes 
among them.^^ He only differs from Mr. Mill in using 

54 Mr. Thomson, " Elem. of Psych./' Vol. i, p. 114; Mr. 
James, " Prin. of Psych.," Vol. I, p. 355, express themselves 
in the same words. 

55 Cf. Introd. to Compar. Psychol., pp. 26. 31. 

56 Modern Psychologists, however, differ in explaining the 
nature of this '' stream." Thus, Hoffding holds that the 
states form a stream " in memory which connects them." cf. 
Outlines of Psychology, p. 49. Sully finds its basis in " a 
healthy and well nourished condition of the brain." cf. 
Human Mind, vol. I, s. 13, 15; so, also, Ribot cf. Diseases of 
Personality. Mr. James says that " the bond is the 
* warmth ' and ' resemblance ' to the central spiritual self now 
actually felt; " as a result they are " recognized and appro- 
priated by the "judging Thought," i. e., the present self. cf. 
James Psychology, vol. I, pp. 356, 341. 

5^ Cf. Senses and Intellect. 

58 Princ. of Psych., vol. I, p. 500. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 45 

the word '' Unknownable " in place of '' possibilities of 
sensation/' ^^ 

Mill 

§ 32. No work of the past generation has exerted so ^^^i- 
powerful an influence for evil upon the English mind 
as Mr. Mill's " S3^stem of Logic." His penetration in 
detecting the weak points in Mr. Hamilton's phil- 
osophy — the prevailing philosophy of the day, and 
the vigor of his criticism, gave to him and to his prin- 
ciples a higher position and greater value than wxre 
just.^° He is styled the logician, i\Ir. Spencer the 
metaphysician, and Mr. Bain the psychologist of the 
Associationalist School. An examination of his teach- 
ing, therefore, means a criticism of the most power- 
ful and influential school of English Philosophy. 

§ 33. Mr. Mill's theory of matter and mind ™'s ^^ 
provoked strong and widespread discussion in ^^^'^d. 
England.^^ He resolves the belief that " the 
mind exists " into the belief of a permanent possibility 
of our states of consciousness. In this he is a faith- 
ful disciple of Hume. To Mill the knowledge of mind 
is relative; we only know it as the notion of something 
permanent in opposition to our passing states and acts. 
But he adds, this permanent may be only a possibility. 
Therefore, the notion we have of mind is the notion 
of the series of actual sensations, and of the infinite 
possibilities of sensation. He calls mind " a thread of 
consciousness, supplemented by beHeved possibilities 

59 Cf. Balfour Found, of Belief, p. 124; also, S. Laing, "A 
Modern Zoroastrian," p. 126. Closely akin to this, in sound 
at least, for it is difficult to attach any sense to the words, is 
Mr. Arnold's " tendency making for righteousness." 

.60 Cf. Examination of Hamilton by J. S. Mill. 

61 Exam, of Hamil., ch. XXI. 



46 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of consciousness," or " a series of feelings with a back- 
ground of possibilities of feeling." But he continues, 
" if we speak of mind as a series of feelings, we are 
obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series 
of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; 
and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that 
the mind or ego is something different from any series 
of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the 
paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a 
series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." 
He confesses that this cannot be explained. " I think," 
he says, " by far the wisest thing we can do, is to accept 
the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it 
takes place, and when we are obliged to speak of it in 
terms which assume a theory, to use them with reser- 
vation as to their meaning." ^^ 
?a}M?Sf- §34- (^) ^^- ^^^^ clearly sees the difificulty, 
fhecmi-^ but, like Kant, he fails to recognize that it 
of^isTwh springs from his theor}^, and that he alone is respon- 
theory. siblc. His false conception of substance as a collec- 
tion of qualities; his failure, with Hume, to grasp a 
real entity in which these qualities inhere, and which 
they modify; his attempt to explain all mental phe- 
nomena by the laws of association ; his mistake in view- 
ing the mind as the sum-total of actual and possible 
states, instead of a real activity producing these states, 
and in which they adhere; his blindness in taking the 
shadow for the substance, or rather the clothes for the 
reality, have led him to explanations which break 
down when rigidly analyzed in the face of facts. His 
whole theory falls to pieces in the attempt to explain 
the simple act of memor}^^ 

^2 Exam., pp. 212, 213, 

63 W. Ward Phil, of Theism. \ 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 47 

§ 35- 0^) To explain the fact of consciousness he is S^^-q 
reduced to the strange statement that '' a series of feel- P^ncipii. 
ings can be aware of itself as a series/' an explanation 
approved by Mr. Bain.^* But do they reflect that the 
" awareness " is something different from the " series," 
and that it sounds like a poor apology for the soul? 

§ 36. (c) The fact is not inexplicable. Let us ^Q^^^Jg^. 
appeal to our inner life. Do our thoughts and feelings piicabie. 
and volitions show us a " series of feelings aware of 
itself," or do they reveal a real ego permanent and 
identical in the midst of successive changes, which 
variously modify and affect it? The answer comes 
without hesitation. The substantial reality of the Ego 
is a primary fact of conscious experience, the only 
explanation of our conscious existence. This is true 
not only of the learned philosopher, but of every 
thinking being. It is forced upon us in every waking 
moment of our lives. 

§ 37. (d) Finally, if we know only sensations and Sequences, 
groups of sensations of necessity we fall into the error 
of Phenomenal Ideahsm. This is illustrated in the 
case of Mr. Mill himself.^^ 

3°. Buddhist Theory of the Soul. 

§ 38. Within the past few years Buddhism, as a phil- jf^^B^'uddh- 
osophy and as a religion, has attracted much attention. ^^"^• 
The fascinating character of Gotama, the singular 
charm of his moral system have led many to consider 

64 a. Mind XI, 459. 

65 The reader may peruse with profit Jevons' " J. S. Mill " 
in Contemp. Rev., January, 1878; Prof. Bowne's " Introduc- 
tion to Psychological Theory," p. 13; where a criticism of 
Mr. Mill is found; also, Mr. Courtney's " Metaphysics of Mr. 
Mill." The best criticism, as Mr. Mill acknowledges, is found 
in Philosophy of Theism by Dr. W. Ward. 



48 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

it more perfect than the rehgion of Christ. As such its 
treatment belongs to another department of Christian 
Apologetics. At present we shall question its teaching 
concerning man. 
its teach- § 30. Buddhism teaches that man consists of an 

ing on '-'■^ 

man. assemblage of different properties or qualities. 

(Skandhas.) These are material quahties (Rupa) 
twenty-eight in number, sensations (vedana) which are 
divided into six main classes, abstract ideas (Sanna), 
six in number, corresponding to the six classes of sen- 
sations, Tendencies or Potentialities (sankhara) in fifty- 
two divisions, and mental pozvers. (Vinnana.) 
Neither the qualities nor the groups of them are per- 
manent. The material qualities are like a mass of foam ; 
the sensations like bubbles on the water; the ideas are 
like the uncertain mirage; the tendencies are like the 
plantian stalk without firmness or solidity; the 
thoughts are like a spectre or magical illusion.^ 

on the § 40. The soul is none of these Skandras ; nor is it 

the result of a combination of them all. Buddhism is 
very explicit on this point. " Thus mendicants," says 
Gotama, " the unlearned unconverted man regards the 
soul either as identical w4th, or as possessing, or as con- 
taining, or as residing in the material properties," and 
so on of the other Skandhas. '' By regarding soul 
in one of these ways, he gets the idea ' I am.' But the 
learned disciple of the converted has got rid of ignor- 
ance and acquired wisdom, and, therefore, the ideas of 
* I am ' do not occur to him." ^'' 

there is §41. The soul, therefore, does not exist; it is not 

DO soul. ^ ^ ' ' 

anything real; it is rather a conception formed from 

66 Cf. Hardy Manuel of Buddhism, p. 424. 

67 Cf. Abhidharma Koshya Vyakhya cit by Burnouf. In- 
trod. a I'histoire. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 49 

the combined action of the Skandhas. There is no 
abiding principle in man ; the body changes and is dis- 
solved; the Skandhas change and expire at death. 
Death is the breaking up of the combination; it is not 
the separation of soul from body, but the dissolution 
of body, and of the groups of elements on which life 
depended.®^ 

§ 42. Buddhism is not content to deny the existence stamps, 

- 7 1 • 1 ^ . ,. r ' - • 1 this belief 

of the soul; it brands belief m its existence a heresy, heresy. 
In the first stage of the path of freedom the student 
must abandon Sakkayaditthi "the heresy of individ- 
uality/' one of the three primary delusions. Again, 
Attevada or " the doctrine of the soul/' is classed with 
sensuality, as one of the four Upadanas, which are the 
immediate cause of birth and death, of pain and sor- 
row. The will is blinded by delusion to crave for per- 
sonal existence, and hence the source of the belief in 
an immortal soul. This egotistical desire binds man 
to life and hinders salvation. The voluntary surrender 
of our individuality is the great step; we then are free.^^ 
"This ignorance of the soul," says Prof. Davids,^" 
is the most important fact in the history of Buddhism." 
And it is indeed worthy of surprise that a religion 
preaching this Gospel of nescience and annihi- 
lation should be heralded as the final answer 
to the most important questions concerning man's life 
and destiny. It rests on the low plane of modern 
Agnosticism and Positivism, and is to be treated 
accordingly. 

*68Cf. Buddhist Catech. by Subhadra Bhikshu, p. 7^ sq.; 
Copleston Buddhism, p. 113; and for the popular form of this 
teaching cf. " Questions of Mahinda." 

69 Cf. Colebrooke Essays I, ch. X; Prof. Corvell's ed. 

^"Man. of Buddhism, p. 30. 

7 



no variety 
in its main 
teaching. 



MATERIALISM. 

§ I. The history of Materlahsm presents little 
variety. Whether it appears as a tendency more or 
less pronounced, as in English Philosophy from the 
time of Locke, Hobbes and Priestley, or in the bold 
and crude form of a system as proposed by Lucretius 
in ancient times,^ or by Buchner in our own cen- 
tury,^ its teaching can be summed up and set 
forth in a few main principles. These are: The eter- 
nity and indestructibility of atomis; nothing produces 
nothing; the eternity of motion and the infinite possi- 
bility of its combination; the iron sway of necessary 
laws throughout the universe; the rejection of final 
causes; the principles of spontaneous generation, and 
of natural selection, at least, in germ. Their applica- 
tion to the material and organic world, to human life 
and action, both of the individual and of society, gave 
rise to the mass of teaching embraced under the term 
Materialism.^ 

§ 2. In our day its defenders have brought to eluci- 
date and develop their principles, facts and hypotheses 
drawn from the progress of the physical, chemical and 
physiological sciences, without, however, effecting an 
essential change in the principles themselves. The 
passage from ancient to modern Materialism, there- 
fore, shows no change in the standpoint or funda- 
mental principles; it only reveals a new collection of 
facts and arguments to support the same teaching. 

^ Cf. de Rerum Natura; Aug. de Utilitate Credendi, n. lo. 

2 Cf. Force and Matter. 

3 Cf. Lange Hist, of Materialism. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 5I 

The clothes in which it is dressed are new. In aim, in 
principle, in thought, it is the same as the primitive 
theory; and we find Mr. Tyndall in a public address 
proposing to the scientific v/orld the doctrines of 
Democritus as the final conclusions of modem 
thought.^ 

II. 
Modern Materialism. 
§ 3. Modern Materialism, especially in Germany, ^°?®^^, 
owed its oris^in to the reaction led by Schoppenhauer ism has its 

*=* y jr i source m 

and Feuerbach against the apriori philosophy of Kant, (^^ revolt 
as developed by Fichte, Schellins: and Hesrel. The (^priori 

r J 1 e> o metaphys- 

result was the inversion and transformation of Hegel's i^s. 
Idealism into pure Naturalism. The distrust of Meta- 
physics became widespread; it was held to deal with 
idle speculation and airy nothing. Philosophy was 
considered a failure ; it had attempted to solve the great 
problems of man's life and destiny, with the result that 
theory gave way to theory, until at last the mind found 
itself in hopeless confusion. Des Cartes gave birth to 
the Empiricism of Locke; this to the scepticism 
of Hume; to confute Hume, Kant wrote the Critic of 
Pure Reason; Transcendentalism became with Fichte 
a Subjective Idealism in which " life was a dream and 
he himself the dream of a dream," and with Hegel de- 
veloped into a false, exaggerated system, whose foun- 
dation was the denial of the Principle of Contradiction. 

§ 4. At the same time the physical sciences rose into ^^^Jg^®^' 
prominence ; under an almost exclusive study they piJ^^Jgai 
rapidly developed, and by the steady avowal of seeking sciences, 
facts according to the methods of observation and 

4 Cf. Tyndall Fragments of Science Art, " Belfast Address;" 
Prin. Tulloch Modern Theories in Phil. & Religion, Art. 
" Scientific Materialism." 



52 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(c) in the 
prevailing 
Empiri- 
cism of 
France 
and Eng- 
land. 



Leaders. 



Buchner. 



experiment, they seemed to promise a sure basis to a 
mind bewildered by the groundless and conflicting 
assertions of a false philosophy. 

§ 5. In France many were prepared for the new 
teaching by the revival of the Empiricism of the Eigh- 
teenth century, under the new form of Compters Posi- 
tive Philosophy, and we have the refined and sensuous 
Materialism which pervaded the regime of Louis 
Napoleon.^ In England the Sensism of Locke devel- 
oped into Scepticism by Hume performed a like ser- 
vice, and produced Mill's theory of Association, Spen- 
cer's Evolution and Bain's identification of thought 
and feeHng with bodily motions. In both countries 
the prevailing habit of thought was somewhat alike, 
and exerted mutual influence.^ 

§ 6. Its leaders are Molleschott,'' Carl Vogt,^ Buch- 
ner, whose work^ may be called the Gospel of 
German Materialism. Buchner gives to matter the 
power of producing life : " The soul is the 
product of a peculiar combination of matter;" 
" in the same manner as the steam engine pro- 
duces motion, so does the organic complication of 
force-endowed materials produce, in the animal body, a 
sum of effects so interwoven as to become a unit, and 
is therefore by us called spirit;" " mental activity is the 
function of cerebral substance; it is emitted by the 
brain as sounds are by the mouth, as music by the 



organ 



" 10 



'As there is no bile without liver, so there 



5 Cf. McCosh Christianity and Positivism, ch. VII. 

6 Cf. chapter IV, Positivism and Agnosticism. 
^ Circular Course of Life, 1852. 

8 Lectures on Man, 1854 & sq. 

9 " Force and Matter," i8S4- 

1° Cf. Opinion of Empedocles that the soul is a harmony, 
St. Thomas Contra Gentes II, 64. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 53 

is no thought without brain." The analogy is false, as 
we shall see; that bile should come from the liver it is 
easy to understand; but thought is of such a nature 
that it cannot come from the brain alone. Vogt, in Vogt. 
an uncouth and vulgar style, holds that the interaction 
of mechanical forces explains all things. 

§ 7. Molleschott contends that the constant move- MoUe- 
ment of the material elements explains physical and 
psychic life. '' The identification of mind and body," 
he says, " is not an explanation, it is a fact, neither 
more nor less simple, neither more nor less mysterious 
than any other fact; it is a fact as weight." 
" No one assuredly pretends to explain gravi- 
tation by means of distinctions between it and 
matter. One states it as an immanent property, as a 
fact upon which it is useless to speculate." '' It is as 
impossible to say why the brain thinks, as to say, why 
zinc and copper joined by a humid conductor generate 
an electro-motor force." ^^ Haeckel, the exponent of Haeckei. 
Monism, expresses the same doctrine in the words: 
" The real materialistic philosophy asserts that the vital 
phenomena of motion, like all other phenomena of 
motion, are effects or products of matter." ^^ Hence 
he denies the distinction between animate and inani- 
mate bodies.^^ To him organic and inorganic forces 
are the same in kind; in their real nature they are one 
and indivisible. 

§ 8. This materialism is crude and coarse. It could o^^|[a?^ 
not withstand the vigor and fire of criticism. In its ^^^If^ ^^^ 
native land it has been superseded by a more refined glJmany 
kind, though the purpose and teaching are essentially 

n Life & Light Disc, at Zurich, 1865. 
12 Evol. of Man, vol. II, p. 456. 
^ Hist, of Creation, vol. I, p. 23. 



54 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



the same. Thus Lange admits that there is no longer 
a Hterary outcry of indignation when a new edition of 
" Force and Matter " appears ; that Molleschott is 
almost forgotten by the great public; and that Karl 
Vogt is now seldom mentioned except in reference to 
some special question in anthropology or some isolated 
and immortal utterance of his drastic humor.^^ 



Scientific 
Material- 



Its advo- 
cates. 



III. 

Scientific Materialism. 

§ 9. Hence the attempt to formulate a scientific 
Materialism. This is a characteristic product of our 
own times. It affects a scientific tone; it appeals to 
positive experience in verification of its assertions; it 
manifests an exclusive leaning to the physical sciences, 
especially physics and chemistry; its explanations of 
certain phenomena, e. g., the phenomena of hfe are 
arbitrary but somewhat plausible; when pushed to a 
crucial point, it seeks refuge in vague generalities or 
in a wise confession of man's limitations and ignor- 
ance; it enters the arena with a definite bias carefully 
concealed under ample protestations of fairness, but 
shows its true colors in the course of the argument by 
skillfully arranging facts, conjectures, hypotheses and 
figures of Rhetoric so that the passage to a wide and 
unwarranted conclusion is almost imperceptible. 

§ 10. The most prominent advocates of this form of 
Materialism are Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Huxley. They 
do not believe that matter, as is commonly meant by 
the term, can account for the phenomena of physical 
or psychic life. Their views of matter are higher ^nd 
purer. To them matter is different from what is gen- 



14 Cf. Lange History of Materialism, vol. Ill, p. 27. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 55 

erally believed, and its capabilities are very great. As Lotze. 
Lotze expresses it: " Matter is actually something 
much better than the name tells and that what it 
appears to be from the outside." ^^ Hence they infer 
that if we knew the nature and potencies of matter, we 
could explain the formation of ideas, and the opera- 
tions of psychic life. Mr. Tyndall admits ''A tendency Tyndaii. 
on the part of matter to organize itself and sees incipi- 
ent life, as it were, manifesting itself throughout the 
whole of what we call inorganic nature." ^^ 

§11. No one denies potencies to matter, ^^t gj^^jj^' 
material potencies alone do not tend to organization, u^e^^jj^n- 
There is a great difference between crystallization, jjf LiJy??*^ 
which he adduces in confirmation of his view, and 
organization as found in living beings.^^ *' Incipient ^SSpient 
life, as it were," is a phrase very ambiguous. Taken 
as a figure of speech, which the words *' as it were," 
would justify, the meaning is clear and no fault ca# 
be found. But when interpreted in a literal sense, the 
phrase is erroneous. It is true that many vital phe- 
nomena can be explained by the laws of Physics and 
Chemistry. The process of digestion can be 
explained by Chemistry; the heart-action, the nervous 
s)istem by Physics ; and the transformation of heat into 
motion can, they hold, account for life. But it must 
not be forgotten that these forces are only instruments, 
and behind their normal action is a vital power which 
causes them to act and to act harmoniously. 

§ 12. It is thus false, or at least ambiguous, to speak l^^^^^jf. 
of growth as " The cycle of molecular action." There ^^^^^^^^ 

1^ Cf. Lotze Outlines of Psychology by Prof. Ladd, p. 93. 
^^ Cf. " Scientific Materialism " in Fragments of Science, 
vol. II, p 81. 

17 Cf. Mivart Truth, 304, 323, 327, 444, 158, sq. 



56 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

is only a partial statement of the truth; the nature of 
growth is far different from the interaction of physical 
forces. It is false to assert that " The animal body is 
just as much the product of molecular force, as chalk 
or sugar," that " The formation of a crystal, a plant or 
an animal, is a purely mechanical problem." Unor- 
ganized matter in any shape" or form is inadequate as 
the cause of the various forms of organized existence; 
and organized matter, as such, can only be explained 
by postulating a directive and unifying agency presid- 
ing over the action of the material forces. In his 
Belfast address, Mr. Tyndall admits that matter, " as 
defined for generations in our scientific test-books," 
is unable to account for Hfe. Hence he urges us to 
change our notions of matter. Having done so, he 
traces " The Hne of life backward," until '' the vision of 
the mind authoritatively supplements the vision of the 
eye," and " by an intellectual necessity crosses the 
boundary of experimental evidence and discerns in 
vulgar matter the promise and potency of all terres- 
trial hfe." 
Mr Tya- § 13. This is an illustration of Mr. Tyndall's reason- 

method of ino;. He destroys the ordinary meaning attached to the 
word " matter," makes it vague and shadowy, so that 
it might be apphed to anything and everything, and 
draws the conclusion he already had in mind. An 
apt illustration is had in the cray-fish which muddles 
the water in order to escape. Following out this line 
of thought Mr. Tyndall could safely say, in the same 
address that '' the Human Understanding is itself a 
result of the play between organism and environment 
through cosmic ranges of time." ^^ 

1^ When Prof. Barker declared that " Life is now univer- 
sally regarded as a phenomenon of matter," he meant either 



reasoning. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 57 

§ 14. Mr. Huxley, in the " Physical Basis of Life," ^ ^^'^f-"^"^- 
sets forth the same views. But where Mr. Tyndall Theo^^of 
uses the word " Matter," he uses '' Protoplasm." His ^i^e-" 
theory may be termed the '' Chemical " or " Mechan- 
ico-Chemical," in contradistinction to the purely 
" Mechanical " of his friend. 

§ 15. Mr. Huxley holds that vital action results 
from *' the molecular forces of the protoplasm." 
Hence he infers that " the thoughts to which I am giv- 
ing utterance and your thoughts regarding them, are 
the expression of molecular changes in that matter of 
life, which is the source of our other vital phenom- 
ena." ^^ A few pag-es back he tells us that " even those Mr. Hux. 

ley's 

manifestations of intellect, of feeling and of will, which teaching, 
we rightly name the high'er faculties," are known *' to 
everyone but the subject of them " as " transitory 
changes in the relative positions of the part of the 
body." ^^ Yet he repudiates the accusation of being 
a Materialist: on the contrary believes MateriaHsm 
" to involve grave philosophic error." His reasons 
are truly ingenuous. " For, after all," he adds, in a 
burst of confidence, " what do we know of this ' ter- 
rible ' matter, except as the name for the unknown and 
hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? 
And what do wx know of that ' spirit ' over whose 
threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is 

that life was always seen manifested in matter, and then he 
enunciated a truth as old as mankind; or that, life was a prop- 
erty or an effect of matter, and then his words are without 
foundation. 

Cf. Some Modern Aspects of the Life-Question, Add. by 
Prof. Geo. F. Barker, Pres. of American Association for 
Advancement of Science, Boston, 1880. 

20 Cf. Lay Sermons & Addresses. 

21 Phys. Basis of Life, p. 138. 

22 lb., p. 123. 

8 



58 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

m 

arising, like that which was heard at the death of Pan. 
except that it is also a name for an unknown and hypo- 
thetical cause or condition of the states of conscious- 
ness? In other words, matter and spirit are but names 
for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phe- 
nomena." ^ 

§ i6. In this Huxley shows himself a legitimate dis- 
ciple of Hume. The logical position is Agnosticism. 
He further assures us that molecular cerebral changes 
cause states of consciousness, but sees no evidence 
that conscious states cause muscular motions.^ 
Hence he infers that '* mental conditions are simply 
the symbols in consciousness of the changes which 
take place automatically in the organism," that " the 
feehng we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary 
act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is 
the immediate cause of the act." His premise is false. 
Consciousness testifies that mental changes produce 
bodily changes, e. g., fear causes pallor of the counte- 
nance. Thus Carpenter holds that we have the same 
evidence for the action of nerve-force on mental 
states, and for mental states calling forth physical con- 
sequences. He concludes that " the correlation be- 
tween mind-force and nerve-force is shown to be com- 
plete both ways, each being able to excite the other." ^ 
real value § 17. Scientific Materiahsm in the hands of these, its 

ofSclen- , ! . 

tificMate- latest defenders, is therefore only an attempt to spirit- 
rialism. ' , , • , 

ualize matter. Yet matter can never be anything but 

matter. It will always retain the characteristic prop- 
erties which mark it out as distinct from mind. Dia- 
lectic sophistry cannot obliterate the barrier between 

23 lb., p. 143. ^ 

2^ Cf. on the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata. 
25 Mental Physiol., §§ 11, 12. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 59 

matter and mind by the endeavor to render the defini- 
tion of matter vague and obscure. The effort fails 
and is remembered only as a passing phase in the his- 
tory of the great conflict itself.^^ 

IV. 

Doctrine. 

§ 1 8. Materialism teaches that the history and devel- ^|Mjor- 
opment of the universe is due to the action of natural world. 
forces, and that these natural forces can be reduced by 
Physics to modes of motion. All forces are material 
forces. The principle is "without matter no force; 
without force, no matter." 

§ 19. Force is a property of matter, matter is a some- 
what undefined, ponderable entity occupying space. 
To the potencies inherent in its ultimate particles can 
be traced all the phenomena of existence. These 
potencies or properties are only different modes of 
motion; and the laws which govern their activity are 
only thoise of mechanics. Matter and force are eternal, 
indestructible and inseparable. Constant transforma- 
tion takes place without in the least lessening the 
material mass or diminishing the sum of the forces. 
There is no repose; but an unending cycle of causes 
and of effects. The laws of nature are invariable ; they 
are simply the expression of the necessary relations 
between the forces. Hence, the existence of God is a 
useless postulate, since the laws of nature are immut- 
able, and admit no possibility of intervention. 

§ 20. The principle of motion is inherent in matter, (b) organic 
Life is explained by motion; thought is explained by 

26 Cf." "Modern Phil. Concep. of Life," Address of J. J. 
Woodward, Pres. of Phil. Soc. of Washington, in Bulletin of 
See, 1882, vol. V, p. 49. 



6o 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(c) mind. 



Mr. Spen- 
cer's at- 
tempt. 



The two 
schools of 
Material- 
ism. 



life, hence thought and life are only forms of motion; 
organic and inorganic forms are only the result of acci- 
dental combinations of matter. 

§ 21. The soul is only a name for the sum of mental 
activities, and in its ultimate analysis is the product 
of a certain mode of material organization. It is not, 
therefore, a real substance, but a series of material 
phenomena.^^ The mode of combination or organiza- 
tion necessary for the production of thought is difficult 
to detect. Physiology, Chemistry, Physics, have tried 
to discover the secret. 

§ 22. Mr. Spencer attempts the solution with the 
principle of the transformation of energy, and the law 
of equivalence.^ His analysis reveals physical forces, 
vital forces and thoughts. The vital forces ' are the 
mean, indirect and exact correlation with physical 
forces on the one side, and on the other they bear the 
same relation to the thoughts which they produce. 
The activity of the mind is in exact equivalence to the 
activity of the oxidation of the brain. Thought is 
reduced to a movement of matter. Its relation to the 
electric vibrations of the filaments of the brain is the 
same as that of color to the vibrations of ether. In 
like manner the will is only the mechanical expression 
of the state of the brain as determined by external 
impressions.^^ 

§ 23. Admitting these premises two alternatives are 
presented: (a) Either reject thought altogether and 

27 Cf. Prof. Bowne, Some Diff. in Mod. Materialism. 

28Cf. The Evolution Philosophy by M. E. Gazelles, p. 116. 

29 This explanation shows how little Materialism has 
changed. " The atoms of Democritus are individually with- 
out sensation; they combine in obedience to mechanical laws; 
and not only organic forms but the phenomena of sensation 
and thought, are the result of their combination." Tyndall 
Belfast Add. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 6l 

admit the sole existence of matter and material motion, 
this is the logical and candid course, and is the position 
of the consistent Materialists, (b) Or hesitate and 
admit the existence of thought in name only as an 
aspect of matter. In this theory the physical scries is 
the objective side, the psychical series is the subjective 
shadow of the objective physical series. Sensation, 
they say, is apparently due to a chemical change in the 
molecule; but in reality the sensation and the chemi- 
cal change are only two manifestations of the same 
motion, or ex. gr.. Mental activity, i. e., perception, 
judgment, etc., is the subjective side of the changes 
in the nervous mechanism of the brain.^° Thus 
argue the English advocates of the Double-Aspect 
theory, e. g., Spencer, Clifford, Bain.^^ Hence we 
have no such being as mind, or Soul; immortality is a 
vain dream; with the dissolution of the organism, the 
individual intelligence and personality melt like smoke 
or a cloud into the elements of the universe. 

V. 
Arguments for Materialism. 
§ 24. Materialists endeavor to strengthen their posi- Siy toown 
tion with various proofs drawn especially from Physi- ^° "^a**®^* 
ology. (a) What is called the soul is known only by 
its connection with matter. Its activities come into 
play in and through a bodily structure. " It is 
enough," writes G. H. Lewes ^^ " that mind is never 
manifested except in a living organism to make us 
seek, in an analysis of organic phenomena, for the 

30 Cf. Prof. Bowne Christian Phil. Quart., Oct., 1881; Art. 
Some Difficult, in Mod. Materialism. 

31 Cf. infra. 

32 Physical Basis of Mind, p. 3. 



62 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(b) from 

mental 

processes. 



(c) de- 
pendence 
of mind 
on body. 



material conditions of every mental fact. Mind is 
never found separate from a material organization." 
" Of mind apart from body we have no direct experi- 
ence and absolutely no knowledge." ^^ But what war- 
rant have we to reason from concomitance to identify? 

§ 25. (b) In company with all our mental processes 
there is an unbroken material succession. Parallel to 
mental circles of sensation, emotion, thought, language 
there is an unbroken physical circle of effects in nerve 
extremities, the afferent nerves, the centres, the cere- 
bral hemispheres, the efferent nerves, etc. " It would 
be incompatible with everything we know of the cere- 
bral action to suppose that the physical chain ends 
abruptly in a physical void, occupied by an immaterial 
substance, which imparts its results to the other edge 
of the physical break and determines the active 
response." Hence there is no, rupture of nervous con- 
tinuity. The mental and physical proceed together, 
as undivided tv/ins. A mental cause is always a two- 
sided cause. When mind operates on body, it is a two- 
sided phenomenon, one side being body that influ- 
ences the body; in other words it is body acting upon 
body.3^ 

§ 26. (c) The absolute dependence of mind on body, 
as proved by Physiology and Pathology. This is 
shown (i) in the growth and development of the child. 
The mental faculties develop parallel to the growth of 
the body. They come into action in proportion as 



33 Cf. Bain Mind and Body, p. 130. 

34 Cf. Bain Mind and Body, p. 132; cf. Tyndall's words: 
" You cannot satisfy the human mind in its demand, for a 
logical continuity between molecular processes and the phe- 
nomena of consciousness. This is the rock on which Mater- 
ialism must inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a com- 
plete philosophy of the human mind," Scientific Materialism. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 63 

the capacities of the organism unfold. The lower fac- 
ulties act first, the higher are gradually matured. 
Hence, the organism has latent capacities for all these 
actions, and the soul exists only in name. 

" For nature crescent does not grow alone 
In thews and bulk; but as this temple waxes, 
The inward service of the mind and soul 
Grows wide withal." 

— [Haml., Act I, Seen. 3. 

(2) The volume weight, convolutions and chemical 
properties of the brain have a strict relation to the 
intelligence. Again disease, fatigue, sleep, stimulants, 
affect our mental operations. Finally, the mind 
acquires its knowledge of the world through the 
senses, and is stimulated to activity by the impres- 
sions.^^ This objection has weight against the exag- 
gerated spiritualism of Des Cartes, Leibnitz and Male- 
branche. It cannot be answered by them. Scholastic 
Philosophy proclaims the interaction of body and 
mind. It stands for the unity of the human composite. 
Finally (3) that all mental phenomena have exact 
equivalents in the specific forms of the nerve-commo- 
tion of the brain. This is the position of cerebral Phys- 
iology.^^ But the basis of this theory is very slight, 
and the theory, as proposed, is far in advance of actual 
facts. Our knowledge of the relations between mole- 
cular changes and mental changes is very deficient.^^ 
No sound argument for Materialism can be drawn 
from the dependence of the mind on the operations of 
imagination and sense. The dependence is extrinsic, 
not intrinsic; i. e., sense and imagination furnish the 

^^ Cf. Bain Mind and Body, p. 131. 

36 Cf. Prof. James Psychology; Tyndall Scientific Material- 
ism; Bain Mind and Body, p. 42. 

3'' Cf. Ladd Phys. Psych., p. 592, sq. 



64 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(d) from 
evolution. 



material of thought; thought itself is superorganic.^ 
Imagination and sense, however, require a nervous 
system and a nervous center. The brain is an organ 
for them, not for the intellect which transcends them.^^ 

§ 2^. (d) It is confirmed by the doctrine of evolu- 
tion. The universe presents a series of existences, one 
rising gradually above the other, one preparing the 
way for another, until the series terminates in man. 
The lowest forms are brought together in obedience 
to mechanical laws ; higher forms are capable of chem- 
ical combinations; still higher, crystals are found; then 
organized existence from the lowest types up to man. 
In the grades of animal life w^e find that the simpler 
the organization is, the fewer are the instincts and the 
more limited is the intelligence. The individual, too, 
in his development, seems to reproduce the history of 
the development of the species; he passes through the 
grades of vegetation, animal and conscious existence.^" 
But this argument from evolution cannot be substan- 
tiated. The law of biogeny is the basis of Haeckel's 
Monism; it rests upon a false analogy, is disproved by 
facts, and is rejected by scientific men. 

§ 28. From this the conclusion is reached that m.at- 
ter alone exists; that the soul is only a name for the 
higher material activities or an aspect of them; that 
with the disintegration of the body the soul vanishes. 



VI. 

Criticism. 
A detailed and minute examination of Materialism 
one-sided. ^\[\ j^q^- j^g given here. Its arguments will be exam- 



(a) Mate- 
rialism is 



38 Cf. Spirituality of the Soul. 

39 Cf. Janet Materialism of the Present Day, p. 130, sq. 
^ Cf. Porter Human Intellect, p. 21. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 65 

ined in the proper place. They touch on many points, 
and require careful and extensive exposition of the 
true doctrine. Here and there, in the following pages, 
as occasion presents, they will be taken up and sifted. 
Some remarks, however, of general criticism, are not 
out of place. 

§ 29. (a) Materialism is a one-sided and partial 
view; hence, in its estimation of facts, it lays itself open 
to the charge of narrowness and exaggeration. It 
postulates an infinite number of eternal, self-existent 
atoms in motion.^^ Epicurus tried to account for the 
movement by the continual descent of the primordial 
atoms in space; but Cicero calls this "a childish fic- 
tion," a " vain invention." ^^ In more modern times 
La Place held that matter was originally in a diffuse, 
nebulous state; that by the action of gravitation it 
broke up into spherical masses; that the collision and 
condensation of these produced heat; that thus the 
masses were fused and afterwards slowly cooled. 

§ 30. But is this motion original and essential, or was 
it imparted? If the former, how account for the begin- 
ning of the process? If the latter, then the condition 
of matter underwent a change. Furthermore, it 
assumes that material substance alone has a real exist- 
ence, and hence that the soul has no reality. This is 
begging the whole question. Now, a system which is 
gratuitous, one-sided and partial, cannot claim to be 
scientific. 

§31. (b) Alaterialism confuses things which are, by ^^^l^, 
nature, distinct. Life is not coexistent with all motion ; fion of 

' ' things. 

nor is mind coexistent with all life.^^ There are physi- 

« Cf. Arist. Met. Bi., ch. 3 and 4. 
^ De Finibus i, n. 19. 

^ Cf. Present Day Tracts, " Modern Materialism," by Rev. 
W. F. Wilkinson. 



66 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

cat, vital and mental forces. One is not the other. It 
is true that Hfe is always found connected with matter, 
and mind with both Hfe and matter, or rather, with 
Uving matter. But we cannot reason inversely, and 
contend that wherever matter is there is life also; or 
wherever life is, there mind is found. Life is not due 
to mere material combinations, nor is mind explained 
by organization. Facts of consciousness are related 
to the brain and to bodily states; but the brain is not 
their cause. "The chasm is never bridged over 
between the last state of the material elements within 
our reach and the first rise of sensation; and scarce any 
one will cherish the vain hope that at a higher stage 
of development science will find a mysterious britlge 
in a case where it is the impossibility of any sure cross- 
ing over that forces itself on us with the most evident 
distinctness." ^* 
not sSen^ § 32. (c) Its methods are not scientific. It conies to 
*^^^- us under the auspices of the physical sciences. The 

true spirit, however, of the experimental method does 
not animate its work. Its teaching concerning origins, 
substances, causes, finds no warrant in true science. 
Materialism repudiates Metaphysics only to set up a 
new Aletaphysics of its own.^^ It is only necessary to 
read a few pages of Mill's Logic to comprehend this, 
and to recognize his patent contradictions. " Material- 
ism," writes Virchow, " is a tendency to explain all 
that exists by the properties of matter; it goes beyond 
experience; it is constituted in a system, but systems 
are rather the results of speculations than the results 
of experience; they show in us a certain need of per- 
fection which speculation alone can satisfy, for every 

44 Lotz Microcosmos I, 148. 

45 Caro, Le Materialisme. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. (>J 

knowledge which is the result of experience is incom- 
plete and has gaps." ^^ 

VII. 
Influence. 
%'\\ Materialism exerted a very g-reat influence due to 

^ ^^ . . physical 

over the generation just passed. The physical sciences sciences. 
were thoroughly imbued with its spirit. Under their 
auspices it flourished and spread. The impression 
was in some manner made upon the student that its 
teaching alone fostered independence of mind. Atten- 
tion was called to the eminence occupied by its scien- 
tific defenders. Their great achievements and success to empiric 
were magnified and attributed to honesty of mind and of English 
candid love of truth. The empiric tone of English 
philosophy, with its strong undercurrent to Material- 
ism, made its progress easier. 

§ 34. But strong opponents were never wanting. lafiuence 
The insufficiency and inconsistency of the Materialis- ®^^®^''^'^^- 
tic position were pointed out. The false pretension 
and unscientific methods of its advocates were 
unmasked. A reaction set in.^^ We have just heard 
Lange's lament of the untimely fate of its apostles. 
Janet's " Materialism of the Present Day " was the 
death blow to Buchner's " Force and Matter." 
Ulrici laid bare the sophistry of Strauss; ''Old and 
New Faith," 1873.*^ The scope and limit of true sci- 
ence were set forth by Caro in '' Le Materialisme et la 
Science." 

§35. In France the spiritualistic school of Maine i^ France, 
de Biran; the influence of Scotch philosophy cham- 
pioned by Royer-Collard, Saisset; the revival of the 

*^ Rev. des Cours Scient., 1864, p. 308. 
*'' Cf. Carus the Soul of Man, p. 380. 
^^ Eng, trans, by Dr. Krauth, 



68 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Study of Aristotle led by Barthol. de S. Hilare; the 
Academie des sciences Morales et Politiques, e. g., 
Leveque, Caro, Bouillier et Janet, broke the wave of 
]\Iaterialism which threatened to submerge every- 
^^^^siand thing.^^ Like influences were at work in England and 
America. America. We see it in the Catholic Revival led by 
Cardinal Newman, Cardinal Manning and Dr. Ward,^° 
and in our country by Dr. Brownson, Fathers Hecker 
and Hewitt ;^^ in the modern Idealistic school, i. e., 
Neo. HegeHan or Neo. Kantian represented by Pro- 
fessors Green and Wallace of Oxford; Dr. Lotze and 
Wundt, Prin. Caird and Prof. Caird, of Glasgow ; Prof. 
Ferrier, of St. Andrews; Dr. H. S. Sterling; Prof. Her- 
bart. Dr. Martineau; in the adherents of the Scotch 
school Prof. Frazer, of Edinburgh; Prof. Calderwood, 
Prof. FHnt; in the writings and influence of Cardinal 
Gibbons, of Dr. McCosh, of Princeton; Dr. Porter 
and Prof. Ladd, of Yale; Prof. Seth, Prof. Bowne in 
the strong commendation bestowed on Scholastic Phil- 
osophy by Pope Leo as the only remedy for the evils 
of the times, and in the Scholastic writings of Fr. Har- 
per and the Stonyhurst Professors ;^^ in the increased 
respect shown for religion, and in the number of men 
who are eminent alike for sincere piety and scientific 
attainments; in the production of such works as the 
" Foundations of Belief " by Rt. Hon. Balfour, and 
" Thoughts on Religion," G. R. Romanes, and "A 
Rebours," by Huysmans,^^ 

49 Cf. " Neo-Christian Movement in France," in Amer. 
Jour, of Psych., 1892-93, p. 496. 

50 Cf. W. G. Ward and the Catholic revival. 

51 Life of Father Hecker, by Father ElHott. 

52 Cf. Encyc. Aeterni Patris. 

53 The names just cited are not disciples of the same school 
of thought; they do not profess the same religious faith, their 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 69 

§ 36. Materialism is formulated in the universal neg- 
ative proposition: nothing but matter exists. This 
proposition is proved false by establishing the truth of 
its contradictory, the particular affirmative proposition, 
viz., that there is an immaterial entity. In the follow- 
ing chapter this is done in proving the existence of the 
soul as an immaterial principle. 

works are not of the same value, nor should they be read 
without judicious discrimination. They are mentioned with 
the view to show how men differing in faith, in language, in 
philosophic principles, in almost everything, yet join in call- 
ing attention to the sophistry and insufficiency of Material- 
ism, and in the effort to propose a Theistic Philosophy. 



SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL, 
meaning of § I. Bv the simolicitv of the Soul is understood a 

the terms. . 

simple immaterial unity. Hence the phrase expresses 
three notions, viz., that the soul is a unity; that it is a 
simple unity; that it is a simple unity totally different 
from matter. In the following chapter the meaning 
and nature of its immateriality will be investigated. 
Here it is sufBcient to state and prove the fact. 



Unity. 

a^faS^*^ ^^ ^ ^' ^^^ unity of the ego is an indisputable fact. To 
deny it is to do away altogether with internal experi- 
ence and to render the facts actually perceived wathin 
us absurd. How can there be a sensation without the 
unity of the subject perceiving? How can I explain 
the fact that / think many thoughts and suffer many 
affections, if the / or ego be not a unity? Conscious- 
ness, therefore, with undeniable force testifies to this 
elementary fact.^ 

IL 

Simple Unity. 

different § 3. It is not eilough to Say that the soul is a unity. 

unity. The expression, as it stands, is ambiguous. There 
are different kinds of unity. Hence it is necessary to 
explain in what way the soul is one. We may distin- 

1 Cf. Mivart Truth, p. 386, foil. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, 71 

guish a collective unity, a potential unity and a simple 
unity, (a) A collective unity is an aggregate of ele- 
ments actually distinct and separable but united by 
some common bond. This bond may be physical, as, 
e. g., many links are united to form one chain; or 
moral, as, e. g., many persons are united by the bond 
of authority, and of obedience to form one society; or 
intellectual, as, e. g., many sentences and paragraphs 
are united to form one definite treatise. 



1°. Collective Unity. 
§ 4. That the soul is a collective unity is the teaching tioSs' 



Assoeia- 



of the Associationist school, as represented by Hume, thesoui&a 
Mill, Spencer and Bain. Hume holds that impressions Snit^y. ^^^ 
give rise to ideas; now to account for an idea of Self 
invariably the same, we should have an impression 
which continues invariably the same through the whole 
course of our lives. But, he says, there is no impres- 
sion constant and invariable; hence ordinary men, 
except metaphysicians, are " nothing but a bundle or 
collection of dififerent perceptions succeeding each 
other rapidly." Thus " all our distinct perceptions are 
distinct existences, and the mind never perceives any 
real connection among distinct existences." ^ J. S. 
Mill resolves the mind into " a series of feelings with 
a background of possibilities of feeling;" but he admits 
that he cannot explain how this " series is aware of 
itself as a series." ^ This admission is fatal to the 
hypothesis.* Mr. Spencer maintains that " the sub- 
stance of mind cannot be known; that Mind as known 
» 

2 Cf. Hume Treatise of Human Nature," ch. Personal Iden- 
tity. 

2 Cf. Exam, of Hamilton, p. 247, 
4 lb., p. 561. 



y2 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of 
activities." ^ To them adhere Beneke who teaches that 
the soul is the complex of acquired habits; Hartman, 
. who says that the soul is like a bundle bound together 
from the activities of the unconscious. Mr. Davis 
also thinks it better to use the word mind to stand 
merely for " a complement of activities." ^ Dr. Mands- 
ley m.aintains that the soul is one by a combination 
and co-operation of the brain-cells and in fact is com- 
posed of essentially different elements which change 
every moment; henee its unity may be dissolved by the 
dissolution of the brain-cells; hence it is a fictitious and 
delusive unity. Prof. Kulpe assures us by conscious- 
ness or mind, is meant the sum-total of all these par-- 
ticular phenomena, e. g., subjective processes, facts of 
consciousness and mental states; he expressly declares 
that he shall nowhere discuss anything like transcen- 
dental consciousness, a substantial soul or an imma- 
terial spirit.^ 
o?this^"^ § 5. This opinion is false. The mind is not a col- 
opinion. lection of units. The mistake of these writers is 'the 
legitimate consequence of a wrong conception of sub- 
stance. If the substance be only a grouping together 
of activities or qualities, it follows that the mind is 
such a unity. 

§ 6. Now consciousness is aware of itself as a unity. 
I am conscious that I now write and that I began to 
write an hour ago. The various states of the mind 
during that time do not appear as separate, each one 

5 Prin. of Psych. VI, pp. 156, 159. 

6 Elem. of Psych., p. 52; cf. p. 2. 

■^ Outl. of Psych., p. 3, tr. from Germ, by E. B. Titchener, 
of Cornell. On self as a unity of synthesis cf. Prof. Dewey, 
" Some Current Conceptions of Self " in Mind. 1890, vol. 15, 
p. 58; Prof. Seth, " Hegelianism and Personality." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 73 

aware Qf itself only ; but there is a continuity and a per- 
sistence throughout. The testimony of consciousness 
contains two distinct elements: (a) The existence of 
ever-changing states, (b) The unity of these states. 
To accept the former alone is to mutilate the testimony, 
to propose a gratuitous and false explanation. Even 
while explicitly rejecting the latter element I should be 
compelled to admit it implicitly. For how could I 
be aware of successive states of consciousness, unless I 
admitted their unity? ^ 

2°. Potential Unity. 

§ 7. That the mind is a potential unity is the conten- Ladd's 
tion of Prof. Ladd. The word Potential is not used opinion, 
in its scholastic meaning. St. Thomas teaches that 
the mind is a potential unity in the sense that although 
one in essence, it exhibits its activity in many modes 
or potencies. Prof. Ladd, however, by a potential 
unity holds that the mind is in potency to become one 
and that its unity is a matter of degrees or of develop- 
ment. Hence the infant is not one, because it has not 
arrived at self-consciousness; we say it is one, but by 
this we mean that it will become one; for the mind can 
be said really to have unitary being only as it acquires 
and exercises the power to make itself one to itself.^ 

§ 8. How this takes place is set forth farther on, his ex- 
when he says that the real unity of mind depends upon 
the firmness and comprehensiveness of the grasp of 
self-consciousness and upon the conscious recognition 
and control of the mental life as under one purpose 

8 Cf. Lotze cited by Mivart Truth, p. 387. 

^ Hegel held that the mind is nothing actually but all things 
potentially, i. e., " a unity which has grown up.'' cf. Wallace's 
Hegel Proleg., ch. VH. This explains Prof. Lp-^-^'' "Oi^'tion. 
Phil, of Mind, p. 202. 
10 



74 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



criticism. 



or immanent iclea.^° Hence the oneness of bei^g con- 
sists in grasping together and binding into a unity of 
self-conscious remembering and reflecting states 
according to some fitting and consciously selected 
plan, all the manifold movements in that flowing 
stream of psychosis which is called mental Ufe.^^ 

§ 9. The potential, therefore, developes into the col- 
lective unity. Ladd seems to confound the fact of 
personal identity with its conscious recognition. That 
I am one is not the same as that I am conscious that I 
am one. The latter supposes the former, does not 
make it. The infant of a week is as real a unity as the 
fact with full-pfrown man. The former is not conscious of its 

the con- ^ 

sciousness unity, the other is ; but the act of consciousness has no 
influence whatever on the fact, as is shown also in 
sleep and in delirium. The idea of personal identity is 
obtained from consciousness, memory and judgment; 
the act of consciousness containing the perception of 
the present ego is not erroneous but the absence or 
perversion of memory can render our judgment erron- 
eous; the idea of the ego is changed or disappears; but 
the person remains the same. I could not be con- 
scious of my unity, if I were not already one. Hence 
the fact explains the consciousness, the consciousness 
does not account for the fact. 



he con- 
founds the 



of the fact. 



Positivist 
view. 



3°. The Unity of the Positivists. 
§ 10. Closely akin to the opinions that the ego is a 
collective or a potential unity is the contention of Posi- 
tivists that the ego is a result. They base the proof 
on scientific data, and throw it into a scientific form. 
Not so long ago, they assure us, white light, water, etc., 



1^ L. C, p. 203. 
11 lb., p. 205. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 75 

were believed to be simple substances, but no one will 
now deny that they are composite. Hence what the 
prism in Physics does for light, what voltaic electricity 
in chemistry does for water, nervous disease and acci- 
dent, i. e.. Physiology and Pathology will do for the 
human ego.^^ The ego is nothing more than an ex- 
tract from internal events and derives from them all its 
being; detached and isolated it is nothing in itself, 
hence a metaphysical illusion. The ego is, therefore, 
a product.^^. 

§11. This opinion rests upon a fallacy: they con- ^ ^^^^^^y* 
found the ego with the states of the ego. The subject 
ego is a cause not a result; it remains always identical. 
The states of the ego, however, are a result ; they con- 
stantly change, e. g., in speaking of a mutual friend I 
can say that he is not the same as he used to be, that 
he has changed in temperament, in manners, in appear- 
ance, in almost everything; yet I do not mean to say 
that the subject, i. e., the man himself is not the same, confounds 

•' ' the ego 

Therefore, we must distinguish the siibject ego, i. e., with the 

stHtss or 

who has undergone the changes, from the phenomenal ^^^ ^so. 
ego, i. e., the changes themselves. 

§ 12. This distinction enables the reader to estimate 
the value of their argument based on the distinction 
between the normal and the hysterical ego. The same 
confusion is here found. The normal ego signifies not 

12 Cf. Taine "Intelligence;" Ribot "Diseases of Person- 
ality; cf. also Th. Brown Phil, of Human Mind, chap. 
Mental Identity. To Mr. Taine the ego is a plank on which 
geometrical figures are marked in chalk. These figures repre- 
sent its divisions. By an illusion we create an empty sub- 
stance the ego in itself. Just as the plank is nothing more 
than the continuous series of its successive divisions; so the 
ego is nothing more than the continuous web of its successive 
events. Intelligence pi BIV., ch. III. 

13 B. P. II, B. 3, ch. I. 



76 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the subject ego, but the nonnal state of the subject ego. 
Nor does the hysterical ego refer to a subject ego, but 
only to a hysterical state of the subject ego. Therefore 
two states of the same ego succeed each other; there is 
no double ego.^^ 

4°. Simple Unity. 
§ 13. By simple unity we mean that the soul is an 
indivisible one having no parts and incapable of being 
divided into parts. In scholastic phraseology it is 
said to be entitative simplex, i. e., a unity by reason of 
its very essence. The reasons for this embrace not 
only the refutation of the views just stated, but also 
positive facts o^ our conscious life. 

unity^o? § ^4- (a) The soul has various acts, but it has no parts. 

Sess^^°^^ Its modes of activity are not the same and it is con- 
scious of their difference; it distinguishes, classifies, 
names them, e. g., sensation, thought, desire, will; but 
the same one ego feels, thinks, desires, walls. All 
these activities have their source and explanation in 
this unity and are modifications of the same unity. 
The modifications are the effects, the one same ego 
is the cause. The grouping together of the effects 
alone will not explain the unity of the ^go. It is the 
unity of the cause that we seek, a unity which is 
already supposed in the attempt to group its activities 
or its thoughts. The fact that there is a unity of con- 
sciousness iij me can only be explained by admitting 
the unity of the ego. Lotze contends that " the fact 
of the unity of consciousness compels us, in the explan- 
ation of the intellectual life, to suppose that there is a 
completely indivisible unity in the subject which exer- 
cises the comprehending activities of consciousness." ^' 

14 Cf. Farges Le Cerveau L'Ame, p. 114 sq. 

15 Micro. I, 72; II, I, 4. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 77 

§ 15. (b) To prove our thesis to a demonstration, let ^^^g^Jj^ 
us suppose that the soul is not a simple unity, but has 
parts, (i) The soul elicits many different acts, but for 
the sake of the argument, we shall take the simplest 
mental act, e. g., the idea. I have, ex. gr., an idea of 
honesty in my mind. Now, if this idea be produced 
by the activity of an extended substance, i. e., the 
thinking principle; then either different parts of the 
idea must pertain to different parts of this substance,, 
or the entire idea must belong to each part of the sub- 
stance, or the whole idea must be produced by a single 
part of the substance. 

§ 16. But the first hvpothesis is absurd. The act of Refutation 

' -^ of the 

apprehension is indivisible. I cannot divide it; it hypothesis 

from fip'f"^ 

either is or is not. Its very nature shows that it can- of mind, 
not be an aggregate of units separately produced by an 
aggregate of agents.-^^ The second hypothesis is like- 
wise untenable. For, if the different parts produced 
the entire idea, then we should have at the same time 
as many ideas as there are parts in the composite sub- 
stance; but this is opposed to the testimony of con- 
sciousness. In the supposition that the whole idea 
belongs to a single part, we have two alternatives, 
either this part is composite or it is a unity; if it is a 
simple unity, then our thesis is proved; if it is compo- 
site, then we shall have to take up the former alterna- 
tives, and so on until we are compelled to accept the 
same conclusion. This argument can be further illus- 
trated in the act of judgment and the act of reasoning. 

§ 17. (2) An analysis of the acts of the will leads to From acts 

, , . A r 1 M. , . ^. of the will. 

the same conclusion. An act of the will always imphes 
a previous act of the intellect. Thus if I resolve to do 

^^ Cf. Stonyhurst Logic, ch. Simple Apprehension. 



78 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Kant's ob- 
jection, 
(a) the 
unity is 
collective. 



Criticism 
of this. 



something, it is only after I have had a conception of 
the thing to be done, and have weighed the motives 
which prompt me to action. Then my will tends to the 
object. Now this act of the intellect and this tendency 
of the will do not pertain to different parts of the ego, 
but are concentrated in a unity. Let us suppose that 
the subject ego is made up of tw^o parts; that the cogni- 
tion pertains to one, while the inclination springs from 
the other. In the hypothesis there would be no act of 
the will; not in the former supposition, for we should 
have only the act of cognition; not in the latter, for by 
hypothesis there is no act of cognition, and an act of 
the will without a previous act of cognition is 
impossible.^'' 

§ 1 8. Kant admits that this argument is very strong, 
but attem.pts to show that it is a paralogism.^^ He 
holds (a) that " the unity of thought, consisting of 
many representations, is collective," and, therefore, " it 
would be impossible to establish the necessity of the 
presupposition of a simple substance." 

§ 19. But this principle is false. The Unity of 
thought is not the result of many representations. 
We have such mental acts as simple apprehension; 
we have ideas of simplest things, ex. gr., of being.^^ 
Again in the act of judgment the mind compares two 
ideas. There is diversity, i. e., the two ideas ; but at the 
bottom of the diversity there is unity, i. e., the relation 
between the ideas. Hence the act perceiving the rela- 
tion is one. The same is also true of reasoning. The 
essence of reasoning is the perception of the relation 
between judgments. But the act grasping this relation 



17 Cf. Balmes Fundamental Philosophy BIX, ch. XI. 

.18 Crit. of Pure Reason. Trans. Dialect BII cl, p. 286 sq. 

1^ Cf. Stonyhurst Logic '' errors on Simple Apprehension.' 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 79 

is one and indivisible. Thus thought is not a collec- 
tion of representations but a simple indivisible unity 
perceiving and expressing the relation between the 
representations, e. g., the thought in which I know the 
judgment, John is good, is not expressed by the sum of 
the concepts John and good; it is a something distinct 
from both, yet expressing the relation existing between 
both, a something which contains a comparison 
between diverse things, and yet unites their diversity 
in the unity of relation.^*^ 

§ 20. (b) Kant says, " The reason we postulate abso- {i^-i^y f^ 
lute unity of the subject is because otherwise we could JjJ^y^^ 
not say of it, I think. But this proposition is a purely 
subjective condition, a merely logical unity, signifying 
something in general, and hence simple because unde- 
termined." Hence he concludes " that we cannot hope 
by means of mere concepts (still less through the mere 
subjective form of all our concepts, that is, through our 
consciousness), and without referring these concepts 
to a possible experience, to extend our knowledge, 
particularly as even the fundamental concept of a sim- 
ple nature is such that it can never be met with in expe- 
rience, so that no chance remains of arriving at it as a 
concept of objective validity." 

§21. It is true the proposition, I think, is the basis J? this!^ 
on which we reason to the unity of the subject. Con- 
sciousness testifies this fact, and our argument is noth- 
ing more than the application of the idea of unity to 
the fact. The fact of consciousness is a universal fact; 
it is true of every thinking being; it alone explains the 
very possibility of thought. The idea of unity is a 
universal idea, applicable to many particular objects. 

20 Cf. Balmes Fund. Phil. 



8o 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Thus our conclusion cannot be questioned; it is true 
of every thinking being. Kant errs, therefore, in say- 
ing that the proposition, I think, is " subjective (i. e., 
an ideal form), logical, undetermined." On the con- 
trary it is a fact, it is real, and determined. Our con- 
clusion is not a transitiis from the ideal to the real. It 
began with the perception of the true nature of my 
individual self, and because that nature is common to 
ail thinking beings, I am justified in drawing a con- 
clusion applicable to all.^ 



simple 

material 

forces. 



the 

principle 
of proof. 



III. 

An Immaterial Simple Unity. 

§ 22. The science of Physics treats of forces, of their 
relations,- and manifestations. It distinguishes forces 
into compound and simple. These forces are inherent 
in matter; they are conceived as properties of matter; 
they can be measured as to velocity and intensity ; their 
relations can be expressed in mathematical formulas. 
They are, therefore, termed material forces. Hence 
we can speak of simple forces which are material. A 
vast difference exists between these forces and the 
unity of thought. The latter is an immaterial unity. 

§ 23. In proving this thesis we shall take as a prin- 
ciple of demonstration the axiom of Aristotle and St. 
Thomas: That the acts of a being are a manifestation 
of its nature. This principal is constantly employed 
in every day experience, e. g., I obtain a knowledge 
of your character by observing your words and actions. 
So, too, in the various departments of physical science 
knowledge increases and discoveries are made accord- 
ing as the properties of beings are disclosed; and this 



21 Cf. St. Thomas Summa Theologiae I. Q. 87, a. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 8l 

takes place by observation of and experimentation 
upon their activities. In like manner by observing and 
examining the operations of my mind and will, I can 
learn something of the nature of that principle which 
works through them. 

§ 24. The line of arsfument may be briefly stated : The 

_,. 7 -1 1 . i-rr 1 question 

VVe know mmd and matter m different ways, the stated. 
former by self-consciousness, the latter by the senses; 
we know them as possessing different properties. 
Hence we infer that the soul is a simple immaterial 
unity.^ 

§2^. (1°) We know mind and matter in different (i) matter 

^ -J ^ '' and mind 

ways. Matter is known throus^h the senses. These known in 

•^ '^ different 

faculties are organic. The organs in and by which ways, 
they act are different parts of the human body. The 
sense-faculties are limited in the range and the number 
of their objects. Mind, however, is known by self- 
consciousness. This faculty is totally different from 
the organs of sense. It is not organic; its activity is 
not bound up with a certain part of the body as, ex. gr., 
the sense of sight is with the eye. By self-conscious- 
ness I am aware of my thoughts or volitions, and by 
the one and same act I know myself as the agent elicit- 
ing these thoughts and volitions and as the subject 
modified by them. Hence I know, and I know that I 
know. The senses on the contrary cannot attain to 
this perfection of knowledge. My eye, ex. gr., sees an 
object but it does not see that it sees. It cannot turn 
over upon itself and contemplate the very act of seeing. 
Its organic nature and material object render such an 
act impossible.^ 

22 Cf. McCosh chty and Posit, ch. 4; Stonyhurst Psych., ch. 
XX, XXI. 

23 Aug. de Gen. ad lit. I. vii, n. 24, 26. 

II 



82 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 26. The senses cannot reflect. This act is peculiar 
to mind alone. I meditate, dream day dreams, exam- 
ine my conscience, bring up in my own mind a pano- 
rama of the past.^^ The faculty which enables me to 
elicit such acts is not organic, it cannot be classed with 
material forces. There is no relation of identity or of 
likeness between an electric force and the activity of 
my mind reflecting upon that force and measuring its 
properties, 
^aii's"^^ § 27. It is true that molecular action of the brain 

words. accompanies the thought, but the passage from one to 
• the other is in Mr. Tyndall's words, unthinkable. 
" Granted," he writes, " that a definite thought and 
definition molecular action in the brain occur simul- 
taneously,- we do not possess the intellectual organ, 
nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would 
enable us to pass by a process of reasoning from the 
one phenomenon to the other. They appear together, 
but we do not know why. Were our minds and senses 
so expanded, strengthened and illuminated as to enable 
us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain ; were 
we capable of following all their motions, all their 
groupings, all their electric discharges, if such there be, 
and were we intimately acquainted with the corres- 
ponding states of thought and feeling, we should prob- 
ably be as far as ever from the solution of the problem. 
How are these physical processes connected with the 
facts of consciousness? The chasm between the two 
classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually 
impassible." ^^ 
k?ow\imd § ^^' (^°) ^^ know mind and matter as possess- 
aad matter jj-,g. different properties. The science of Physics 

as possess- & 1 ir ^ 

ing differ- 
ent pros- nA ^r T •■, ' 1 

perity. 24 Cf. Liberator!, vol. 2, p. 274. 

25 Add. to British Assoc, in Frag, of Science. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 83 

enumerates and explains the properties of matter. 
We know that matter is hard, has definite size, shape 
and color, is ponderable, occupies space, etc. Not one 
of these can be appHed to mind.^^ This is shown from 
our ideas. We have conceptions of objects which are, 
by their very essence, immaterial, e. g., God, angel, 
soul; we have abstract and universal notions which 
can be applied to material and immaterial beings, e. g., 
being, potency, essence, existence, cause, etc. ; we have 
ideas which represent material objects but in an imma- 
terial manner, e. g., the ideas of a triangle in general, ^^-^^ft^ 
the concept of humanity. Let us take as an illustra- * 
tion the idea of virtue. We have the conception of 
Virtue; we speak of it in glowing words, recount the 
history of the saints and heroes it has made, set forth 
its strength and beauty, strive to make it the aim of 
our own lives, and dwell upon the lustre it will shed 
about our name. Virtue is something real ; the idea I 
have of it exerts a real influence upon the moulding of 
my character and life. Yet the idea has not shape, or 
size, or color, or weight. There is nothing material 
about it.^^ 

§20. (2) The same is true of the acts of judgment (2) from 
and reasonmg. An act oi judgment cannot be meas- andrea- 
ured or weighed. It is an indivisible unity as we have 
seen. The negative judgment exhibits this more 
strongly than the positive judgment. There is no uni- 
formity about the ordinary judgments of Hfe; they 
dififer and may be changed. What material force can 
explain an intricate train of thought, the tracing of an 
effect to a hidden or remote cause, the solving of a 

26 S. Aug. de quan. An., n. 4, 5, 6. 

2^ S. Thomas C. Gentes LII, ch. 49, 50; cf. Aug. de Gen. ad 
lit. 1. vii, n. 27. 



84 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

problem in mathematics, in philosophy or in history? 
The perception of different objects, the discovery of 
their relations, the separation of cause from circum- 
stance and occasion, the just estimate of varying influ- 
ences, the careful application of experimental methods, 
the comparison of the universal and the particular with 
the view of drawing a conclusion, have nothing what- 
ever in common with material activities. " The pas- 
sage from the physics of the brain," writes Mr. Tyndall, 
'' to the corresponding facts of consciousness is 
unthinkable." ^s 

Se wnT § 30- This conclusion is strengthened by a consider- 

ation of the acts of the will. The will is a tendency to 
what is apprehended as good ; in actual exercise it may 
be a tendency to a good not yet possessed, or an 
avoidance of what is bad, a delight in the possession 
of good, or sorrow at its loss. These are so many 
channels of human activity. The love of a mother for 
her child; the constant strife to lead a noble and holy 
life; the sorrow for sin; the resolution to do better; 
the bitter struggle with temptation; the resolve to die 
for country; or to sacrifice life sooner than violate the 
law of God; or to suffer a living martyrdom- — these, 
viewed only as phenomena, cannot be measured, or 
weighed, or converted, as Mr. Bain contends, into 
heat, motion, or electricity; they belong to a sphere 
far above material forces or activity .^^ 

memor? ^3^* (4) Memory brings its testimony to give 

greater strength, if possible, to our conclusion. By 
memory we are made aware of our abiding personal 
identity. Now, if the mind were only a series of suc- 
cessive states, as Mr. Mill holds, this knowledge would 

28 Q{ Belfast Address in Frag, of Science. 
25 Aug. de An, et ejus origine, 1. iv., n. 19. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 8$ 

be impossible; for then there would be a constant flow 
without a principle grasping and connecting these 
states into a unity. But this substantial ^° principle 
cannot be material, e. g., the organism. The bodily 
elements constantly change; they have no permanency. 
Hence memory would be impossible; nor could we 
then account for the conviction as to our abiding per- 
sonal identity. Therefore, if we refuse to admit a per- 
manent indivisible principle which is at the same time 
immaterial, the fact of conscious memory remains 
inexplicable.^^ 

§ 32. Finally we refer to the phenomena of deaf- (5) fj.^^ 
blind mutes.^^ Here are creatures who cannot see, mutes!*^*^' 
speak, or hear, yet are capable of sublime thoughts, of 
deep and pure affections. It is impossible to account 
for the existence of such phenomena by recourse to 
the senses of touch and of smell, which alone they pos- 
sess. Much less can we explain them by material 
agencies. Hence we must admit a principle which is 
immaterial to account for the unity of their mental life. 
The story of Laura Bridgeman and of Helen Kellar is 
a practical proof of our thesis.^^ 

30 Cf. ch. on Sub. of Soul. 

31 For a beautiful description of the power of memory cf. 
S. Augustine Confess. 1. X, ch. 8-16. 

32 Mr. Huxley tells us that " man born dumb would be capa- 
ble of few higher intellectual manifestations than an orang or 
chimpanzee." cf. Man's Place in Nature, ch. H. 

33 Cf. i6th Annual Report of Perkins Institute for the Blind 
for the year ending Sept., 1891, Boston, Mass. It is difficult 
to understand, in the face of this conclusion, what Prof. Ladd ' 
means when he says that " a philosophy of mind which has 
its basis in the actual facts of mental life, makes short work 
of despatching certain doctrines once held as to the so-called 

* simplicity ' and ' individuality ' of mind." cf. Phil, of Mind, 
p. 205. 



POSITIVISM. 

§ I. Side by side with Materialism, often viewed as 
its cause or as its off-shoot, thriving on the same soil 
and in the same atmosphere, is another intellectual 
product of the time, Positivism} Between both there 
are many points of contact: They are congenial; they 
are confined to the world of sense phenomena; they 
deny the existence of super-sensible entities; there is 
no God, no angel, no soul; both lay claim to be phil- 
osophies. Yet MateriaHsm is wider in its sphere, is 
more theoretic, is a philosophy only. Positivism, on 
the contrary, lays special stress upon the methods and 
limits of the physical sciences, hence its name ; aims at 
the amelioration of society, and is therefore a Sociol- 
ogy; is not merely a theory presenting an intellectual 
solution of the universe, but a doctrine holding out to 
the religious aspirations of the human heart the ab- 
stract idea of humanity in place of God. 

I. 

History. 

§ 2. The author of Positivism is A. Compte.^ His 
principal works are " Cours de Philosophic Positive " 
(1842), which sets forth his views on the philosophy 
of knowledge and the theory of the sciences; and 
" Systeme de Politique Positive " (1854), which is 
origin as a purely sociological. As k philosophy or special mode 

philoso- 
phy. 

1 " The Positivist School is a sect which arises from Mater- 
ialism, and has neither value nor power unless by Material- 
ism." Lefevre, " Renaiss. du Materialisme," p. 411. 

2 Died 1857. 



. CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 8/ 

of thought Positivism is a protest against an artificial 
a priori metaphysics and is a continuation of the em- 
piricism of the eighteenth centry; as a system of so- Jodoiogy. 
ciology it claims kindred with the teaching of St. 
Simon, the friend and guide of Compte's younger days, 
who so vigorously combatted the individualism of J. J. 
Rousseau;^ as a religion it appears in the borrowed ^l^f^j^^^^ 
rites and external forms of the CathoHc church.* Thus, 
in philosophy, Compte recognizes as precursors Hume 
and Kant; in sociology, Condorcet and DeMaistre; in 
science, Gall. Through these he claimed direct rela- 
tion to Bacon, Des Cartes and Leibnitz, the real 
fathers of modern philosophy. He gleans " the grains 
of truth " scattered throughout their writings, adds 
thereto the ritual of the Catholic church, which he calls 
the pure and true form of Christianity, and proclaims 
this synthesis to be the great philosophy of the nine- 
teenth century and of times to come.^ 

§ 3. The system of Compte is the true Positivism. 
His orthodox disciples are Lafitte and Robinet. 
Littre, his greatest disciple, divided the teaching of his 
master into two parts and laid great stress on the first 
part, i. e., the philosophy, rejecting the system of wor- itsdiffer- 
ship and of conduct.® Yet with Compte it is one con- 
nected system of philosophy and polity.^ By Positiv- 
ism is understood also the philosophy of J. S. Mill and 
of Taine, the teaching of Frederick Harrison, of G. W. 

3 Cf. Flint " Philosophy of History; " Watson " Compte, 
Mill & Spencer," p. 23. 

4 Cf. " Clothes of Religion," by Wilfred Ward. 

5 Cf. " Modern Theories in Phil, and Relig.," by Principle 
Tulloch; "Aspects of Positivism in Relation to Christianity," 
by Canon Westcott in Contemporary Rev., vol. VIII, p. 383. 

^Cf. Compte et la Philos. Positive, by M. Littre; M. Littre 
et le Positivisme, by M. Caro. 
^ Cf. Dr. Bridges' " Unity of Compte's Life and Doctrine." 



88 . CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Lewes, George Eliot,^ and the Agnosticism of Her- 
bert Spencer, W. Huxley, of Youmans and the Scien- 
tific Monthly.^ In Italy, Ardigo preaches his own 
Positivism, and says its author must be sought for in 
Galilee.^^ In Germany, Ernest Laas gives still another 
version; he considers Compte a parent in name only, 
the genuine apostle is Pythagoras, not as history usu- 
ally presents him, but the true Pythagoras as deline- 
ated by a judicious and enlightened criticism.^^ 

H. 

Basis. 
Sethod!^^^ § 4. The fundamental points of Positivism are (a) 
the positive method. This maintains that the direct 
observation of facts alone gives authority to the 
sciences in general and to philosophy in particular; in 
other words, we can know only phenomena and their 
law^s. The principle is not new; it is the inductive 
method of Aristotle, St. Thomas and Bacon. Compte, 
however, extended and applied it with effect. His vital 
mistake is in contending that there is but one order 
of existence, namely, the material; and that beyond 
the material order there is nothing. He has no war- 
rant for such assertions; they are pure assumptions 
contradicted by the voice of individual consciousness, 
by the testimony of history and of sound philosophy. 
Furthermore, Compte, by " facts," understands "phe- 

8 " What Compte and Spencer have taught in the name of 
philosophy, Tyndall and Haeckel in the name of science, G. 
Eliot has applied to life and its problems." G. Eliot, by G. 
W. Cooke, ch. IX. This teaching is especially found in 
Daniel Deronda. 

9 Cf. Life of Youmans, by John Fiske. 

JO Cf. Falckenberg Hist, of Mod. Phil., p. 552. 

11 Cf. " Compte sa vie sa doctrine," by P. Gruber, S. J. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 89 

nomena." This interpretation springs from the false 
theory of " the Relativity of Knowledge " which denies 
the universal and supposes that our knowledge con- 
sists in adding particular to particular.^^ 

§ 5. (b) As a result of this method, the supra- (b) no 
sensible and absolute, as, e. g., God, the soul, sub- sensible 
stance, essence, cause, etc., are once and for all re- 
moved from the field of science; they are in reality only 
chimaeras, the product of the imagination, or the 
creations of a disordered brain.^^ Thus the way is 
prepared for his classification of the sciences. Now 
we do not find fault with the positive method in se, 
i. e., considered as a method of scientific investigation. 
We protest against the exclusiveness, i. e., that it is 
the sole method of research, and against its conse- 
quences, viz., the denial of other methods and the limi- 
tation of knowledge.^^ This exclusiveness, this denial, 
this limitation, is the very essence of Positive Philoso- 
phy. We contend that we have ideas " of being in 
general," of '' law," of " force," of " cause; " that these 
ideas are not physical, but metaphysical; that they are 
conceptions of the mind having a basis in real things, 
and are not simply sensitive phenomena. The con- 
ception of '' cause " arises from oiTr individual con- 
sciousness. We are conscious that there is something 
within us which exerts power, and has a direct and 
immediate influence on our thoughts, volitions, and 
bodily movements. By an act of will I can move my 

12 Cf. Watson " Compte, Mill and Spencer," p. 38. 

12 " Look carefully about you," is the sarcastic exclamation 
of Socrates, " and see that none of the profane are present. 
By these I mean such individuals as have faith in the exist- 
ence of nothing but what they can grasp with both their 
hands, and deny the operations of spirit, and the generations 
of things, and whatever else is invisible." Plato " Theatetus." 

^'^ Cf. Morell Philosophical Tendencies of the Age, p. 26. 
12 



90 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

arm, I am conscious of external objects affecting me 
and producing a change in me; so I infer that external 
objects act upon one another.^^ Even G. W. Lewes 
admits, in open opposition to his creed, that " the fun- 
damental ideas of modern science are as transcendental 
as any of the axioms in the ancient philosophy." ^^ 
humaSty! § 6. (c) In place of God, who has been set aside by 
the positivistic method, the idea of humanity is held up 
as an object of worship, and as a centre of unity for the 
followers of the new philosophy. 

III. 
Doctrine. 
origin. § y^ Compte realized that fixed principles of thought 

and of conduct were necessary to the well being of the 
individual and of society; that their absence gave rise 
to uncertainty and confusion, and ultimately led to 
every evil in the social and political order. To reor- 
ganize society and place it upon a firm basis, his first 
aim was to put an end to the intellectual anarchy which 
prevailed about him.^^ He thought society could be 
regenerated and saved by science alone. In the effort 
to reconstruct society after the Hght and the methods 
of modern science Positivism arose. 
the^Three^ § 8. Taking the law of evolution as his first principle, 
states. Compte afBrmed that the fundamental law of history 
is to be found in the development of the human mind. 
He claims tl^at he discovered it in the law of historical 
filiation or law of the Three States. According to this 
all human theories passed through three successive 

16 Cf. Rickaby "General Metaphysics," ch. Causation; 
Martineau " Essays," p. 140. » 

17 Phil, of Aristotle, ch. IV, §§ 62, (>z. 

i^This also was the aim of the Traditionalist School, cf. 
de Lamennais Ess. sur L'Indifferance. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 9I 

stages, (a) the theological or imaginative, illustrated 
in *Fetichism, Polytheism and Monotheism ; (b) the 
metaphysical or abstract, which differed from the for- 
mer in explaining phenomena, not by divine beings 
but by abstract powers or essences which are behind 
them; (c) the positive or scientific, where man enlight- 
ened perceives that the only reahties are not super- 
natural beings, as, ex. eg., God or angels, nor are they 
abstractions, as ex. gr., substances or causes, but phe- 
nomena and their laws as revealed by science. This ^S^iS^won 
law, he maintained, is to Sociology what gravitation is p^g^^"^" 
to Astronomy. It proves Sociology a natural science 
whose phenomena are developed according to inva- 
riable natural laws. The different states give rise to 
and exhibit three different phases of thought or phil- 
osophies. The main source of modern intellectual 
confusion and error is to him the simultaneous use of 
the three philosophies; whereas the scientific, being 
the final evolution of intellect, is the most perfect and 
alone ought to prevail.^^ 

§ 9. The positive is what is real, useful, certain, pre- Pofitivf °* 
cise, organic, and relative.^" Hence it makes no men- 
tion of a higher will; it rejects first or final causes and 
abstract entities as ex. gr., principles and essences; it 
strives only to discover the invariable laws which 
direct the action of phenomena, to trace out their mu- 
tual relations, and to bring them into one organic 
whole. Whatever escapes experiment is vague and 
undetermined, and thus unworthy of consideration. 
He contends that his teaching is only common sense 
carefully gathered, collated and formed into a system. 

1^ Cf. Lewes Compte's Philosophy of the Sciences, sect. I. 
20 Sys. de Polit. Posit. I, p. 57. A Positivist Primer, by 
C. G. David, p. 5. 



92 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tio?of*the ^ ^^* '^^^ ^^^^ ^^ historic filiation prepares the way- 
Sciences, for the classification of the sciences.^^ He draws a 
distinction between abstract science which deals with 
the laws, e. g., Chemistry, and concrete science which 
has for its object phenomena in detail, e. g., Botany. 
The former are sciences properly so called, with them 
Positive Philosophy deals. Philosophy is the most 
universal of the sciences ; it takes the methods and re- 
sults of the other sciences with a view of co-ordinating 
them under a higher unity. To be clear and exact, this 
classification should be made according to the degree 
of dependence among the dift'erent orders of phe- 
ciSsiflca-^ nomena. Hence the law which obtains in the classifi- 
tion. cation is the decreasing generality and increasing 

complexity; the simplest and most general phenomena 
forming a basis for the more complicated. Thus we 
have Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, 
Physiology, (Biology) and Social Physics or Sociol- 
ogy. At first he considered Ethics to be a part of 
Physiology, then of Sociology, and finally classed it a 
distinct science. Logic and Psychology are not par- 
ticular sciences; the latter is only a branch of 
Physiology.^^ 
results of § jj. This system of sciences enables us to dispose 
tion. facts for the social welfare and to put social benevo- 

lence on a scientific foundation. Thus the sciences 
lead up to Sociology, i. e., the science of man in 
society. Compters final aim, his last and greatest effort. 

. 21 cf. Lewes 1. c, sect. Ill, IV. 

22 J. S. Mill separates from Compte on this point; he 
strongly maintains that Psychology is a distinct science. _ cf. 
A Compte & Positivism, pp. 63-67. For this Littre criticises 
Mill severely, maintaining that the acts of intellect and will 
are irreducible phenomena with the same relation to the ner- 
vous substance that weight has to matter, cf. Littre Pref. to 
Materialism & Spiritualism, by M. Leblais, p. XX. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 93 

In relegating the phenomena of intellect and will to 
the physical sciences, in the attempt to explain the 
order and progress of the moral world by social 
Physics, in denying to Psychology the character of a 
distinct science, the thoughtful student readily per- 
ceives that the system is a disguised form of 
Materialism.^^ 

§12. Compte considers marl as only the highest His 
product of nature, "the apex of the animal series." ^ oilman. 
Hence all human phenomena, especially those of the 
mind, are purely physiological, and can be explained 
by the action of the environment upon the organism. 
Thus Physiolog-y embraces the whole science of man. and on the 

-^ ^ -^ science of 

Consistent with his principles he rejected psychology °ian. 
as taught by the Schoolmen; its method as a science, 
i. e., introspection he considered vain and absurd. He 
applied the term '' functions " to intellectual and voli- 
tional acts; and held that these were to be observed 
only in their effects. This, he says, can be done in two 
ways; either by a most exact determination of the 
organic conditions, on wdiich they depend, or by the 
direct observation of their succession. The former 
method is the more scientific and was adopted by Gall. 
He praises the system of Gall as illustrating how men- 
tal and moral phenomena can be treated on a positive 
scientific basis. He admits that Gall failed by multi- 
plying functions and by the attempt to locaHze them; 
yet he contends that we cannot deny the principles, 
that the fundamental dispositions of mind and of will 
are innate, and that the particular faculties are essen- 

23 Cf. Lewes 1. c, sect. XIV, for the passage from the inor- 
ganic to the organic. 

24 Lewes Hist, of Phil., vol. II, p. ^2\ Compte's Philosophy 
of the Sciences, sect. XXI. 



94 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tially distinct and independent, although many of them 
often concur in the production of definite acts.^^ 
ganic^' § 13- He divided the organic kingdom into vegeta- 

Kmgdom. ^-^^ ^^^ animal by reason of the nervous system. 
There is no essential difiference between man and brute. 
Instinct is only fixed reason; reason is only variable 
instinct. The brain is not an organ but a system of 
organs.^^ These are found more complicated and per- 
fect in proportion as the animal rises in the gradated 
scale of life. The organs are the centers of functions, 
which Phrenology, with the assistance of Anatomy and 
Physiology, locates. Hence the method of Gall aims 
at showing the true nature of man and animal. 
ac^/oFttiT § 14- He denies the supremacy of the intellect taught 
inteuect. ^^ ^^^ ^j^ Psychology and maintains that the intel- 
lectual are subordinated to the affective functions.^^ 
Unity of He appeals to daily experience for proof that the pas- 
sions are stronger than reason and that reason is sub- 
ject to them. He denies the unity of the Ego and 
holds that the idea of the Ego is nothing more than 
the general consensus of the whole organism; it is 
produced by the constant feeling of the animal func- 
tions acting in harmony. Not every animal can ex- 
press this feeling by pronouncing the word I; but 
each and every one has the idea, in as much as he 
perceives that he is himself and not another. It may 
even happen that in some animal the perception of 
the I is more vivid and the feeling more intense than 
in man.^^ 

2^ Cf. Evolution-Philosophy, by M. E. Gazelles, in Pop. 
Science Library, ch. VI, VII, VIII. 

26 In like manner Sully holds that we have not a memory 
but a cluster of memories; hence, it is not " a single faculty." 
Cf. Human mind, vol. i, p. 354. 

27 Cf. Mill on the Floss, D. Deronda; Life of G. Eliot, by G. 
W. Cooke, ch. X. 

28 Cf. Chapter on Personality. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 95 



IV. 

Relation to Agnosticism. 
§ 15. Huxley claims to have invented the word "Ag- ^Jg^Jw 
nostic." He is its open champion and sole authorized 
exponent. The creed of Agnosticism drawn up by 
Mr. Laing in reply to Gladstone, he rejects with 
scorn.^^ He therefore seems best fitted to tell what 
Agnosticism is. He says it is not a creed but a method, 
the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of 
a single principle: in matters of intellect follow the 
reason as far as it will guide you and not pretend 
that conclusions are certain which are not demon- 
strated or demonstrable.^" When interpreted ac- 
cording to the letter, this principle looks innocent and 
harmless. But when understood after Mr. Huxley's 
own mind, it is very different. With him it means 
that any reality beyond phenomena and their laws is 
unknowable. Now this is the main principle of Posi- 
tivism. Hence Frederick Harrison seems to put the of f. 
question very clearly when he says that " the point h^^^^^^**- 
of view" for the Agnostic and Positivist as to the so- 
lution of the theological problem is the same; only 
the Positivists repudiate the word Ag-nostic.^^ Her- of h. 

, . °. Spencer. 

bert Spencer indicates the " point of view " when he 
tells us that the word Agnostic fitly expresses the con- 
fessed inability to know or conceive the nature of 
the power manifested through phenomena.^^ 

§ 16. Littre acknowledges that there is a close kin- ^^^^^ 
dred (" cousingermain ") and, upon many points, a 

29 Cf. Essays upon some contrary questions IX, p. 281. 

30 Cf. ib. 

31 XIX Cent., Man, 1889. 

32 Cf. Nature and Reality of Religion. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

perfect harmony between Agnosticism and Positivism; 
with this difference, however, that the basis of Posi- 
tivism is in the hierarchy of the sciences, whereas the 
basis of Agnosticism is in Psychology.^^ 

§ 17. The criticism of Littre is just and throws Hght 
on the sources of Positivism. Its influence in Eng- 
' land is very great and is due to the power liume 
wielded in the formation of EngUsh thought. Compte 
acknowledges Hume as his principal precursor.^* 
/lume denied all knowledge of substance, cause, etc., 
and held that the human mind could know only phe- 
nomena and their relations of association.-^^ But this 
is the fundamental principle of the Agnosticism of Mr. 
Spencer, of the Positivism of M. Compte and of the 
Associationism of Mr. Mill. This enables us to 
understand how it is that writers like Mr. Huxley re- 
pudiate Positivism; complain that thinkers, whose 
philosophy had its legitimate parent in Hume or in 
themselves, were labeled " Compists," in spite of 
vehement protestations to the contrary; revindicate 
Hume's property in the so-called "new Philosophy;" 
yet at the same time hold a doctrine which is essen- 
tially the Positivism of Compte.^^ Mr. Spencer has 
been often called a Positivist, because he employs 
their scientific method and holds many doctrines pro- 
posed by Compte, as ex. gr., the existence in nature 
of invariable laws, the principle of the Relativity of 
knowledge and the origin of intellect from sense. But 
he contends that these truths were proposed and de- 

33 Prin. de Phil. Posit, p. 59; Compte and J. S. Mill, p. 9 sq. 

34 Catech. Posit. Pref., p. 7. 

35 Cf, Treatise on Human Nature. 

36 Cf. Lay Sermons VII, " Physical Basis of Life," and 
VIII, " Scientific Aspects of Positivism," " Essays upon 
Some Contra. Questions," Essay IX, " Agnosticism." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. SXJ] 

fended by philoisophers long before Compte set them 
forth.^'' He also rejects characteristic doctrines of the 
French philosopher, especially the attempt at recon- 
struction.^^ Writing later in the XIX Century in re- 
ply to Frederick Harrison, he sums up the difference 
in fewer and more pointed words by saying that the 
Agnosticism of Compte is negative, whereas his own 
is positive.^^ Yet Mr. Ribot calls Spencer's First 
Principles the " Metaphysics of Positivism." ^° 

§ i8. Thus Mr. Spencer, Mr. Huxley and Mr. Leslie 
Stephen claim and with some show of truth that 
their Positivism or Agnosticism is absolutely inde- 
pendent of the French. Nevertheless Mr. Lewes,*^ M. 
Littre,^^ and Mr. Harrison*^ are positive and pre- 
emptory in rejecting their assertion. 

V. 

Influence, 
§19. The influence exerted by Positivism for the i^^ general, 
past fifty years has been very great. It has formed a 
certain atmosphere of thought which has spread over 
all ranks and classes of society. Coming from the 
hands of its author, a system of philosophy and of 
polity, it gradually dropped one characteristic trait 
after another in the effort to assimilate itself to dif- 
ferent minds and different peoples whither it was 
borne, until at present it is little more than a mode 

3^ Cf. Spencer First Principles, p. 137; Mill's Exam, of 
Hamilton, p. 260. 
^ Cf. Reasons for dissenting from Phil, of Compte, 1870, 

* 39 XIX Cent, July, 1884. 
^^ Cf. English Psychology by Mr. Ribot, p. 129. 

41 Hist, of Phil. V. II. conclus. 

42 Phil. Posit. XVII, p. 453. 
«XIX Cent., 1884. 

13 



98 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of thought, or a tendency of mind. Its principles are 
very few and very vague; its forms are indefinitely 
variable; it cannot be distinguished from Materialism, 
Agnosticism and Naturalism. Yet in spite of its con- 
stant changing and its disposition to change still more 
if possible, it comes down to us through these years 
with something of its original spirit still clinging about 
it. We still discover the same distrust of any claim 
to absolute truth, the same antagonism to what is be- 
yond the range of sense, the same belief that the com- 
plete explanation of a phenomena consists in detect- 
ing the relations of succession and of contiguity. Its 
influence is seen in the tone of society and the conduct 
of life, in poetry and fiction, in science and speculation. 
In conformity with the fundamental law of the Three 
States it seems to reveal a bias for historical studies, 
especially those departments which most easily ex- 
hibit man as a mere animal, to the exclusion of the 
intellectual and moral nature, e. g.. Anthropology, 
Ethnology.*^ 
In England. §20. Dr. Brewster was the first man of scientific at- 
tainments to praise Compte, although he condemned 
his anti-religious tendencies.*^ J. Stuart Mill places 
the author in the highest rank of European thinkers; 
he considers " Le Cours de Phil. Positive," the great- 
est work which the philosophy of the sciences has 
produced,*^ a veritable encyclopedia; and declares him- 
self an unreserved partisan of Compte's method.*^ He 
says that Compte attempted to build Positivism into a 
system, and places him above Leibnitz and Des Cartes 

44 Cf. Prof. Flint, Phil, of Hist. 

45 Edin. Rev., Aug., 1838, vol. ^T, p. 271; Littre A. Compte, 
p. 260. 

46 Letter Oct., '41; Bain, J. S. Mill Mind, 1879. 

47 Logic, pp. 346, 421, 620. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 99 

as a pioneer of philosophy .^^ In 1853, Miss Harriett 
Martineau published in two volumes an abridgment 
of " Le Cours." Lewes holds that all other phil- 
osophies serve as a pedestal for Compte's, and 
hereafter they will only develop his teaching. 
While Huxley repudiates Positivism; while Spen- 
cer and Mill reject its characteristic teachings, ex. 
gr., the classification of the sciences and maintain that 
Psychology is a science; while Bain is silent; the ad- 
hesion of Lewes and of Congreve and of Harrison is 
entire.^^ Positivism also influenced Dr. Maudsley's 
J' Physiol, of Mind," Buckle's ''History of Civi- 
lization;" Leckey's "Rationalism in Europe," the writ- 
ings of Grote, and of G. Eliot, and more especially * 
Mrs. H. Ward's " Robert Elsmere." 

§21. In France, Littre has done most to spread ^^ ^'^®'°<^®' 
the philosophy of Compte.^^ Ch. Robin and de Blain- 
ville profess themselves his disciples in biology. He 
has influenced Renan, Vacherot, Taine, Berthelot, C. 
Bernard, Ribot and the reahstic school of Zola. Two 
reviews have as an object the propagation of his phil- 
osophy, e. g.. La Philosophic Positive," and " Revue 
Occidentale." ^^ 

§ 22. In Germany it has penetrated indirectly by ^^ny^' 
English influence rather than by a study of the phil- 
osophy of Compte. It has drawn the attention of 
writers such as Bucholz, Twesten, E. Duhring, Fr. A. 
Lange, E. Bernheim. 

^^ Compte & Positivism. 

^° Cf. Dr. Rich Congreve " Catech. of Relig. of Humanity." 

51 A. Compte et la Phil. Posit. 

52 Cf. Ravaisson " La Philosophic en France au xix siecle," 
p. 65 sq.: " Philosophy In France," by Th. Ribot in Mind, vol. 
II, p. 2^6) Janet " La Philos. Franc. Contemp." 



100 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

critfcfsm ^ ^3- ^^ ^^^ Other hand Compte and the Positive 
Philosoph}^ have been severely criticised by able and 
learned writers. Whewell calls him a shallow pre- 
tender in modern science, one whose discoveries are 
absurdly erroneous.^^ J. Herschell points out glaring 
errors in Mathematics.^ Huxley is especially severe. 
He says that Compte has no eminence as a teacher 
in mathematics; that he had only an amateur's ac- 
quaintance with physical, chemical and biological sci- 
ence; that his works are repulsive for the dull diffuse- 
ness of style.^^ He finds in Positive Philosophy little 
or nothing of scientific value.^^ He says the veins of 
ore are few and far between and the rock so apt to 
run to mud that one incurred the risk of being intel- 
lectually smothered in the working.^ He is irritated 
to find Compte put forward as a representative of sci- 
entific thought and accuses him of superficial and 
second-hand knowledge.^^ He contends that a critical 
examination of the law of the three states brings out 
nothing but a series of more or less contradictory 
statements of an imperfectly apprehended truth, and 
his classification of the sciences whether regarded his- 
torically or logically is absolutely worthless, and cites 
Spencer as agreeing with him,^^ He refers with ap- 
proval to Mill's severe criticisms of Compte's Socio- 
logy .^° He sees nothing in Compte's philosophy 
worthy of attention from a scientific point of view; it 

53 a. MacMillan, Mar., i866. 
^ McCosh, Christianity and Positivism, p. 172. 
5^ Essays on some Controverted Questions, p. 291. 
5® Lay Sermons, " Physical Basis of Life," p. 140. 

57 lb., " Scientific Aspects of Posit.," p. 147. 

58 lb., pp. 150, 164. 

59 lb., p. 156, cf. Spencer " Genesis of Science." 

^•^Ib., p. 153; A. Compte and Positivism, by J. S, Mill, p. 
67 sq. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. lOI 

is the reverse of true science, a tissue of contradic- 
tions, a heap of absurdities.^^ 

VI. 

Criticism. 
§ 24. (a) The fundamental law of Positivism is the (a) its 

, . , . . ^.. . . , . fundamen- 

law of historic riliation ; it supposes the successive ex- tai law is 



istence of the three states: Theological, Metaphysical 
and Positive. But this law is a hasty, superficial gen- 
eralization. What he calls states are mere aspects of 
things; nor does one give way to the other in gradated 
succession; they exist simultaneously. His system 
therefore rests upon a basis which lacks verification; 
nay even which is shown to be false. 

§25. (b) Positivism is not a philosophy; on the (b) not a 
contrary it is a strong attempt to destroy philosophy .^^ phy°^°* 
Philosophy deals with causes; its aim is to set forth 
the first principles of knowledge, to throw light upon 
the problems of existence. These questions are forced 
upon the mind and demand an answer. Positivism 
resolutely pushes them aside. To preserve a strained 
neutrality, it is compelled to deny God, the soul, es- 
sence, first or final causes. The existence of meta- 
physics as a science and of necessary truth is a stand- 
ing refutation of Positivism.^^ Thus we find leading 
philosophers complain that Compte has neglected the 
fundamental problem of human knowledge; that his 
system is a philosophic-nihilism. 

61 Cf. Lay Sermons VIII, p. 147 sq.; Essay upon Some 
Contr, Quest., IX, " Agnosticism." 

62 Cf. Morell Philosophical Tenden. of the Age, p. 27. 

^^ Cf. Father Harper " Metaphysics of the Schools; " \V. G. 
Ward " Philosophy of Theism; " McCosh " Fundamental 
Truth." 



I02 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(c)his 
doctrine 
of man is 
false. 



(d) his 
proofs are 
assump- 
tions. 



§ 26. (c) His contention that man is only the first of 
the animal series and that Physiology is the complete 
science of man, is false. The only proof alleged is 
the assumption itself with the wise remark that they 
who refuse to accept it are immature in intelligence. 
As a logical consequence, some writers contend that 
Psychology is only a department of Physiology.^* 

§ 2y. To them thought and the soul are functions 
of the brain, and therefore a chapter in the sciences 
which studies the functions of organs. But there are 
two distinct orders of phenomena, psychical and phys- 
iological. The functions which Physiology studies 
are organic, and can be localized; Psychology inves- 
tigates inorganic acts, e. g., thought. Again the 
methods of investigation dififer. The facts of Physi- 
ology are known through the senses ; those of Psychol- 
ogy through introspection or self-consciousness. So 
great is the difference between the two orders of facts 
that while some men have denied the existence of 
things outside of our representations, e. g., Berkeley; 
the most determined sceptics, e. g., Hume, never 
questioned the validity of our actual psychic experi- 
ence.^^ 

§ 28. (d) M. Compte seems not to lack: presumption. 
In this way he supplies what is wanting from a scien- 



^Mr. Hodgson, Mr. James " Prin. of Psychology" I, ch. 
i, 6, 7, hold that there can be no science of Psychology except 
a cerebral Psychology; Dr. Maudsley rejects the method of 
introspection; he maintains that Psychology should be studied 
objectively, i. e., physiologically; that Physiology has done 
away with the old Psychology, cf. McCosh, Christianity and 
Positivism, p. 193. 

65 On the validity of Introspection as the Psychological 
method, cf. Stonyhurst "Psychology," ch. 11; W. G. Ward 
" Philosophy of Theism; " Dr. Martineau " Essays, cerebral 
Psychology." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. IO3 

tific point of view. He takes immediate observation of 
the senses as the test of truth. But what proof does 
immediate observation furnish for the initial point of 
his system, viz., the law of the Three States? Or for 
the fundamental principle of his theory of knowledge, 
viz., that the supra-sensible order is altogether inacces- 
sible to our minds? Or for the denial of the higher 
faculties in man, and as a consequence the rejection of 
the spiritual and social development and the relegation 
of history and sociology to the level of the physi- 
cal sciences? 

§ 29. (e) Finally, Compte's philosophy is positive in {fv^e'^hl- 
name only. It leads to uncertainty, doubt and unbe- misnome*. 
lief. He proclaimed the fundamental maxim of con- 
temporary infidel science: that exact observation by 
the senses is the only method of knowledge; what it 
gives we should accept; what it cannot verify, we 
should reject as of no value. He rigorously applied 
this principle to all branches of science and to all de- 
partments of human life. Now there are certain great 
verities in human life, ex. gr., God, soul, first prin- 
ciples of reason, the moral law; the capability of the 
mind to obtain truth, — not grasped by sense which 
stand out as bright lights, giving us our bearings and 
guiding the mind to the harbor of safety and rest. Posi- 
tivism blots these out of sight and leaves the mind, who 
trusts in it for guidance, like a vessel tossed to and fro 
adrift of its moorings. A philosophy that ignores the 
higher questionings of the mind and the higher aspi- 
rations of the heart cannot claim to be the guide of 
human life. Man is conscious that he is more than a 
brute. He is made to look upwards, not to grovel on 
the earth; he is to be uplifted, not depressed; he seeks 



104 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

more light, not shadows and darkness. To one, whose 
faith has been undermined and shattered by the poison 
of false philosophical principles, Positivism may seem 
like a beacon in the gloom. Feeling that God and 
things divine are out of reach, by an instinctive nobil- 
ity of nature he reaches out to his fellow-man. He is 
filled with the spirit of the " Grand Etre," he longs to 
devote himself to the service of Humanity. But this 
is only a tem.porary exaltation, a passing feeling, which 
yields to a deeper and more hopeless dejection.^^ The 
object of our eager and enthusiastic search was not to 
be found. The shadow lured, not the substance. As 
as a philosophy Positivism could not be lasting.^^ Its 
author never seemed to have a true conception of 
man's nature and dignity. Human nature rises up in 
protest against false and partial views of man. 

VH. 
Conclusion. 
§ 30. The attempt of Compte to found a philosophy 
has failed. His work is not Philosophy; and often 
erroneous and ridiculous from the scientific point of 
view. Nevertheless he is not without merit. He has 
left a philosophical theory of the sciences and of their 
methods which has value; he had great power of 
thought and of sympathetic conception; he has shown 
independence and impartiality in his judgments on the 

66 Cf. Robert Elsmere, by Mrs. H. Ward. 

67 A reaction has set in as shown by the revolt against the 
realistic school of fiction, by the publication of " Foundations 
of Belief," and by the signs of a religious awakening, e. g., 
acceptance of Christianity by Romanes. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. IO5 

Catholic church, on Protestantism, Liberalism and the 
Spiritual power.^^ 

§31. Positivism denies the existence of any super- 
sensible entity. This is a universal negative proposi- 
tion. To prove that it is false according to Logical 
principles we must show that its contradictory, i. e., 
the particular affirmative proposition is true. This is 
done in the following chapter by establishing the exist- 
ence of the human soul as a spiritual principle. 

^^ Cf. P. Gruber S. J. " Compte, sa vie, sa doctrine." 
14 



THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL. 

Se titie.^ § I • It is not enough to state and prove the fact that 
the human soul is an immaterial substance. Scholastic 
philosophy teaches that the soul of brutes is immate- 
rial. Now an essential difference separates the soul of 
the brute from that of man.-^ The difference consists 
in the element of spirituality which belongs to the 
human soul alone, and is expressed in the statement 
that the soul is a spirit. Hence the phrase employed 
in our manuals of philosophy, current in Catholic 
thought, which is the title of the present chapter. 

I. 

Explanation of Terms. 
§ 2. To prevent any misconceptions which might 
arise either from an exaggerated use of the words, or 
from false imputations respecting their meaning, it is 
necessary to set forth the clear and exact import of the 
notions. 

(1) spirit. § 2- (i°) A Spirit is an immaterial substance which 
is independent of matter in being and in act. 
It is essential to and characteristic of a spirit to exist 
and to exert its activity independent of matter. This 
separates it from all other existences, especially from 

BpSits simple immaterial entities. Thus, ex. gr., God is a 
spirit. But God is a pure spirit in the highest signifi- 
cation of the word; hence it is absolutely repugnant 
that He should ever be or become a soul. With good 
reason, therefore, Christian Theodicy rejects the con- 
tention of the Stoic philosophers that God is the soul 

1 S. Augustine De Lib. Arb. II, n. i8; de Trin. XV, n. i. 



ex. gr. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. IO7 

of the world. Below God there may be, as philoso- ^^^• 
phy infers, and are, as faith teaches, other spirits, e. g., 
angels. They are pure spirits created by God to exist ^°^®^* 
and act independently of any connection with matter. 
Thus it is conditionally, i. e., by reason of their creation, 
repugnant that they should ever be or become souls. 

§ 4. But the concepts of spirit and of soul, viewed in IJuY. ^^ 
themselves, are not mutually exclusive or repugnant. 
A spirit may be at the same time a soul. For this it 
is necessary and requisite that it have an intrinsic and 
natural tendency to vivify and actuate a body. Under 
one aspect it is a spirit; under another aspect it is a 
soul. In this case we have a spiritual soul, such as, ex. 
gr., the human soul. The human soul is a spirit be- 
cause it exerts its activities of thought and of will inde- 
pendently of the body; it is soul, i. e., anima, in as 
much as it vivifies and animates a body.^ 

§ S- (2°) The question for solution is not the possi- (2) the 

. . . ^ question 

mhty of such substances, but the fact; are there such to be 

-^ . . . solved. 

actually existing? In answer we point to our soul, 
which is the principle of vegetative, sensitive and in- 
tellectual life. 

§ 6. (3°) A spiritual soul is, therefore, a possibility ^^LSptsof 
and a fact. The error of Des Cartes and of his follow- spirit and 

of soul 

ers is in confounding the concepts. They require ^T^ ^is- 
dififerent definitions and are differently realized in dif- 
ferent things, e. g., an angel is a spirit but not a soul; 
man has a soul which is also a spirit ; the brute has a 
soul, which is not a spirit. 

§ 7. (4°) It is of the essence of the soul to vivify and ^ ^ ^°" • 
actuate a body, ex. gr., "anima " (soul) comes from the 
verb animare, i. e., to animate. The term, soul, is con- 
notative. It signifies a thing not absolutely, but as 

2 Cf. Aug. de an. et ejus origine, 1. VI, n. 2)7- 



I08 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

having a relation to something else, viz., the body 
animated; just as the term father signifies a man hav- 
ing a relation to another who is his son. To animate 
a body it is necessary that the soul be simple and im- 
SSateriai i^aterial. A spiritual substance is immaterial, but an 
uaf.^"^^*" immaterial substance is not on that account spiritual. 
The concept of immateriality is distinct from that of 
spirituality; the latter implies the former with some 
element in addition. To be spiritual a substance must 
be able to perform some acts without an intrinsic 
dependence on the body which it animates. The co- 
operation of a bodily organ is not required for spiritual 
acts; thus, ex. gr., we think abstract truths which can- 
not be embodied in matter. Thought is a spiritual act; 
the brain is not its organ in the same way as the eye is 
the organ of sight. Spiritual, therefore, is another 
word for super-organic.^ 
^ueSn ^ ^' ^5°^ -^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ purpose to prove that all the 
stated. acts of the human soul are super-organic. This is not 
true. The vegetative acts of digestion, ex. gr., and of 
assimilation, the sensitive acts of sight, of hearing, etc., 
are performed v/ith the intrinsic co-operation of the 
bodily organs, and are strictly speaking organic. The 
aim is to show that certain acts of the soul are super- 
organic ; that these very acts are characteristic of man ; 
and that as a logical consequence since the nature of a 
being is revealed in and known from its acts, the 
human soul does not depend for its existence on the 
intrinsic co-operation of the body. It is a fact that the 
soul and body united form one human composite; it 
is a fact that certain acts of the soul are performed 
with the intrinsic co-operation of the body so that they 

3 By spirit " proprie dici non universam animam sed aliquid 
. ipsius." Aug. de an. et ejus orig. 1, IV, c. 22, n. 36 sq. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. IO9 

belong more properly to the body and are called bodily 
acts; but it is also a fact that some acts of the soul are 
of a higher nature than these latter; and are, therefore, 
termed acts of the mind and of the will. We admit all 
this : At present, however, we are concerned only with 
the last statement, and on this our argument is based.* 

11. 
The Argument. 
§ 9. The reasoning rests upon data furnished by the j^^Jg^f.^"^ 
individual consciousness. The reader need but ex- gence. 
amine his own inner life to find phenomena which are 
not the outcome of sense and cannot be explained by 
sense. 

1°. Let Us Analyze the Facts of Intelligence. 
§ 10. (a) We have notions in the mind which are im- (a) from 
material and cannot be referred to any bodily organ, organic 

ri^i 1 • 1 111 notions. 

Ihey move on a plam above sense and belong to an 
order of entities which have nothing in common with 
the objects of sense. Our minds have the conception 
of God; we discourse of his infinity, of his mercy and 
loving kindness; with awe we contemplate his majesty 
and spotless holiness; our will is strengthened in a 
resolution to avoid vice and sin, and to practice virtue; 
we look forward to the future v/ith courage and hope. 
Yet these notions are the product of a bodily 
organ. They elude the grasp of sense and cannot be 
confined within its limits. I cannot see them with the 
eye, nor hear them with the ear, nor feel them with 
the hand. I may strive to picture them upon the im- 
agination and confine them to color and to form, but 

4Cf. St. Thomas I. Q. 75. 



no 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



like a bird they are away on the wings of thought far 
up into the deep empirion of mind and I sink back in 
failure. I may speak of them, but I do not exhaust 
their meaning; and to those who hear, the spoken 
word gives an insight into the mind's possibilities.^ 

§ II. We study Logic which treats of the laws of the 
mind, of the forms and modes of thought; Psychology, 
which investigates the nature of the soul, of mind and 
of will; Metaphysics, which sets forth necessary truths, 
the fundamental notions and principles on which the 
whole universe is constructed; Ethics, which contains 
the notions of right and wrong, and deals with the 
laws and relations of man in his individual, domestic 
and social life; Mathematics, which based on a few ab- 
stract truths rises into a structure of magnificent pro- 
portions, the pride and glory of intelligence;® Theodicy, 
which soars aloft to God and discourses on the nature 
of the divine attributes. We move in worlds beyond 
sensitive experience. The acts which we elicit are 
not the product of an organ; they are super-organic 
and spiritual. We may therefore legitimately infer 
that their principle is also super-organic and spiritual.'^ 

§ 12. (b) It is not true to hold that the intellect 
knows only abstract truths and immaterial entities. 
Material things and objects of sense form part of its 
knowledge. The manner in which it apprehends these 
objects furnishes a strong proof of its inorganic 
nature.^ The sense, e. g., of sight perceives only the 



^ C. Gent. BII, ch. 49; Augustine de quan. an., n. 7, 8, 9, 22. 

'° Cf. S. Augustine De Lib. Arb. 1. ii, n. 22, 23, 24. 

'^ Aug. de an. et ejus origine 1. iv, n. 31; C. Gent. BII, ch (£', 
McCosh Christianity and Positivism, p. 208 sq. S. Augustine 
shows that the brute has not science. De quant. An., n. 49, 
50, 54. 

8 Aug. de Gen. ad Lit XII, n. 49, 50. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. Ill 

concrete, the particular, the object limited by the 
material determinations of color, size and form. The 
intellect grasps the very nature, which it conceives as 
abstracted from all concrete limitations, and as appli- 
cable to all individuals of the same class.^ This imma- 
terial abstract universal conception furnishes the basis 
for the intellectual process of classification. Hence, 
the distinction of genus, of species, of properties and 
of accidents, which are employed not only in the 
descriptive sciences, ex. gr., the classifications of Bot- 
any, of Zoology, but also in the ordinary conversation 
of daily life, ex. gr., we speak of a class of honest men, 
thus grouping individuals under the abstract concep- 
tion of honesty. So, also, analysis, synthesis, com- 
parison, inference, are intellectual processes which 
reveal in material objects relations utterly impervious 
to organs of sense. In fine, the masterpieces of art, 
the great sciences of nature appeal primarily to mind.^° 
§ 13. I stand on the sea-shore and look out over its 
heaving waves; my mind is filled with the thought of 
its mighty power and its trackless wastes. Or I turn 
my eyes upwards to the heavens studded with stars; in 

^ On difference between " sensation " and " thought " cf. S. 
Aug. de quant. An., n. 56, 57. 

1° " One of the most important functions of physical science, 
considered as a discipline of the mind, is to enable us by- 
means of the tangible processes of Nature to apprehend the 
intangible. The tangible processes give direction to the line 
of thought; but this once given, the length of the line is not 
limited by the boundaries of the senses. Indeed, the Domain 
of the senses, in Nature, is almost infinitely small in compari- 
son with the vast region accessible to thought which lies 
beyond them. From a few observations of a comet, when it 
comes within the range of his telescope, an astronomer can 
calculate its path in regions which no telescope can reach, 
and in like manner, by means of data furnished in the narrow 
world of the senses, we make ourselves at home in other and 
wider worlds, which can be traversed by the intellect alone." 
Tyndall " on Radiant Heat," in Fragments of Science. 



112 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

thought I pass beyond the horizon into the boundless 
reach of azure blue, and am filled with the notion of 
infinity. I listen with delight to a symphony of Bee- 
thoven, or to a masterpiece of Shakespeare; I gaze 
with pleasure upon a Raphael or a Murillo; I look 
with admiration at the grand and noble propor- 
tions of an ancient Cathedral. In thought I go out 
with reverence to the creative mind whose glory shines 
around and through them; I am conscious of strong 
•' sympathy for the genius of the worker; and the pleas- 
ure I feel is purely intellectual — the result of the 
influence of mind upon mind.-^^ 

§ 14. Finally it is mind which enables me to read 
your thoughts, to divine your feelings, to pierce stone 
walls, to gather up into a connected whole the experi- 
ence of a lifetime or the labors of centuries, to pass 
beyond the confines of the present with a view to pre- 
dict and plan for the future. In the light of this what 
basis can there be for Mr. Bain's contention that 
thought consists in organic movement? ^^ 
conscious- ^ ^^' ^^) ^^^ strongest and most convincing proof 
^®ss. that the mind is not an organic faculty is drawn from 

the phenomena of self-consciousness.^^ Conscious- 
ness is a sensitive act, e. g., a dog can feel pain. Self- 
consciousness, however, transcends sense; it is not 

^ St. Thomas I q. 75 a.. 2; I. Q. 84 A. I. " Natura animae 
praestantior est quam natura corporis, excellit multum; res 
spiritualis est, res incorporea est, vicina est substantiae Dei. 
Invisibile quidem est, regit corpus, novet membra, dirigit sen- 
sus, praeparat cogitationes, exserit actiones, capit rerum infin- 
itarum imagines." Aug. in Ps. 145. n. 4. 

12 Cf. Present Day Tracts, n. 42, " Points of Contact be- 
between Revelation and Natural Science," by Sir. J. W. 
Dawson. 

^ An interesting criticism of Tyndall's views on conscious- 
ness is given by Mallock in " Is Life Worth Living," p. 221 
sq. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. II3 

only an act by which I am aware of the facts afifecting 
me, but it is a faculty by which I can reflect upon my 
own acts and know myself to be their source and their 
subject. Hence I not only know, but I know that I 
know; in some wonderful manner the subject know- 
ing and the object known are one and the same, e. g., 
I myself know myself to do so and so. This power 
of reflection which is characteristic of self-conscious- 
ness cannot take place by the intrinsic co-operation of 
a bodily organ.^^ 

§ 16. Self-consciousness may be considered as an act fr^^^f* 
or as a state. As an act it is a judgment of the intel- 
lect; as a state it is a train of reflective thoughts upon 
self.-^^ Matter is not capable of an act of reflection, ^ffter? 
nor can it make itself the object of its own activity. 
The senses also, by reason of their organic nature, are 
immerged in matter and cannot have their acts as 
objects. Thus the eye sees, but it cannot see that it 
sees; the ear hears, but cannot hear that it hears; and 
so on for the rest. The mind, on the contrary, knows 
and knows that it knows. This reflection is a certain 
self-penetrating, self-acting power; it is a certain self- 
possession. 

§ 17. Physiology and Biology teach that after seven 
years the atoms of the human body undergo a com- 
plete change ; hence an old man differs physically and 
materially from what he was when a boy. Self-con- 
sciousness with memory, however, show his identity. 
The optical reflection of Physics, the reflection of 
Acoustics, e. g., the echo, differ essentially from the 
reflection of consciousness. Here the ego is at one matter, 
and the same time reflecting and reflected, active and 

i^Cf. St. Thomas I Q. 14. a 2. , 

15 St. Thomas I., q. 14, al. 



114 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

passive; it is a self-penetration and a self-possession, 
whereas in physics there is a real separation. In 
Physics we have matter in motion, subject to the laws 
of mechanics; the reflection of the ego may be com- 
pared to motion, but is by no means mechanical ; there 
is an analogy, but no identity. Self-consciousness has 
been called a " circular motion," a " wave." But cir- 
cular motion is only a return to the same point in 
space; it is not a reflection upon itself; nor is a " wave " 
different in kind from physical motion. " No body," 
writes the Angelic Doctor, " possesses an activity 
capable of reflecting upon the same body acting," and 
again, " a material body is set in motion only by 
parts." ^^ 

§ 1 8. Furthermore, a material entity or a sense- 
organ cannot divide itself into two parts, so that they 
may be identical with the whole; yet in self-conscious- 
ness the ego reflecting is distinguished from the ego 
reflected upon, but so that both parts possess each 
other ; for this reason St. Thomas calls the act " a 
complete return upon itself, * reditio completa.' " ^^ 
The phenomena of self-consciousness are the rock 
upon which Physics and Physiology have been shat- 
.tered in the effort to explain away the higher nature 
of men. Mr. Huxley, for example, has tried to 
explain them dynamically, i. e., by cerebration. He 
holds that cerebral molecules, animated with energy, 
produce them. Tyndall also contends that atoms, 
individually without sensation, combine in obedience 
to mechanical laws, with the result that organic forms, 
sensations and thought are due to their combinations.^^ 

16 C. Gent. BIT, ch. 49. 

17 De. Ver. ql. 

18 Cf. Belfast Address. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. II5 

How unfounded and arbitrary is this assertion, is evi- 
dent from a careful analysis of the nature of the act. 
Leibnitz long ago set the attempt convincingly aside." 

2°. The Phenomena of Will. 
§ IQ. Another series of considerations tending- with (2) from 

, . , , . . ^ , the will. 

cumulative force to prove the inorganic nature of the 
soul, is drawn from the phenomena of the will.^ 
There is in man not only a tendency to objects which 
belong to the order of sensitive experience; there is 
also a higher, a rational tendency to good as appre- 
hended by the intelligence. 

§ 20. The train of reasoning is, therefore, based from 
Upon the existence of a Rational will. Consciousness win. 
testifies that every act of rational will presupposes a 
previous act of knowledge. " Ignoti nulla cupido " is 
a truth of individual experience. Now the will desires 
and acquiesces in spiritual goods ; hence, the act of the 
intellect which antecedes this desire must be spiritual. 
Viewed in this aspect an additional argument is had 
for the spiritual nature of the mental act. The direct 
and obvious proof, however, is drawn from the nature 
of the tendency itself. 

§ 21. (a) A tendency which, in its exercise is bound ^g^^^^to* 
up with the body or a part of the bodv, is limited to an abstract 

, , ' classinca- 

what is particular and concrete. It cannot go out to <^ion. 
the universal or embrace a class of individual objects. 
Nevertheless, I know from my own conscious experi- 
ence, that I can hate not only a bad man, but also the 
class of bad men; that I can love not only a good man, 
but also the class of good men; that I can shun the 

19 Cf. Monology, § 17. 

20 St. Thomas i, 2, q. 22 sq. 



Il6 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.. 

company of thieves, murderers or robbers, and seek 
the fellowship of the good, the wise, the just. The ten- 
dency to an abstract classification, as proposed by the 
intellect, has nothing in common with an inclination 
whose exercise is bound up with an organ of sense.^^ 
(b) to su-^ § 22. (b) An organic tendency cannot be directed to 

perorganic . . 

objects. objects which transcend the bounds of sensible expe- 
rience. It is as evident that sense cannot grasp what 
is beyond sense, as that my arm cannot reach out to 
what is beyond its reach. Now, individual experience 
shows that there is in us a tendency to objects which 
are purely immaterial. Thus, I love truth; I strive 
after Christian virtue; I am inflamed with patriotism; 
I hate sin; I esteem integrity; I prize honor; I prac- 
tice honesty; I strive to reproduce in my own life the 
great Christian virtues of humility, charity, self-denial, 
self-sacrifice, etc. This tendency cannot be organic 
because of the spiritual nature of its objects. It is, 
therefore, inorganic, and we legitimately infer that the 
principle from which it springs, viz., the will, is inor- 
ganic also.^2 

(c)from §2^. (c) Another consideration is drawn from con- 
conscience . . 

science, which reveals the existence of a moral law 

binding upon the will. There is in every man, by vir- 
tue of his rational nature, a participation of a certain 
eternal and immutable law, which is none other than 
the light of intelligence implanted in us by God, with 
a view to guide us in the knowledge of what we 
should do and what we should avoid. By its assist- 
ance we decide with certainty and without hesitation 
that certain things are good, that others are bad, that 



21 C. Gent. BIX, ch. 6o; " adhuc intellectus, etc." Sum- 
Theol. I, q. 8o, a. i. 
22 C. Gent. BIL c. 82. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 11/ 

we should avoid all evil acts, and that we should per- 
form those good acts which conduce to the mainte- 
nance of order. If I act according to the dictates of 
this law within me, the still small voice of conscience 
praises, and I feel a new accession of strength, whence 
I know not But if I act in opposition to its behests, 
I am conscious of shame, of blame, of sorrow, of 
remxorse. 

§ 24. Its sanction is clear, definite and unfailing. 
Though in the silence of my room, secure from the 
sight of another, I should commit an act which is 
wrong, I carry within me a witness, a judge, an aven- 
ger, who exacts the last farthing of punishment. 
Again confident and strong in the approbation of con- 
science I strive for what is right and just, holding as 
of little value the idle comments of those around me. 
Conscience has made heroes in the past and conscience 
enlightened by Christian faith has made saints and can 
make saints of us all.^^ Now the basis and law of this 
binding force cannot be sought for in an organic fac- 
ulty; it is absolute, universal and transcends all sensi- 
tive experience. We must conclude, therefore, that it 
is inorganic and spiritual.^* 

§ 24. (d) Finally we appeal to the phenomena of ^^ijif^®®" 
free-will. That we are free is here an assumed fact; 
it is proved at length elsewhere.^^ Liberty of will is 
the crowning perfection of man's volitional nature, just 
as self-consciousness is the climax of intellectual devel- 
opment. It means the power of self-determination. 

23 Cf. The Great Enigma by W. S. Lilly, p. 21. 

24 St. Thomas I2, q. 21, al; q. 91, a2 ad 2; Rickaby, ch. IV; 
Newman Gram, of Assent, p. 106. 

25 Cf. Rickaby; Fonsgreave " Le Libre Arbitre; " Dr. Ward 
" Philosophy of Theism." 



Il8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fjje*^^"^* §25. Matter has no such power, ex. gr., physical 
activity can be considered as (a) velocity, which 
depends on intensity of impulse and the mass (b) 
direction, hence the law of the parallelogram of the 
forces (c) mechanical work, hence the law of the con- 
servation of energy and the value of living force. 
Underlying and ruling these forms of activity there 
is the law of inertia. Now inertia implies complete 
passive indifiference, but liberty means activity in the 
highest sense — the power of self-determination; iner- 
tia contains the element of necessitation in its very 
concept, liberty excludes external compulsion and 
internal determination. Thus inertia as an essential 
property of manner and liberty as an essential prop- 
erty of will are contradictory.^^ 
miuer^ § 26. An Organic act is under the control of physical 

not free, forces and of external agents. The senses necessarily 
receive impressions; ex. gr., I cannot help seeing with 
my open eye, or hearing with my ear. On the con- 
trary the will can select some motives presented by 
the intellect and set aside others, can choose some 
objects and reject others, it can despise a motive, 
abstain from acting, or deliberately choose the oppo- 
site. Moreover modern Physiology teaches the law of 

26 Cf. Janet " Traite Elementaire de Philosophic," vol. i, 
p. SS7. " After having admitted first, the notion of ponder- 
able matter, then that of ether, later the notion of actual 
movement, and then that of potential movement, contempor- 
ary science is compelled to recognize still another force, a 
soul-power, in order to satisfactorily understand the observed 
and observable facts. Experimental Physics demonstrates 
that morality is possible, that duty and free-will can be 
affirmed, and consequently, that men can escape from the 
mechanical determinism without upsetting the order of the 
universe." Conclusion of a lecture delivered at Paris, 1893, 
by M. Pictet, now Prof, of Physics in Berlin; cit. in Amer. 
Jour, of Psych., 1892-93, p. 511. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. IIQ 

the specific energy of the senses, i. e., the organs of 
sense each in its own specific way respond to an exter- 
nal stimulus, e. g., an electric current to the eye is a 
spark, to the ear a sound, to the taste something bitter. 
Finally the existence of Psycho-Physics, which is the 
result of efforts made to formulate a law between the 
stimulus and the sensation, show the dependence of 
the organs on material impulses, and prove that they 
are not free. 

§ 2^. Not so the acts of the will. I have the power 
to resist a strong inclination, and to chose a weaker 
one; a short message announcing a death may cause 
in my will emotions altogether out of proportion to 
the stimulus; I feel no necessity, nor do the same 
things always afifect my will in the same manner. I 
may chose to-day what I despised yesterday; and from 
many diverse objects I am at liberty to select here and 
now w^hatsoever I please. It follows that the will can- 
not be an organic force, else we should be necessitated 
to act according to impressions, and these impressions 
would be the determining cause of human action. 
Consciousness and common sense testify to the con- 
trary. Hence, we speak of a person who is apt to be 
guided by impressions as a man who lacks discrimina- 
tion and good judgment.^^ 

3°. Human Speech. 

§ 28. Besides the endowment of spiritual faculties 
man possesses the gift of human speech. This is the 
instrument and expression of thought and volition. 
By language I hold converse with the greatest minds 
in all ages; I know their thoughts, aims and desires; 

27 St. Thomas Sum. Theol. i, q. 115, a. 4. 



120 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

or I comniiinlcate with those about me in the various 
occupations of daily Hfe, in school, at business, in the 
professions, in the family, in discharging the obliga- 
tions of friendship. The power of speech is character- 
istic of the human race.^^ It is an insurmountable bar- 
rier between man and beast. Some scholars, forgetful 
of the higher nature of man, go to excess in holding 
that language is the only difference which marks man- 
kind distinct from the animal kingdom.^ 
of ian-°° ^ § 29. During the present century the science of Com- 
guage. parative Philology has sprung into existence. It is 
based upon the analysis of language. In every lan- 
guage are found certain roots or phonetic types which 
are regarded as ultimate elements. From these roots 
language has developed. The laws of the growth are 
phonetic decay and dialectic regeneration.^^ Now^ an 
examination of the roots or the ultimate elements of 
speech shows that their formation requires a mind cap- 
able of abstraction, and of forming universal con- 
cepts.^^ The roots signify something proper, peculiar 
and characteristic of an object, and are, therefore, 
always abstract and universal.^^ From the very struc- 
ture of language, therefore, we infer the existence of a 
mind which is super-organic and spiritual.^ 

28 Cf. Mivart Truth, p. 351 sq., 224 sq., 279. 

29 Muller Science of Language II, p. 372. 
2° Muller Science of Language, vol. I. 

^^ Cf. Mivart Truth, p. 232; Tyler Primitive Culture vol. i, 
p. 216; Muller Science of Thought, ch. IV. 

22 Cf. Whitney Language and Study of Language, ch. VIL 
^ The power of expressing his thoughts by articulate 
sounds has ever been considered as the distinctive character 
of man; the absence of articulate language in animals is not 
explained on merely anatomical grounds; again some animals, 
ex. gr., parrot, are capable of uttering articulate sounds, cf. 
Dr. Th. Bischoft' on Difference Between ]\Ian and Brutes in 
Anthrop. Rev. of London Society, vol. I, p. 54. 



SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL AND MODERN 
SCIENCE. 

§ I. The spirituality of the soul has been bitterly 
assailed. The modern school of Materiahsm and of 
cerebral Physiology have made this thesis a point of 
attack. They have employed every means to show 
that the soul is material or at least organic. The rea- 
sons alleged in support of their contention are so spe- 
cious that they deserve a special consideration. 



Correlation of Thought to the Structure of 
THE Brain. 

§ 2. Our adversaries contend that there is a strict The 
mathematical proportion and correlation between the °^J®^^^^^- 
perfection of the brain and the degrees of intelligence. 
As a consequence they infer that the knowledge of the - 
one is an infallible indication of the other. This con- 
tention is a logical consequence of their principles. 
Their whole argument is based upon a fallacy. From general 
the tmion of thought and of brain they infer the iden- ^" ^^^^^' 
tity. We hold that there is a union of thought and 
brain, as there is a union of soul and body, neverthe- 
less that they are essentially distinct. 

§ 3. The proofs they present are insufficient and rj-j^^j^. 
fallacious. p^'^^^^- 

1°. From Quantity of Brain-Matter. From 

(a) They appeal to the quantity of brain matter; hence of brain- 

1 . , . , , , , matter. 

the greater is the quantity of cerebral matter, the more 
intelligent is the being. To ascertain the quantity, 
they employ various criteria; either directly, by tak- 



122 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ing the volume of the cerebral mass; or indirectly by 
measuring the capacity of the empty skull. In the 
former case the brain is weighed immediately after 
death. In the latter case the skulls of all peoples, both 
ancient and modern, contribute to the questionings of 
science. The tombs of ancient Egypt, the ruins of 
excavated cities furnish materials for study. Topinard 
and Broca have adopted this method, because more 
universal and apparently more scientific. By appeal- 
ing to archaeolog}^, ethnology, etc., they hoped to 
prove that in proportion as peoples advanced in civili- 
zation, the volume of the brain likewise increased. 
weigS"^ § 4. (a) If the criterion of weight were valid it should 
apply to all living creatures. But facts prove conclus- 
ively that it is not of any value. Thus, ex. gr., the 
brain of an 
(1) abso- Elephant weighs 3,000 grammes, 
weight. Dolphin weighs 1,800 gr. 

Whale weighs 1,500 gr. 

Man weighs 1,300-1,400 gr. 

Horse weighs 600 gr. 

Ox weighs 500 gr. 

Monkey weighs 400-600 gr. * 

Donkey weighs 360 gr. 

Dog weighs 80 gr. 

Cat weighs 30 gr. 

Now, in the hypothesis the elephant and whale 
should be more intelligent than man; the ox more 
intelligent than a monkey; while the dog and cat 
should show signs of the least intelligence. Experi- 
ence shows that this is not true. Hence the hypothesis 
must be abandoned. 
ulr^^' § 5- (2) Recourse was then had to the method of 

weight. relative weight, i. e., the weight of the brain should be 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I23 

considered not absolutely but in proportion to the 
weight of the individual body. But the results have 
been just as unsatisfactory. In this case the infant 
should be four times superior in intelligence to the fully 
developed man ; the monkey would be superior to man ; 
while the dog would be inferior to the bat, the horse to 
the donkey and man to the canary.^ 

§ 6. (i) Driven from this position thev sous^ht (3) to the 

- . ' . . . . ' . , enceph- 

refuge in proposmg as a criterion the weight of the aion. 
brain compared to the encephalon, i. e., rest of the 
head, e. g., the medulla oblogata and cerebellum. In 
this case man would be placed almost on a level with 
the duck or the crow. 

§ 7. (4) Finally, an attempt was made to weigh the ntrvSus^ 
nervous system as a whole. But this is impossible; the '^y^^®"^- 
nerves and fibres are too delicate and complex to per- 
mit its successful accomplishment. As a fact many 
men of great intelligence possessed a small, or frail 
and sickly body, ex gr., Alexander Pope. Moreover, 
even if successful, we could not admit that the process 
is scientific, because the organs and nerves of the body 
have not all the same functions, or importance or 
dignity.^ 

1 Tiedeman says that at birth the proportion of brain to 
body is i to 5.85 in the male; but this diminishes with years, 
e. g., at 10 years, i to 14; at 20 years, i to 30, and later on. i 
to 36. Bischoff says that in man the relative weight of Brain 
to the body is 1:35; in whale, 1:3300; in elephant, 1:500; in ox, 
1:900; in horse, 1:550; in dog, 1:250. Yet he tells us that the 
law is not general, ex. gr., in canary and greenfinch, 1:14; in 
some apes, 1:13, i. e., sajou, and in the Sanniri, 1:24. cf. 
Dr. Th. Bischoff on Difference Between Man and Brutes in 
Anthrop. Rev. of London, vol. I, p. 54. 

2 Among the Magyars short individuals had heaviest, and 
middle-sized, the lightest brain, cf. Weight Proport. of Brains 
of Austrian Peoples by Dr. Weisbach in Anthropol. Rev., vol. 
VII, p. 92. 



124 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(5) restrict- 
ed to 
human 
species. 



brain of 
woman. 



brains 

different 

races. 



§ 8. (5) The failure of these attempts was attributed 
to the fact that the appHcation was extended to all 
species, w^hereas, it should be confined within the limits 
of one only. Let us admit the truth of the complaint, 
and continue the experiment. We take the human 
species because the objection is aimed at destroying 
the higher nature of man. 

§ 9. Now, it is a fact that the brain of woman weighs 
less than man. Broca and Topinard show that 
between the ages of twenty and sixty years the weight 
of a woman's brain is from 125 to 164 grams less than 
that of man. Nevertheless, woman is not inferior to 
man in intelligence. She is capable of thoughts as 
sublime, of deeds as heroic, of efforts as admirable. In 
history-, in science, in philosophy, in letters, she has 
left productions not inferior to man's ; even in theology 
we have St. Catherine of Alexandria and St. Teresa. 

§ 10. It is false to maintain a natural mental infer- 
iority in w^omen. She differs from man anatomically 
and physiologically; the nervous system is more deli- 
cate and sensitive; the whole organization conspires 
to make her fit for her duties of motherhood. This 
has an influence upon the mxoulding of character, and 
hence, indirectly upon the mental qualities; but it by 
no means makes her inferior. 

§ II. If we pass to a comparison of the brains of dif- 
ferent races, the facts we meet cannot be reconciled 
with their hypothesis. Mr. David gives, as a result 
of careful study, the following table :^ 

Ancient Britains 52.54 ounces 

English 50.28 ounces 



^ Cf. Contributions towards determining weight of brain in 
different races of man, by J. B. David, in Phil. Transact, of 
Royal Soc. of London, 1868, vol. 158, p. 505 sq. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I25 

Irish 49.62 ounces 

Merovingians 50.28 ounces 

French 47-21 ounces 

Italians 48.24 ounces 

Lapps 47-65 ounces 

Finns 48.31 ounces 

Hindus 44.22 ounces 

Dahomans 46.63 ounces 

Kafirs ' 49.04 ounces 

Esquimaux 49-^5 ounces 

Malays 50-13 ounces 

Dayaks 44.80 ounces 

New Caledonians 47-14 ounces 

New Hebrides 44.66 ounces 

Maoris 45-19 ounces 

Kanakas 47-^9 ounces 

According to Dr. Hunt the American negroes in 
slavery had the same brain capacity with the Hindus, 
who are a metaphysical race, ex. gr., weight of male 
Hindu 44.22 ounces, average weight of negro 46.96, 
or, according to Dr. Peacock, 44.34. Hence we find 
a high intellectual development in a nation remarkable 
for small brain.^ 

§ 12. Finally, let us examine the individual. That fodw?!-''®''* 
the weight is by no means proportionate to the intel- "*^^' 
ligence is evident from the following table :^ 

Cuvier 64.5 ounces 

Abercrombie 63. ounces 

Schiller 63. ounces 

Goodsir 57.5 ounces 

4Cf. Anthrop. Rev., vol. VII, p. 190; cf. also " Elements d' 
Anthropologic," par Topinard, ch, XVI. 
5 Cf. Bastian Brain as Organ of Mind, p. 369. 



1^6 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Spurzeim 55.06 ounces 

Jas. Simpson 54. ounces 

Dirichlet 53.6 ounces 

De Morny 53.5 ounces 

D. Webster 53.5 ounces 

Campbell, Lord Chancellor 53.5 ounces 

-^§"^ssiz 53.3 ounces 

Dr. Chalmers 53. ounces 

Fuchs 52.9 ounces 

De Morgan 52.75 ounces 

Gauss 52.6 ounces 

Judge Jeffry 51.8 ounces 

Dupuytreu 50.7 ounces 

Grote 49-75 ounces 

Whewell 49. ounces 

Herman (Philol.) 47.9 ounces 

Hughes Bennett 47. ounces 

Tiedman 44.2 ounces 

Hausmann 43.2 ounces 

Thus Cuvier's brain weighed 1,830 grams, Broca's 
1,484, Hausmann's 1,226, Gambetta's 1,160, whereas 
the average weight of the European brain varies 
between 1,350 and 1,360 grains. The heaviest brain 
measured, according to Bastian, is that of an illiterate 
Sussex bricklayer, which weighed 67 ounces, 14J 
ounces heavier than that of Dan. Webster. Turner 
cites women with brains of 50 ounces, and no evidence 
of high mental power.^ The weight of the brain of 
Laura Bridgeman was about 1,200 gr., its volume 
about 1,160 c. c; but the mean weight of the European 
female brain is, according to Bischoff, 1,244.5 gr., 
to Tiedman 1,275, to Huschke 1272, to Schwalbe 

^ Cf. Turner Anatomy, vol. I, p. 297. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. \2'J 

1,245/ Hence, Bastlan concludes that there is "no 
necessary or invariable relation between degree of 
intelligence of human beings and mere size or weight 
of the brain. Demented persons may have large 
brains; ordinary people have large brains; men of abil- 
ity have average or small brains."^ 

§ 13. If the degree of intelligence corresponds to the from the 
weight of the brain, the growth of the organ should be brain, 
proportionate to the development of the mental facul- 
ties. But the facts are contrary.^ In childhood the 
growth of the organ is very great, whereas the develop- 
ment of intelligence is very small, e. g., six months 
after birth the weight has doubled, at three years it 
has trebled, at seven years the growth becomes much 
retarded; nevertheless, the intelligence then only 
begins to develop. Again the maximum of cerebral 
development is had between the ages of fourteen and 
twenty; from twenty-five to forty the weight increases 
still more slowly; then diminishes. But reason and 
wisdom do not follow the same law in their develop- 
ment. Hence, we have the remarkable fact proved be- 
yond question that reason, judgment and wisdom in- 
crease, whilst the weight diminishes.-^" 

§ 14. Pathology of the brain presents facts which 
cannot be explained by the criterion of weight; ex. gr., 

'^ Cf. Brain of Laura Bridgeman by H. Donaldson, in Amer. 
Jour, of Psych., vol III, Sept., 1890. 

^ Bastian Brain as Organ of Mind, p. 369; cf. Quartrefages 
The Human Species, p. 410; Calderwood Brain and Mind, 
pp. 20, 503. 

9 S. Augustine considers this objection, and shows that the 
soul develops without any corresponding development of the 
body. cf. de. quant An., n. 27, 28, 29. 

10 Cf. Dr. Body's Table of Weight of Human Body in Phil. 
Trans, of Royal Soc. of London, vol. CLI, year 1861, p. 241; 
Weight Proportions of Austrian Peoples by Dr. Weisbach, 
in Anthr. Rev., vol. VII, p. 92; Gray's Anatomy, p. 707. 



128 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the human brain is composed of two hemispheres; 
nevertheless, we know instances where intelHgent men, 
e. g., Broca, who possessed an average brain, and have 
carried on their mental labors with only one hemis- 
phere, and gave no sign of lack of intellect.^^ '' It is 
impossible," writes Mr. Donaldson, " to judge by the 
scales alone about the intellectual capacity of a given 
person, or even whether he was healthy, criminal or 
insane." ^^ 

§ 15. (b) Measurement: This method is considered 
more scientific than^that of weight; it can be applied 
to the skulls of past ages. Therefore, more stress is 
laid upon it. The facts are as follows :^^ 

6 in the age of polished stone 1606 c. c. 

24 Gauls 1592 c. c. 

21 Egyptians of 4th dynasty 1532 c. c. 

12 Egyptians of iith dynasty 1443 c. c. 

9 Egyptians of i8th dynasty 1464 c. c. 

84 Merovingians 1 504 c. c. 

67 Parisians of 12th cent 1531 c. c. 

■ 77 Parisians of 19th cent 1559 c. c. 

74 Italians of 19th cent 1467 c. c. 

7 Maoris 1446 c. c. 

85 Negroes of W. Africa 1430 c. c. 

146 Ancient Britons 1524 c. c. 

1 16 Kanakas 1470 c. c. 

9 Esquimaux. . . 1535 c. c. 

36 Anglo-Saxons 1412 c. c. 

9 Lapps ^ 1440 c. c. 

12 Dahoman Negroes 1452 c. c. 

^1 Cf. Calderwood Brain and Mind, p. 317; Ferrier Func- 
tions of the Brain, § 89. 
^2 Cf. Growth of the Brain. 

13 Cf. Elements D'anthropologie by Topinard, ch. XVII; 
Anthropology of Topinard tr. by R. Bartley. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I29 

These facts show that savages and ancient races 
have a skull capacity equal and even superior to mod- 
ern and civilized peoples. If this criterion were our 
guide, we should then be compelled to conclude that 
the Esquimaux are equal to the Parisians of the pres- 
ent day, and superior to the Europeans; that the 
Anglo-Saxon is inferior to the Dahomen Negro, and 
is almost at the lowest scale of humanity. 

§ 16. 2°. From quality of brain '}^ An examination of ^"^fff^ 
the quality of brain-m.atter leads to the same irrefut- 
able conclusion. We may distinguish chemical and 
physical qualities. Neither one nor the other, nor both 
combined, can explain the fact or the degree of 
intelligence. 

§ 17. (a) The chemical theory of life and of thought (a) chem- 
is based upon the chemical discoveries of digestion, of life and 
etc. These discoveries are good; they mark an 
advance, and contribute much to the maintenance of 
the health of the individual. The mistake is made in 
extending their influence beyond just limits. Because 
chemical elements are found in the organism, it does 
not follow^ that they can explain life and thought. 

§ 18. As a result of the introduction of the synthetic 
method, chemists have produced in the laboratory 
organic substances or certain compound substances 
which are found only in living beings, e. g., urine, 
formic acid, lactic acid. Hence they infer that life is 
due to ordinary chemical forces alone. They maintain 
that all living powers are cognate; that all living forms 
are fundamentally of one character; and that protop- 

15 Physiologists of to-day have been compelled to abandon 
the hypothesis of quantity. The present position is that 
thought is explained by quality of the brain, i. e., by the con- 
volutions and the grey matter. Cf. Gray's Anatomy, p. 707; 
McClellan's Regional Anatomy, vol. I, p. 25. 

17 



130 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

lasm is the formal basis of all life. This protoplasm 
contains the four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen 
and nitrogen ; these, when brought, together under cer- 
tain conditions, give rise to protoplasm, which exhibits 
the phenomena of life. The inference is obvious that 
" all vital' action may be said to be the result of the 
molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it. 
And if so, it must be true, in the same sense and to the 
same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now 
giving utterance and your thoughts regarding them, 
are the expression of molecular changes in that matter 
of life which is the source of our other vital phe- 
nomena.^^ 

§ 19. The animal or plant is an organism. It takes 
in certain materials from the outside w^orld, and by a 
organic certain process forms therefrom organic substances 
tances. which are immediately assimilated into tissue, etc., for 
its own nourishment. Again certain material in the 
organism which has been used and no longer con- 
tributes to its nourishment, is insensibly detached and 
gradually expelled into the outside world. Some of 
these waste substances are inorganic and others are 
organic, e. g., urine, formic acid. The mineral sub- 
stances which enter the organism and the inorganic 
matter which has been expelled, belongs to inorganic 
chemistry and are under the sway of its laws. The 
organic waste substances, however, pertain to organic 
chemistry. Now chemists have succeeded in produc- 
ing organic waste substances. But can chemistry arti- 
ficially produce true organic substances — substances 
fit to be immediately assimilated by the organism? 

§ 20. Pasteur has proved by experiments that these 
organic substances in the organism possess properties 

^^ Huxley, Lay Serm. " Physical Basis of Life." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I3I 

which the artificially produced substances lack. More- 
over, chemistry is unable to produce an organ. Much organ, 
less can it hope to produce an organism. It is power- 
less to explain why the materials so combine that life 
results. The products of chemistry always want the 
properties and characteristic of life, e. g., growth, organism, 
nutrition, propagation. The persistence of these acts, 
their concentrated action, the fixity of the specific type, 
the permanence of the individual throughout the 
stages of its growth, the transmission of life by gener- 
ation are characteristics of the living organism which 
science is utterly unable to imitated The chemists 
may analyze and combine, but cannot produce the liv- 
ing being. The germ of life is wanting. 

§21. Mr. Tyndall admits that the chemist can pro- 
duce organic substances, but says that life can come " 
only from demonstrable antecedent Hfe.^^ What 
makes, asks Mr. Preyer, the materials of a seed or of 
an egg so combine that life results from their activity? 
In vain does chemistry grope for an answer.^^ Mr. 
Haeckel bids us look to carbon for the cause, but does 
not tell how it is.^° 

§ 22. Ap-ain the methods of chemistry and the meth- inetii9dsof 

° -^ chemistry 

ods of life are totally different. Chemistry employs and of life, 
electric currents and excessive heat to obtain certain 
results. Life employs gentle means and an ordinary 
temperature; nothing seems forced and the activities 
maintain a normal mode. 

§ 23. If chemical qualities cannot explain life, with conclusion, 
greater reason they are powerless to solve the problem 

1^ D'Hulst Melang. Philos., p. 170 sq. 

18 Belfast Add. Prof. Tulloch Modern Theories in Phil- 
osophy and Religion, p. 157. 

1^ Cf. Lange History of Materialism, vol. Ill, p. 61, note. 
20 lb., p. 56. 



132 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of mind. The attempt, however, has been made. 
Molleschott, ex. gr., held that " without phosphorus, 
there is no thought." Feuerbach adopted this; and 
Tyndall cites it in Fragments of Science.^^ But why- 
phosphorus? No reason is given. It is an arbitrary 
assumption. Furthermore, the brains of the two ani- 
mals proverbially stupid, ex. gr., sheep and goose, show 
the most phosphorus. 

sjcai quaii- § 24. (b) But may not physical qualities of the brain 
supply the explanation we seek? By physical quali- 
ties are understood the number, depth and variety of 
the convolutions. Of this theory M. Topinard is the 
most eloquent exponent. The convolutions contain 
the grey substances, on the amount of which intelli- 
gence depends, hence he says the more numerous are 
the convolutions, the more grey matter is had. 

§ 25. If intelligence depend on the convolutions, 
experiments would be in its favor. Nevertheless 

criticism, some animals possess remarkable instinct who have 
smooth skulls, e. g., squirrel, rat, mouse, beaver. On 
the other hand the ox and cow have many convolu- 
tions in the skull, yet are by no means remarkable for 
intelligence. According to this criterion the elephant 
should be more highly gifted than man; the ass and 
sheep should be the equal of the elephant and superior 
to the dog; and the woman should be the inferior of 
man. Again the brain of man and of the chimpanzee 
are very much alike in structure; yet there is a vast 
difference in intelligence.^ Moreover, there are ex- 
amples of men who were highly gifted in mental pow- 
ers, yet whose brains were not more complex than 
the ordinary brain, and, on the contrary, instances of 

21 Cf. Scient. Materialism. 

22 Cf. Quatrefazes " Human Species." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 133 

brains remarkable for convolutions without any sign of 
great endowments.^^ 

§ 26. Finally regularity is by no means a necessary 
condition. Bichet, who held this opinion, is said to 
have had one hemisphere smaller than the other. 
Experience shows that intelligence is compatible with 
small, unsymmetrical and badly formed skulls. There 
may be exceptions to our reasoning. Let us grant 
that there are. We contend that Materialism should 
not base a theory upon exceptions. It is not scientific. 
Furthermore, their conclusion should have the force of 
a physical universality. If not, it falls to the ground; 
for they contend to establish a physical law.^* 

§ 27. Science, therefore, is powerless to prove the 
strict correlation of intelligence to the size or structure 
of the brain. As a final resource they appeal to occult 
qualities. Thus Ferrier writes "There is in the head 
an Unknown which science has not yet been able to 
determine." But how bitterly have they ridiculed 
such a position in endeavoring to explain the source of 
life!^^ They are compelled to make the admission 
because there is in the human brain something which 
IS not matter, but is independent of matter in exist- 
ence and action, viz., a spiritual soul or mind.^ 

- 23 Cf. Calderwood Relations of Brain and Mind, pp. 24, 503. 
24 Cf. P. Janet " Le Cerveau et la Pense." 

26 Cf. Huxley " Physical Basis of Life" in Lay Sermons, 
p. 137. 

27 " The alleged scientific principle," writes Prof. Ladd, " of 
psycho-physical parallelism, is far from being the self-evident 
conclusion of modern psycho-physical research which it is so 
often and so rashly assumed to be. Even the simplest rela- 
tions between the phenomena of the lowest order of con- 
sciousness and the concomitant cerebral activities, are far too 
fluctuating, complicated and changeable to be subsumed under 
this principle. Of parallelism in space we cannot speak ap- 
propriately in this connection. Of parallelism in time there 



134 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

II. 

stated!^^ ^^^ Localization of Function. 

§ 28. A strong objection to the Spirituality of the 
soul is drawn from the attempt to fix the basis of our 
activities in different parts of the brain, i. e., from local- 
ization of function. The aim is to show that the soul 
is not one principle, but a collection of many princi- 
ples ; and that in its existence and action it is bound up 
completely with the organs, and hence organic, not in- 
organic. The contention appears the stronger and the 
more specious because it contains an element of truth. 
A careful analysis will unfold its full meaning and 
enable us to estimate its true force. 

con^ctiwi. § 29. The conviction that certain activities of the 
soul are organic or connected in some special manner 
with particular parts of the human body is no discovery 
of recent times, but is as old and widespread as human 
nature, and is revealed in the phrases of every lan- 
guage. Thus we say that the eye sees, that the brain 
thinks, that the heart feels. In the present century, 
however, the attempt was made to investigate this line 
of thought and to throw the conclusions into scientific 
form. 

§ 30. Gall based his protests against the ultra spir- 
itualistic school of Des Cartes on physiological 
grounds. He set forth his system in a work of four 
volumes.^''^ In it are contained the two principles 

is only an incomplete and broken analogy. And when one 
tries to think out clearly the conception of a complete quali- 
tative parallelism, one finds the principle soon ending in in- 
adequacy, and finally becoming unintelligible and absurd." 
Ladd Phil, of Mind, p. 344. 

27a " Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System and 
of the Brain," 1810-1817. 



GaU. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 135 

characteristic of his system, (a) The human brain is 
the instrument of all the higher powers in man, and 
each faculty is located in a very circumscribed portion, 
(b) The outer form and shape of the skull exactly cor- 
responds to the inner form and shape of the brain, so 
that by an examination of the protuberances we may 
infer the inclinations and degrees of the faculties. 
Gall marked out twenty-six and Spurzeim thirty-five 
portions of the skull which were considered the organs 
of distinct propensities, as, ex. gr., murder, theft, wit, 
secretiveness, etc.^ 

§ 31. This theory is unscientific, is based on arbitrary criticised. 
assumptions and has been completely discredited by 
Physiology and Anatomy.^^ His classification of the 
faculties is of no value whatever; the method is unsci- 
entific and he confounds sense with intellect. The 
assignment of the faculties to so many different areas 
of the skull is purely imaginary, is false and is held 
up to ridicule by contemporary science. The second 
principle has been likewise discarded. Experiment 
has shown that the badger, the fox and dog have brains 
almost identical, yet how unlike are their skulls ! Again 
in man the skull varies in thickness, and a membrane 
may be found between skull and brain, thus destroy- 
ing the similarity of conformation,^® 

§ 32. The theory of Gall has failed, but interest in brain 
the study of the human brain has steadily increased. ^ ^ ^* 
The peculiar shape of the head, its complexity, the dif- 
ferent lobes, etc., naturally excite the curiosity of the 
student and lead to experiments as to the functions 
of the parts and their mutual relations. The methods 

^ Cf. Dr. Bastian " the Brain as an organ of mind," ch. X. 
29 Cf. Sully The Human Mind I, p. 50. 
^ Cf. Surbled Le Cerveau. 



13^ CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, 

pursued in the investigation are more scientific and the 
conclusions are carefully tested. Hence the depart- 
ment of cerebral Physiology, which is the product of 
our own times.^^ The results obtained by these inves- 
tigations are very interesting, and at first sight may 
seem to be a strong objection to the doctrine set forth 
in the preceding chapter. To make the criticism more 
exact, it is necessary to classify the facts.'*^ 
(n sensa- § ^^^ (jos^ Sensation: M. Broca, in 1861, obtained the 
first scientific result by localizing the centre of articu- 
late speech in the third frontal convolution near the 
fissure of Silvius and the island of Reil.^^ The way was 
opened to some important discoveries.^^ Thus, ex, gr., 
(a) The phenomena of Aphasia have been connected 
with an injury to this convolution. These pathologi- 
cal facts are complex and are Hke the phenomena ob- 
served in acquiring a language.^^ Sometimes com- 
plete aphasia is found, as in fever; after recovery 
speech may return, ex. gr.. Card. Messofanti, or it must 
be again learned.^^ More frequently, however, it is 

21 Cf. Encyc. Brittan. art. Physiology. 

22 Cf. Six Lectures on Cerebral Localization delivered by 
Prof. Donaldson before the Boston Medico-Psychological 
Society Feb. and March, 1891, and found in Amer. Jour, of 
Psych., vol. 4, 1891-92, p. 113 sq. 

33 Cf. Broca's Convolution as told by himself in Bulletin de 
la Soc. Anthrop. de Paris, 1861, p. 326; La circonvolution de 
Broca, par G. Herve, Paris, 1888. 

34 Cf. Sully The Human Mind, vol. 1, 312, 354; James Psych., 
vol. I, p. 30 sq. 

35 Cf. Ribot Diseases of the Memory. 

36 " A case is recorded by Dr. Hun, of Albany, the sufferer 
being a blacksmith, thirty-five years of age, who, after a long 
walk under a burning sun, was seized with symptoms of 
congestion of the brain, and for several days lay in a state 
of stupor. V/hen he recovered from this state he understood 
what was said to him, but had great difficulty in expressing 
his desires in words, on account of which he resorted to 
signs to convey his meaning. If the name of a thing he 
wished was uttered in his hearing, he would say " Yes, that 



» CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I37 

partial; at times some words are retained, e. g., "no 
doubt," an oath, etc.; again certain letters or figures 
are lost; or technical words only are remembered; or 
a class of words cannot be recalled, e. g., nouns; or 
the person affected cannot speak, but can sing, and 
vice versa.^^ 

§ 34. (b) Writing memory, i. e., agraphy, has been ^V!^"^*" 
localized at the basis of the second frontal convolution 
of the left hemisphere. A lesion here causes the loss 
of writing movements. The phenomena are varied 
also and very strange, e. g., the person affected can 
write music only, or can write his name, or a few 
words only, (c) Auditory Aphasia or Verbal Deaf- ^2J^S=^ 
ness is located in the first and second temporal convo- 
lution of the left hemisphere along the fissure of Sil- 
vius. In this case the word is heard as a noise or 
sound, not as a sign of language.^^ Verbal deafness is 
complete or partial, e. g., a student cannot understand 
French, or a certain number of words or musical 
sounds.^^ 

is it," but he still continued unable to name it. After fruit- 
less attempts to repeat a word, Dr. Hun wrote it for him, and 
then he w^ould begin to spell it letter by letter, and after a 
few trials was able to pronounce it. If the writing were now 
taken from him he could no longer pronounce it, but after 
long study of the written word and frequent repetitions, he 
would learn it so as to retain it, and afterwards use it. He 
kept a slate on which the words he required most were writ- 
ten, and to this he referred when he wished to express him- 
self. He gradually learned these words, and extended his 
vocabulary so that after a time he was able to dispense with 
his slate." In Dublin Quart. Journal, p. 53, Feb., 1891, cit. 
by Calderwood Mind and Brain, p. 392. 

27 Cf. Ferrier " The Functions of the Brain," § 99; cf. W. A. 
Hammond Treatise on the Diseases of the Nervous System, 
ch. VII; Dr. Bateman "Aphasia." 

2^ Cf, Carpenter Mental Physiology, p. 437 sq. 

39 Cf. Mind III, p. 157; Sully The Human Mind, vol. I, p. 
Ill; Dr. Allen Starr "The Pathology of Sensory Aphasia" 
Brain, July, 1889. 

18 



138 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

{Jmdne^s! ^35* (^) Finally verbal blindness has been traced to 
a lesion of the second parietal convolution in the left 
hemisphere a little above the organ of verbal memory. 
In this case the person sees the writing, but cannot 
read it, like a child who has not yet learned the letters ; 
it is a foreign language to him ; there is no connection 
between the sign and the idea signified. Instances of 
partial verbal blindness are very singular, e. g., for 
words, but not for syllables; or for syllables, not for 
letters; or for letters, not for figures; or for Arabic, 
not for Roman figures. The localization of these sen- 
sitive activities is placed beyond doubt. Contempo- 
rary science admits their truth.^^ 

mo^vemeSt § 3^' (^°) ^^^"^oiis Movement: The localization of 
motor centres Avas proposed in 1861 by Mr. HughUngs 
Jackson. In 1870 Fritsch and Hitzig found that by 
touching certain parts of the brain with an electric cur- 
rent, muscular action in the body was the result. Fer- 
rier, Duret, de Carville continued the experiments on 
the same line.*^ It was found that the principal 

40 Cf. Diet, of Psych. Medecine by H. Tuke under " Mem- 
ory; " Annales de Phil. Cretienne Avril, '87; Farges " Le 
Cerveau L'ame," p. 181 foil. ; Transactions of Congress of 
American Physicians and Surgeons, 1888, vol. i, p. 278. Fer- 
rier and Munk attempted to localize the sense of sight, touch, 
smell and hearing, but they do not agree in the results 
obtained. Goltz says that the hypothesis which teaches that 
circumscribed centers subserve special functions in the cere- 
bral cortex is untenable, cf. Mind, April, 1882. And G. 
Croom Robertson, influenced by the data presented, inclines 
to Goltz's opinion in preference to Ferriers'. lb. cf. also, 
James Prin. of Psychology i, p. 31; Mind, vol. V, p. 89; vol. 
VII, p. 299. 

41 Hitzig's and Ferrier's results were confirmed by the N. Y. 
Society of Neurology, cf. N. Y. Med. Jour., March, 1875; 
also Localization of Function in Jour, of Anat. and Physiol. 
V. XII; Boston Med. and Surgical Jour. V, 91; Calderwood 
Brain and Mind, ch. IV; Psychological Review, 1895, vol. 2, 
p. 2>Z- 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I39 

groups of voluntary muscles could be put into action 
by exciting the parietal or the posterior half of the 
frontal lobe, hence the so-called '"* motor zone," i. e., 
the convolutions about the fissure of Rolando. Again 
a paralysis of these muscles was superinduced 
by removing the corticle coating of the same 
lobes. Yet functions, impeded by an operation on the 
cerebral cortex, are found to be restored by the vicar- 
ious action on the part of the centres surrounding the 
lost part.^^ These discoveries have been utilized in 
surgery. Thus successful operations, e. g., for epi- 
lepsy, contractures, paralysis have been performed.*^ 

§ 37. (3°) Reason: Made confident by the success in 3° Reason. 
locaHzing the centres of sensation and of nervous 
activity. Physiologists claim that certain parts of the 
brain are the areas of the rational faculties. Adopting 
the same method as in the preceding cases, they have 
exerted all their ingenuity to locate these centres. 
That a faculty be localized it is necessary, that (a) it 
should be isolated from all other activities; (b) that an 
organic lesion suppresses the activity connected with 
it; (c) that by the cure of the lesion the act is restored. 
Can these conditions be verified for the higher acts of 
the soul, e. g., the abstract idea, the judgment, reason- 
ing, free choice, hatred, love, etc.? 

§ 38. Science in vain seeks a favorable answer. The 
very nature of these activities so opposite to sense and 
motor acts show the futility of the attempt. The con- 
fessed inability of experimentators to map out the 
areas of thought shows that they are dealing with a 
problem which eludes the blade of the scalpel and lies 

42 Cf. Ravisson Rapport sur la Philos. du XIX Siecle, p. 189. 

43 Cf. Dr. Ferrier " The Functions of the Brain," ch. IX, 
§ 72; Mr. Hersley in Phil. Trans. V. 179, p. 205. 



I40 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

beyond the reach of the electric current. There is no 
ground to assign the intellectual powers to the " silent 
parts of the brain." These parts may be the seat of 
inhibitory powers controlling the nervous system. 
Hence we conclude that intelligence has its seat no- 
where in particular but has relation to all parts of the 
brain.^* 

conclusion. § -^9. The examination and classification of the ef- 
forts ma.de by scientists to localize the activities of the 
soul in certain portions of the cerebral cortex places 
the objection in its full and true light. Far from 
weakening, it only strengthens our Hne of reasoning. 
To prove the spirituality of the soul it is not necessary 
nor is it the aim to show that all its activities are inde- 

strengfh-^ pendent of the bodily organs.*^ The purpose is to show 

ened by : ^-^^^ ^^iq higher faculties — those distinctive and char- 
acteristic of man, are inorganic. The arguments pre- 
sented to substantiate this position were strong, and 
when taken together have an overwhelming force. 

failure to 'phg failure to localize the hig-her faculties must be con- 

locahze ... 

Y^viti sidered as an additional argument in favor of the thesis. 

§ 40. In like manner the success obtained in local- 
by success '^ ^ 

iniocaiiz- izing" nervous and sense-activity only strengthens our 

Ing sense ^ j j g 

*^d motor- position. In proving the spirituality of the soul a dis- 
tinction was drawn between the organic and the inor- 
ganic faculties. The organic activities are not inde- 
pendent of the body; on the contrary, they require the 
intrinsic co-operation of parts of the body. If I see 
with my eye, hear with my ear, speak with my mouth, 
it is only natural that Physiologists should attempt to 
trace the optic and auditory nerves and the vocal 

^* Cf. Ferrier, ch. VII; James Psych, i, p. 64, n; Dr. Surbled 
Le Cerveau, p. 165; Caldervvood Brain and Mind, p. 316; 
Farges Le Cerveau L'ame. 

45 Cf. chapter on Spirituality of the Soul. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I4I 

chords to certain parts of the brain and that they 
should do it successfully. All this is within their legiti- 
mate sphere. In localizing motor-centres and sensi- 
tive acts, they have done no more than what was from 
the beginning admitted they might do. Thus their 
very success as well as their failure prove the spiritu- 
ality of the human soul.^^ 



III. 

Psycho-Physics. 

§41. The efforts made especially in German> ||^^^°g^ 
during late years to bring the methods of the 
physical sciences to bear upon the investigations 
in psychology have given rise to the department of 
Psycho-Physics. By an abundant use of mathematical 
formulas this new branch of study lays claim to the 
name of a science. Its object is the measurement of 
Psychic acts; its real aim and influence are materialis- 

^^ The distinction of intellect from sense and nerve-move- 
ments; the impossibility of localizing the former; the localiza- 
tion of the two latter, is held by Lotze. Cf. Outlines of Psy- 
chology, ed. by Prof. Ladd, pp. 138-142. " One clear result 
is," writes Mr. Calderwood, " in all known living organisms 
Brain is the chief organ of Sensori-motor activity. * * * 
Accordingly, the leading demands upon the organ are these: 
To supply nerve energy adequate to keep the whole sensori- 
motor apparatus in condition for functional activit)'-; to pro- 
vide for transmission of impulse, whether occasioned by ex- 
ternal impact, or by visceral or other internal excitation; and 
to secure co-ordination of all sensory and muscular activity 
according to the requirements of animal life. These are the 
functions common to the brain, as a grand centre of a 
nervous system. The marvellously complex forms of sensi- 
bility and activity natural to the higher orders of animals are 
all dependent on the nerve-system, and all the multifarious 
combinations requisite within the unity of animal life are pro- 
vided for by action within the great central body — the 
Brain," L. c, p. 196. Yet he shows that sensori-motor activ- 
ity is the antithesis of intelligent action. lb., p. 203. 



142 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tic; and its existence as a science is to Materialists the 
one direct proof of their position. 

its basis § 42. It is a fact that sensations differ in quality, 

thus, ex. gr., sound differs from sight. It is a fact also 
that they differ in quantity, i. e., in intensity, in dura- 
tion, in extension. By intensity is meant the vividness 
or strength; by duration is understood the time taken 
up in the production ; by extension reference is made to 
the bodily surface affected. 

Weber and § 4-2. To explain the fact that sensations differ in 

Fechner. . ^^. ^ . 

intensity and duration, Weber, of Leipsic (1840), spent 
twenty years of experiment. He inferred a law that 
sensation grows with equal increments, when the ex- 
citation grows with relatively equal increments. This 
furnished a basis for the studies of Fechner. In i860 
he published in two volumes the " Elements of 
Psycho-Physics." By psycho-physics he understood 
an exact theory of the relations of soul and body, of 
the physical and psychical world. In this work he at- 
tempted to formulate a law ruling the exact quantita- 
tive measurement of all mental acts. He hoped to 
obtain indirectly what Herbert failed to get directly.^^ 
Thus a new department of study was opened, which 
was eagerly taken up and developed by Helmholtz, 
Bonders, Delboeuf, Wundt, Markel and Hall.^ 

47 Cf. Fakkenburg Hist, of Phil., p. 603. 

4^ Prof. Jastrow makes a distinction between Weber and 
Fechner; he says that the Psycho-physical methods are appli- 
cable only to such experiments as can be utilized for estab- 
lishing Weber's law, that Fechner's law can be deduced from 
Weber's experiments only by the use of a series of assump- 
tions hardly one of which is even probably justifiable; that 
the function and value of Weber's law depends on " its fur- 
nishing (it may be within limits) a means of comparing the 
sensibility of different incommensurate senses." He makes 
this distinction with the object " to clear the way for a more 
rational system of Psycho-physics, by directing future experi- 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 143 

§44. (a) Intensity: Fechner thought that he could (^^) i^*®'^- 
explain the intensity of the sensation by discovering 
the relation which existed between it and the external 
stimulus. His aim was to estimate the intensity of the 
effect from the -intensity of the cause. He found that 
the intensity of the sensation was not proportionate 
to the intensity of the stimulus ; but was augmented as 
the logarithm of the stimulus. He took as the unit of 
measurement the smallest perceptible difference in sen- 
sations. Thus he found that a constant ratio, different 
however for the kind of sensation, prevails between 
the production of a sensation consciously distinguish- 
able from a previous mental state and the quantity of 
the stimulus required. Hence the famous law of 
Fechner: "To increase the intensity in arithmetical 
progression the stimulus must be increased in geome- 
trical progression;" thus, ex. gr., that the sensation 
be one, two or three times stronger, the stimulus must 
be increased from ten to loo to i,ooo.^^ 

§ 45. (i) It is not a universal or a rigorous law. criticism 

Wundt admits, " For sound the concordance is most universal 

or rigor- 
precise; for sight, pressure and motion, it has a more ous. 

restricted value; for temperature and taste it is abso- 
lutely uncertain ; for smell and general sensibility there 
are no experiments." Hence, he concludes, that " the 
law of Weber has not a universal value; it is applied 
only to certain sensorial domains, and agrees approxi- 
mately with most of them only within certain limits." ^° 

mentation into that path in which it is most promising of 
results, and thus preventing the employment of the many un- 
critical and unanahjzed processes now current." Cf. A Critic 
of Psycho- Physic Methods in Amer. Jour, of Psych., vol. I, 
Feb., 1888. 
^^ Cf. Ladd Elements of Physiological Psychology. 
_^° Cf. James " Psychology, vol. I, p. 533 sq., where he criti- 
cises the practical importance and the theoretic interpretation 



144 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Hering, of Prague, holds that the law is of value when 
applied to normal stimulation and to a very narrow 
range above and below, which he calls the " range of 
sensibility." ^^ Thus, when the stimulus has been in- 
creased to a certain strength, the sensation shows no 
appreciable gain, ex. gr., a very powerful sound; the 
difference between the central and peripheral portions 
of the sun's disk is not noticeable; a prolonged stimu- 
lation produces dullness, fatigue, monotony. 

(2) limited § 46. (2) It is not applicable to the whole range of 
in range, j^^j^^^j jjfg^ Thought cannot be reduced to the cate- 
gory of material quantity. When we say that one de- 
sire is stronger than another, or that one spiritual 
being is greater than another, we mean not material 
but virtual quantity, which in Scholastic phraseology 
is another term for the greater or less perfection of a 
being. Furthermore, the process of measurement is 
based on the unit of sensation. This unit is found to 
vary for different sensations. But how may we hope 
to obtain units for the higher powers? Hence the 
higher spiritual life of thought and of voHtion cannot 
be subjected to quantitative measurement. 

(3) even § 47- (s) Even when restricted within the sphere of 
tiSH^!^^^' sensation, its statements are questioned, (a) Sensa- 
(a")sensa- tion is not simply an external impulse; its total and 
mere^^** adequate cause includes a subjective element, i. e., the 
impulse, excitability of the sensitive organ; in other words, the 

actual power of reaction possessed by the organ and de- 
rived from the soul which informs it. In overlooking 
the subjective element, they have neglected the prin- 

of Weber's law. cf. also, vol. I, p. 616; Sully Human Mind, 
vol. I, pp. 88, 89; "A New Instrument for Weber's Law," by 
J. Leuba, in Amer. Jour, of Psych., 1892-93, vol. 5, p. 370. 
5^ Cf. German Psychology, Ribot, ch. V. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I45 

cipal cause of the sensitive act. The subjective con- 
ditions of age, of temperament, of present attention, 
etc., cause variations in sensation. This explains how 
it is that two equal impulses can produce different sen- 
sations and vice versa. 

§ 48. (b) Again thev seem to assume that the quality (b) quality 

. ' . . varies. 

of the sensation does not vary. Consciousness testifies 
that the quality of sensations is not always preserved 
intact. Thus, ex. gr., a notable increase in intensity 
of the sensations of hght, of sound, etc., causes change 
also in the quality, ex. gr., the beautiful and the sub- 
lime.^^ Fechner supposes that sensations are multiples. 
He says the unit of intensity is the least perceptible 
difference between two sensations, and thus by consid- 
ering sensations as multiples of this unit he could quan- 
tify them. But a sensation as such is indivisible. And 
the character of the unit is very questionable.^^ (c) Most 
recent writer.s contend that the law is not psychologi- 
cal, but only physiological, i. e., they attribute to prop- 
erties of the nerve-structures the necessity of greater 
stimulus in order to efifect an appreciable change in 
the sensation.^^ Prof. Tichener, of Cornell, gives to 
Weber's law a purely physiological interpretation; on 
the nature of mind he is content with psycho-physical 
parallelism and leaves the question to metaphysics, 
holding that it does not pertain to Psychology .^^ 

§ 49. (b) In duration: To this study the title Psycho- (]>) dura- 
metry has been given. Its leaders are Helmholtz, 
Bonders, Exner, Hermann, Wundt, etc. A mental 

52 Ladd Phys. Psych., p. II C5. 

53 Cf. Sully Human Mind, vol. I, p. 89; Davis Elements of 
Psych., p. 435. 

54 Cf. James Psychology I, p. 548; Sully "Human Mind" 
I, p. 89. 

55 Cf. Outlines of Psychology by E. B. Tichener. 

19 . ! 



146 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Operation can be measured in time, (i) if it is composed 
of many successive acts, e. g., syllogistic reasoning, 
etc., the estimation of motives preparatory to a delib- 
erate choice; (2) or if the same act be prolonged, e. g., 
the contemplation of beautiful landscape, the study of 
the work of art ; (3) or if the act be produced gradually 
so that a certain time elapse in the production. 

§ 50. A spiritual operation, e. g., an act of thought 
or of will, may have duration in the first two cases and 
can therefore be measured; but not in the third way. 
By virtue of its very nature it passes from potency to 
act, i, e., is produced instantaneously. Consciousness 
assures us of this fact. On the contrary, a sensation 
or organic act may have duration in all three ways, 
e. g., we may have a train of sensations, or the same 
sensation may be prolonged, or it may be produced 
successively, e. g., from thumb, to hand, to whole arm. 

§ 51. Thus, ex. gr., the time of the transmission of a 
neural action through a definite nerve length has been 
ascertained by experiments^ to be about iii feet a sec- 
ond. The interval between a shock on one hand and 
the response with the other has been found to be 0.15 
of a second ; this is called reaction time. The reaction 
time varies according to the expectation of the patient, 
the degree of his attention, the intensity of the stimulus, 
and the " personal equation," i. e., the natural quick- 
ness and habits of the person. In like manner, by the 
automatic registration of a galvanic chronoscope the 
time taken to distinguish one of two sensations, e. g., 
colors, called discernment time, varies from o.i to 0.03 

^^ The mechanical instruments employed to measure the re- 
action time are Ludwig's Kyniograph, Marcy's Chronograph 
and Exner's Psychodometer. Cf. James Psychology, vol. I, 
p. 87. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 147 

of a second.^^ These results present no difficulty. The 
data for calculation are too inaccurate for use, as 
Wundt admits,^^ and Mr. James expresses " doubts as 
to the strict psychologic worth of any of these meas- 
urements," (vol. I, p. 524, n.). Our thesis concerns only 
inorganic acts. The higher powers of mind are be- 
yond the reach of these experiments ; ^^ and again, 
*' The proper psychological outcome of the new de- 
partment of Psycho- Physics is just nothing." ^° 

§ 52. (c) That sensations are extended is a fact of j^ngatFon*" 
individual experience, e. g., in the sense of touch, a gl^fgation 
scald on the arm is greater in extension than the prick 
of a needle. The efforts made to find the discrimina- 
tive sensibility of different parfs of the body, lie within 
the limits of Physiology .^^ 

§ 53. The objection drawn from Psycho-Physics is 
not so formidable when closely examined. It does not 
even touch the position we hold. Its leading defend- 
ers candidly confess its limitations. The conclusion, 
therefore, is obvious. Each objection analyzed and 
explained is in reality an indirect argument for the 
higher nature of our soul. Science, sifted of all imagi- 
nations and assumptions, vindicates the contention of 
sound philosophy and proclaims the true dignity of 
man. 

57 Cf. Science, Sept. 10, 1886; Mind XI, p. 2>^7. 
5^ Cf. James L. c, p. 89. 

5^ Cf. James L. c, p. 94; Ribot German Psychology, ch. 
VIII. 

60 Mr. James Psychology V. I, p. 534. 

61 Cf. Ladd Elements of Phys. Psych., p. 405; Sully Human 
Mind, vol. I, p. 106. 



PANTHEISM. 

§ I. The objections against the spirituality of the 
soul, which were examined in the preceding chapter, 
have been proposed in the name of science. They are 
of recent origin and carry to the mind of the reader a 
conviction which ordinarily accompanies the carefully 
selected data, the exact methods, the rigid reasonings 
of modern science. In this case, however, the strength 
was in appearance only; under the severe test of logic 
and of fact the idle boastings have been shattered. 
of^hiE § ^- Philosophy also has its difficulties. They call 
P^y- for a solution as clear and as convincing. Under new 

forms they constantly reappear in the history of the 
human mind. The words, the phrases, the considera- 
tions in their favor, the principles from which they 
spring, may clothe them in the vigor of youth; yet 
when freed from the circumstances of time and place, 
they stand forth as passing phases of errors as ancient 
as the records of human speculation, 
theism^s.^ § 3- A false system of philosophy which seems to 
have a fascination for the speculative mind is Panthe- 
ism. As has been shown. Materialism and Positivism 
attack the very existence of the soul; Pantheism de- 
nies its true nature. The former contend that matter 
only exists ; that everything can be ultimately resolved 
into material elements; that a super-organic or spirit- 
ual world is a non-entity; that God, the soul, etc., are 
illusions. The latter holds that every existing being 
is a manifestation of or an evolution from some pri- 
mordial essence, which pervades creation; that par- 
ticular things have the same common nature ; that as a 
consequence one being alone exists, which is all in all. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. > I49 

I. 

Modern Pantheism. 
§ 4. We pass by the Pantheism of the Eleatic school modern 

^ -^ . pantheism. 

represented by Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melis- 
sus; that of the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus and Proclus; 
or its phases as proposed by Erigena and Avicennes 
in the middle ages. These forms have an interest to 
the student of history. Modern Pantheism requires 
careful examination; its influence has been wide and 
profound; its teachers have held a leading place as 
thinkers and as men of letters; it has been boldy and 
persistently proposed as a system of thought, which 
alone answers the problems of existence, and satisfies 
the highest, noblest aspirations of the heart. 

1°. Spinoza (1632- 1677). 

§ '5. Spinoza may be considered the father of modern Spinoza. 
Pantheism. An ardent disciple of Des Cartes, he 
found himself in full sympathy with the reactionary 
movement against the philosophy of Aristotle and the 
Schoolmen. Unfortunately he pushed the principles 
of his master to an extreme. 

§ 6. Des Cartes defined substance to be that which teaching, 
exists of itself so that it needs no other thing for its ex- 
istence. From this Spinoza inferred that one substance 
alone existed ; that it was infinite and was what is called 
God. He taught that this substance by a power of self- 
determination expresses itself in matter and in thought. 
The world of matter and of thought are, therefore, 
revelations of the absolute truth. They are both real, 
but independent of each other; hence we cannot con- 
ceive of body acting on mind or of mind acting on 
body. But matter and thought exist as two parallel 



150 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



influence. 



series; the more perfect is the body, the more perfect 
is the mind. Thus my mind is only a part of God's 
mind; my body is part of His embodied substance. '* I 
declare," he writes, " the human mind to be a part of 
nature, namely, because I hold that in nature there 
exists an infinite power of thinking, which power, so 
far as it is infinite, contains ideally the whole of nature, 
in such wise that its thoughts proceed in the same 
fashion as nature herself, being, in fact, the ideal mirror 
thereof. Hence follows that I hold the human mind 
to be simply the same power, not so far as it is infinite 
and perceives the whole of nature, but so far as it per- 
ceives alone the human body; and thus I hold our 
human mind to be part of this infinite intellect.^ 

§ 7. The influence of Spinoza upon modern thought 
has been very great. His fundamental principle, e. g., 
that the one substance has two attributes, matter and 
thought, especially underHes the attempt of contempo- 
rary English Psychologists to explain the union of 
soul and of body, i. e., the Double-Aspect Theory. His 
ethics was the constant companion of Goethe ; his Pan- 
theism was by SheUing harmonized with Idealism; the 
*' Absolute " of the latter was the " natura naturans '* 
of Spinoza.^ But he had no great disciple to propose 
his theory in whole or in part; nor can he be said to 
have formed a school, whose position and number are 
clearly and sharply defined.^ 



teaching 
of Kant. 



2°. German Pantheism. 
§ 8. Kant cannot be accused of Pantheism. His 
principle, however, as developed by his followers, led 



1 Spinoza Ep. XXXII. 

2 Cf. Essays by E. Caird, vol. I, " Goethe." 

3 Cf. Essays in Literat. and Philos., by E. Caird, vol. II, p. 
3Z2. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I5I 

immediately and directly to a Pantheistic doctrine 

which in one form or another has profoundly moved 

the German mind for the past hundred years. Kant reJsom"''^ 

held that the mind perceives not objects as they really 

exist independent of us, but the appearances only as 

they are in the mind ; hence the word phenomenon with 

him is something ideal not real. The object itself is 

unknown. The speculative reason, therefore, gave 

subjective truth, i. e., the truth of its ideal appearance, 

as covered over with the forms of thought, not objective 

truth, i. e., the truth of the object itself as independent 

of the mind.* 

§ 9. He recognized, however, that we need objective feasorfa^ 
truth ; hence he invented the practical reason in order ™^s° rom 
to pass from the subjective to the objective. This tSofeec^^ 
method w^as critically examined by his successors and ^^^®- 
rejected as insufficient and imaginary.^ 

§ 10. Another method was sought and believed to be fication^of 
found in identifying the subject thinking and the object lnd''object. 
thought. The absolute unity of substance, which is at 
the same time the ego and non-ego, the subject and 
object, the ideal and the real, seemed to be a legitimate 
solution of the difficulty. It follows from this that one 
substance alone exists. In proposing this explanation, 
however, and in setting forth its true nature its defend- 
ers separate into widely diverging camps. 

Fichte (1762- 1 81 4). 
§11. Fichte maintained that things unknow^n are to j^Js teach- 
us as nothing ; the only real thing, therefore, is the Ego. concerning 



the ego. 



^ Cf. Critic of Pure Reason Transc. Aesth., p. 34, Muller's 
trans. 

^ Cf. Essaj^s in Literature and Pliilos., by E. Caird, vol. II, 
p. 431. 



152 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(a) The external world is the projection of the Ego, 
the product of my unconscious act; hence the world 
about me has existence only as a manifestation of 
spirit. Inasmuch as the Ego by its activity produces 
external things, they have a reality only in the mind 
which by thinking- creates them; thus when the mind 
ceases to think, they cease to exist. 

" We are no other than a moving row 

Of magic shadow-shapes that come and go." ^ 

S?at?onof § i^- (b) He then attempted to explain the relation 
the deeper ^^ ^J conscious self to the deeper Self. The solution 
^®^*- he proposes is that there is only one Spirit — the spirit 

of nature; that the conscious self is the transient ex- 
pression of the one Spirit or the deeper Self; that the 
private thought is the passing shadow^ of the divine 
universal thought. With Fichte, therefore, the ego is 
the only reality. His system, as justly been termed, 
Transcendental Egoism. 

Schclling. 

teaching. § 13. Schelling (1775-1854), at first the disciple, be- 
came afterwards the critic of Fichte. His teaching 
is the exact reverse of his early master. Schelling held 
that one being alone has real existence; this being he 
called the Absolute. By its own essential activity the 
Absolute evolves and manifests itself; the manifesta- 
tion results in the world of nature and of man. Hence 
his great division of, Nature Philosophy and of Trans- 
cendental Philosophy. The world around us shows 
the struggle of this one divine spirit to m.anifest itself 
in countless varying forms until in man it attains the 

^ Omar Khayyam in Rubaiya. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 153 

consciousness of itself; this is the end and the crown 
of the whole evolution. The double manifestation of 
nature and of spirit reaches unity in the Ego, wdiich 
embraces both subject and object in its concept. 

§ 14. With Fichte the ego was real; was the creator; eXfr^JS^^' 
the subject. With SchelHng, on the contrary, the Ah- ^i^hte. 
solute was real; it was the universal mind, in which 
subject and object were identified; the finite mind be- 
ing only a phase in the manifestation of the infinite 
mind. To Schelling reason is a faculty transcending 
all finite experience, hence, he says, it is not personal; 
it is the all-seeing eye confronting itself, gazing upon 
eternal realities; my own deeper, truer self is nature, 
the one great life permeating and vivifying all, the one, 
divine, absolute spirit. The system of Schelling has 
been rightly called " Objective Idealism " or the 
" Philosophy of the Absolute." 

§15. Schoppenhauer is considered an off-shoot of influence 
Schelling; he puts the '' will " in place of the '' Abso- ing. 
lute." His Pessimism is drawn from a study of Budd- 
hism.'' Hartman endeavored to reconcile Schoppen- 
hauer and Hegel. He retains the Pessimism of the 
former, and the evolution of the latter. His " Uncon- 
scious " is another term for the " will " and the '' Idea." 
In literature Schelling is considered as having given 
rise to the Romantic School, ex. gr., the Schlegels, 
Novalis, etc. Through Coleridge, Schelling exerted 
great influence on the English and the American mind 
during the first half of the present century. Thus we 
account for its traces in Emerson, Parker and Alcott.^ 

^ Cf. Caro " Le Pessimisme." 

^ In 1850 a French translation of Schelling appeared; the 
main source was Coldridge. 

20 



154 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Hegel. 

the^cor?" ^ ^^* ^^^^ Culmination in the development of Kant 
^ure being ^^ reached in Hegel.^ His system seems to be kind of 
compromise between Fichte and Schelhng. (a) Hegel 
starts with the concept of pure and undetermined 
being. He says that the mind conceives of being as 
necessary or contingent, as eternal or temporal, as 
spiritual or material, as finite or infinite; that these 
are limitations of being and mutually exclusive of each 
other, e. g., the necessary excludes the contingent; 
hence an analysis of these reveals another concept 
which is outside of these limitations and yet contains 
them, i. e., the concept of pure being or of being viewed 
without determination or modes. 
(b)not § 17. (b) He contends that the idea of pure being 

supposes the idea of not-being, for the mind cannot 
conceive the one without conceiving the other at the 
same time; and that the idea of pure being does not 
dififer from the idea of not-being; hence he derives the 
tofieri^ concept of no-being, (c) This last concept he dis- 
tinguishes from the concept of absolute nothing, for it 
is a medium between existing being and absolute 
nothing. Hegel calls this concept To -fieri, i. e., what 
is to be or the becoming}^ 
Sonof^he § ^^' ^^^ existing things are a manifestation and 
Idea. evolution of the To fieri. This evolution is seen (a) in 

abstract and metaphysical notions, hence the depart- 
ment of Logic; (b) in real existences and material 
phenomena, hence nature; (c) finally the idea rises to 
consciousness and manifests itself in the phenomena 

9 Cf. Wallace's Hegel Proleg., ch. VI. 

10 Cf. Introd. to Hegel's Phil., by W. T. Harris; Hegel's 
Logic, by W. Harris. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 155 

of human thought, hence the world of man — the high- 
est and most perfect of its manifestations.^^ 

§ 19. Criticism: (a) The Idea of Hegel is nothing an'^a^sump- 
more than possible being; it is, therefore, abstract not *^°^- 
real in itself; its evolution is an abstract evolution. Yet 
he assumes it to be real; just as he assumes thought 
and reality to be identical. The very basis, therefore, 
of his system is an assumption, (b) He denies the (b^ con- 
fundamental principles of reason, e. o;., the principle of principles 

^ ^ ' ^ ' ^ ^ of reason. 

contradiction; ex. gr., according to him the to fieri is 
and is not at the same time. In fact, he holds that his 
theory cannot stand without assuming the falsity of this 
principle.-^^ (c) From its consequences. His system (c)conse- 

i:^ tr \ / ^ J quence. 

was at first favored by the German government and 
thus became the philosophy of the state. Soon, how- 
ever, its assumptions and errors w^ere discovered and 
exposed; his disciples thereupon separated into three 
schools. Strauss' " Life of Jesus " caused a division; 
hence the old and young Hegelians. With Strauss 
stand Fuerbach and Schmidt. Between is a third 
party, ex. gr., Rosenkrantz and Michelet. With 
Strauss, Philosophy of religion becomes a histori- 
cal criticism of the Bible and Theology, hence the 
Mythical school of Biblical interpretation.^^ Strauss 
developed into Materialism and Atheism in " Old 
and New Faith," 1872, where he holds that cul- 
ture is incompatible with Christianity, which is 
a religion of poverty; that the process of life 
is 'eternal, hence no need of a Creator; that the new 
religion is a cult of genius, which consists in sympathy 

^1 Cf. Liberatore, vol. II, pp. 19, 20. 

12 Cf. Fr. Hecker, Aspirations of Nature, ch. X, 

13 Cf. Strauss' " Life of Jesus," in which the Son of God 
is ideal Humanity, and " Christian Dogmatics." 



156 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

with the highest efforts of humanity, hence his Positiv- , 
ism. Feuerbach ran more directly into Materiahsm. 
He holds that man is the sole subject of Philosophy; 
that Philosophy is opposed to religion as health is to 
disease; that religion arises from man objectifying his 
own essence; hence in opposition to Hegel he taught 
that self-consciousness is the absolute and in his God 
man knows himself.-^* The teaching of Strauss and 
Feuerbach reaches Sensuahstic Egoism in Schmidt 
" Individual and his Property." ^^ 
influence. g 20. The influence of Hegel was, however, greater 
than that of Fichte or of Schelling. His philosophy 
spread into other countries and was modified by them. 
At present he divides with Kant the Pre-eminence in 
Idealistic philosophy. The leading Idealistic trend of 
thought in England and in America is either Neo- 
Kantian or Neo-Hegelian.^^ 

3°. Hie Vedanta. 

s^dYJ^^^^' § 21. Another source of modern Pantheism must be 
sought for in a land which in manner of life and in 
habits of thought is the direct antithesis of our West- 
ern civilization. The Hindus are a nation of philoso- 
phers. From the earUest times they have set the mind 
to solve the great problems of existence. Their at- 
tempts are found in the Upanishads, a collection of 
philosophical writings dating back to the sixth cen- 
tury, B. C, and in the various commentaries upon 
them, especially that of Sankara. 

^'^Ci. Fr. Hecker, Aspirations of Nature, ch. X; Life of G. 
Eliot, by G. W. Cooke, ch. IX. 

15 Cf. Falckenberg Hist, of Mod. Phil., ch. XVI; Philos. in 
Germany, by W. Wundt, in Mind, vol. II, p. 493- 

16 Cf. Phil, of Relig. Caird, pp. 229-241: Present Day Tracts 
No. 38 " F. Bauer," by Rev. A. B. Bruce. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 157 

^22. Schoppenhauer says that the study of these ^^e^^''^^!"®- 
works has been the solace of his Hfe;^^ Sir Wilham 
Jones thinks that " Pythagoras and Plato derived their 
sublime theories from the same fountain as the sages 
of India;" Cousin sees ''in this cradle of the human 
race the native land of the highest philosophy;" and 
Fred. Schelegel holds that " the loftiest philosophy of 
Europeans or the IdeaHsm of the Greeks, in compari- 
son with Oriental Idealism, is a feeble spark." ^° 

§ 23. The problem of the Upanishads, is to explain p^^Q^jj^^ 
the true nature of the soul and its relation to Brahma. 
The soul is called Atman, i. e., self; Givatman, i. e., liv- 
ing self; and after its substantial unity with Brahma had 
been discovered Parama- Atman, i. e., the highest self.^^ 
To Sankara the self, i. e., the Atman, is not what is 
commonly meant by the Ego, but lies far beyond. The 
Ego is our character and is made up of nationality, 
prejudices, language, body, senses, etc. These form 
only the involucra of the self. 

§ 24. The higher knowledge is to know one's self as ?^*^^® 5^' 
identical with the Highest Self; this is called Atman- 
Vidya, i. e., the knowledge of one's self.^" The true 
nature of the soul is the one's self; individuality is only 
a fiction, or rather an illusion ; ^^ what is real and true 
in the individual is the Self .within and invisible, infinite 
divine, all-pervading.^^ Hence external things are only 
appearances; my own spirit is the one spirit; that 

17 Cf. S. B. E., vol. I, p. LVII. 

18 Cf. Vedanta Philosophy, p. 8, by Max Muller. 

19 Atman in the Vedas, is a pronoun, e. g., ^pse, /; afterwards 
it was used to express the ipseitas, i. e., the self. cf. Muller 
1. c. p. 21. 

20 S. B. E., vol. I. p. XXV. 

21 S. B. E., vol. XV, p. XXXVI. 

22 Cf. Katha Upanished. 



158 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

which alone exists, is the unive^^sally present imper- 
sonal Self.^^ 

Brahman. g 25. The great principle of the Vedanta is that there 
can be onl)- one Brahman. The soul is not a part of the 
divine Self; not a modification of the Divine Self; not 
different from the Divine Self; hence the Divine Self 
and the Human Self are one and the same substance. 
The fetters of Upadhis, i. e., the senses, cause the 
Highest Self to appear as conditioned and blinds us as 
to the substantial oneness of both. When this 
nescience of illusion is destroyed by Vidya, i. e., true 
knowledge, we can perceive that the soul is God : Tat 
Tvam Asi, i. e.. Thou art It. " Thou canst not see the 
seer of the sight; thou canst not hear that, that hears 
the sound; thou canst not think the thinker of the 
thought; thou canst not know the knower of all knowl- 
edge. This is thy Self that is in all things that are." ^* 

Its influ- § 26. This teaching is pure Pantheism. It has ex- 

erted wide influence in Europe and America. Schop- 
penhauer, especially, is indebted to its doctrine. His 
Will corresponds to Brahman the subject of the world, 
the only true reality, the highest Self; his Vorstellimg 
to the phenomenal world seen by us objectively, and 
recognized as unreal.^^ 

II. 
Influence. 

Influence § 2^. From these three sources modern Pantheism 
ng an . ^^^ ^^kcn rise and has spread. We shall now briefly 

23 Williams' Buddhism, p. 105. 

24 Brih. Upan. Ill, 4.2; Mund. Upan. Ill, i. 8; cf. especially 
the Katha Upanishad. 

25 Cf. Colebrooke Essays; Prof. Gough, Phil, of the Upani- 
shads; A Rational Refutation of Indian Phil. Systems by Dr. 
Hall. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1 59 

trace its influence upon contemporary thought. From 
Germany the new teaching passed into England. Ger- 
man Hterature, e. g., Goethe, Richter, NovaHs, was 
even more powerful than philosophy in spreading its 
tenets. Coleridge was a student and admirer of Schel- 
ling. He explained his master and thus introduced 
his system to English and American thinkers. Carlyle, 
by his translations of Goethe, e. g., Wilhelm Meister 
made thousands of readers familiar with that gifted 
mind. Coleridge was the theologian and philosopher, Coleridge. 
Carlyle the preacher and man of letters in the new ^ariyie. 
intellectual awakening. The Ethical IdeaHsm of Mr. Arnold. 
Arnold can be traced to the same source.^® Words- Words- 
worth, the Poet of Nature, also came under the influ- 
ence. We find traces of its mystic thought, of the one 
spirit that speaks in man and in nature, breathing out 
of his poetry.^'' 

" For I have learned 
To look on Nature, not as in the hour 
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes 
The still sad music of humanity. 
Nor harsh nor grating, though of ample power 
To chasten and subdue. And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with a joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns. 
And the sound ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man; 
A motion and a spirit that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things." ^8 

But Coleridge gave way to the theological reac- 
tion of the Oxford School and became eventually the 
parent of the Broad Church party, e. g., Maurice; 

26 Cf. Pfleiderer Devel of Theol., p. 330. 

27 Cf. E. Caird Essays, vol. I, Wordsworth. 
^ Cf. Excursion. 



l60 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Wordsworth made room for Tennyson, who became 
the poet of skepticism of his age; and the spirit of 
idealism was replaced by the empiricism of J. S. Mill. 
The English mind is too practical to remain long 
under the sway of Transcendental thought. 

In America. § 28. The influence of these writers, however, spread 
to their American contemporaries. Transcendental 
philosophy found a foothold in New England. While 
its main source was German, through Coleridge and 
CarMe, in reality it was eclectic. Cousin w^as widely 
read,^^ and traces of the Vedanta philosophy are found 
in Emerson. In New England, TranscendentaHsm 
spread through every sphere of life. Theology was 
platonic and mystic; it found its source in Fichte and 
Jacobi, in Herder and Schleiermacher. The attempt 
at the reform of society is illustrated in Brook Farm.^° 
Leading men as Theo. Parker, Prof. Walker, W. H. 
Channing, Mr. Ripley, Mr. Brownson, in Boston 
Quarterly, Bronson Alcott became its propagators. 
Emerson, however, was the highest product and 
master-mind of the movement.^^ 

Emerson. § 29. To Emerson the soul was supreme. By the 
soul he understood " the background of our being, an 
immensity not possessed and that cannot be pos- 
sessed." The soul or mind is eternal, one, immanent 
and Self manifesting. It is within man so that the 
"Act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spec- 
tacle, the subject and the object are one." He writes 

29 Cf. Specimens of For. Stand. Literature, ed. by Geo. 
Ripley, 1838: Brownson's Quarterly, vol. I, p. 6; F. Hecker's 
The Church and the Age, ch. XlT. 

20 Cf. Transcendentalism in New England, by Frothing- 
ham, p. 158; Brownson's Quart. Rev., vol. Ill, p. 409 sq. 

31 Cf. Brownson's Quarterly, vol. Ill, p. 273; vol. IV, p. 
421 sq. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. l6l 

that " the currents of the Universal Being circulate 
through me ; that I am part and parcel of God ; " or 
that " man and the world are incarnations, projections 
of God." To him man is an infinite soul; and every- 
thing real is self-existant. " We see the world piece by 
piece," he tells us, " as the sun, the moon, the animal, 
the tree; but the whole, of which these are the shining 
parts, is the soul," or " the web of events is the flowing 
robe in which the soul is clothed ; " and *' through all 
persons appears this identical impersonal nature, which 
is God." ^^ The same trend of thought is shown in 
his poetry. 

" Onward and on the eternal Pan, 
Who layeth the world's incessant plan, 
Halteth never in one shape, 
But forever doth escape, 
Like wave or flame, into new forms 
Of germ and air, of plants and worms. 
I that to-day am a pine. 
Yesterday was a bundle of grass." 

In the hymn to Brahma, Mr. Emerson puts into 
verse thoughts found in the Katha Upanishad. 

If the red slayer thinks he slays, 
Or if the slain thinks he is slain 
They know not well the subtle ways 
I keep, and pass and turn again. 

Far or forget to me Is near; 
Shadow and sunlight are the same; 
The vanished gods to me appear; 
And one to me are shame and fame. 

They reckon ill who leave me out; 
When me they fly, I am the wings; 
I am the doubter and the doubt, 
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings. 

32 Cf. Nature: Over Soul; Spirit; Add. to Div. Students, 
July 15, 1838; the Transcendentalist. 
21 



l62 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Sei^u^' ^ 3^- Emerson does not defend himself against the 

charge of Pantheism. That such is the trend of his 
teaching cannot be gainsaid. That a character of such 
singular sweetness, a mind of such delicacy and rich- 
ness, should be brought under the sway of this teach- 
ing is in part due to the intellectual atmosphere of the 
time; for Transcendentalism was in its earliest stages, 
a reaction of the whole man from the narrow and Puri- 
tanical sensism which prevailed in New^ England. A 
deeper and more cogent reason is found in the man's 
mind. Emerson was not a consecutive thinker. He 
saw beautiful things and he saw deeply; but what he 
presented were only fragments. He never showed the 
least desire to connect these parts into a consecutive 
whole. Hence the strange disconnectedness which is 
seen in the sequence of his sentences.^^ 

Dr. Royce. §31. Transcendental philosophy in America has 
passed its meridian. It has died a natural death. Yet 
Emerson has left an influence behind him in his writ- 
ings. Its best modern representative is Dr. Royce.^^ 
Dr. Royce proclaims himself an idealist, and holds that 
" the whole choir of heaven and earth " is nothing for 
any of us but a system of ideas which governs our be- 
lief and conduct; hence we never get beyond our own 
ideas, because all minds are in essence one; thus 
the whole world of ideas is essentially one world and 
so it is essentially the world of one's self and That art 
Thou. 

§ 32. Dr. Royce has the spirit of Fichte, but not 
his teaching; he is an improvement on Fichte; he 
starts from an experimental basis and appeals for 

34 Cf. Azarias Phases of Thought and Criticism, ch. 3. 

35 Cf. Spirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. XI. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 163 

proof to Berkeley. But Ficlite and Berkeley are fund- 
amentally opposed. Fichte is a pantheist, Berkeley a 
Christian; to Fichte all things are projections of the 
Ego; to Berkeley external objects have a reality in 
the mind of God. Hence he is an idealist with Berke- 
ley, yet not a true disciple; he avoids the vagaries of 
Fichte, yet retains his Pantheism. The teaching of Dr. 
Royce is most properly term.ed a syncretism of the best 
elements of Idealistic Pantheism put into the most 
natural and strongest form. He admits a universal 
mind with Schelling; in setting forth the relation of 
our minds to the universal mind, he is a Vedantist and 
a disciple of Sankara, without however the spectre of 
transmigration. Unlike Hegel, he contends that the 
higher self is personal and conscious; nor does he fall 
into the strange contradictions of that philosopher. In 
the definition of matter as a " permanent possibiHty of 
sensation," he is a phenomenal Idealist with J. S. Mill. 

§ 33. Such is a .brief sketch of Transcendentahsm in "ents.^*'' 
our own country. The influence and trend of thought 
was pantheistic; although not all those wdio came un- 
der its sway can be charged with Pantheism. Its 
antagonists were strong and powerful. Dr. Porter, of 
Yale, set forth the best of Trendelenberg, who in Ger- 
many led a reaction to Aristotle in the effort to recon- 
struct German philosophy demoralized by the failure 
of Hegel. Prof. Ladd is the disciple of Lotze, the last 
of the German metaphysicians; Prof. James is of the 
materiaHstic school; and Dr. McCosh, of Princeton, 
was the last and most consistent thinker of the Scottish 
School which for a century in England, in France and 
in America, withstood the philosophy of Sensism. 



164 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



III. 

The Neo-Hbgelian School. 
Origin. g 24. A sketch of modern Pantheism would not be 

complete without a reference to the Neo-Kantian or 
Neo-Hegelian school. The cry, " Back to Kant," 
raised by Beneke, Zeller and Fisher in Germany, was 
taken up in England and America.^^ The aim was to 
stem the tide of scientific materialism and agnosticism. 
In England, J. H. Sterling was the pioneer in his ''Se- 
cret of Hegel," 1865. He was foUov/ed by J. Caird, 
" Introd. to Philosophy of ReHgion," 1880; Ed. Caird, 
" Crit. Philosophy of Kant," 2 vols., 1889; " Evolution 
of Religion," 1893; Green,"Prolegom. to Ethics," 1887; 
" Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion," by A. Saba- 
tier, 1897; by Wallace, Bradley and Adamson.^^ In 
America the movement is carried on by W. T. Harris, 
U. S. Com. of Education; C. Everett, G. Morris, G. 
Howison, Stanley Hall, J. Watson.^^ In Germany the 
Neo-Kantian influence is seen in the Ritschlin school; 
the Neo-Hegelian in Pfleiderer. The distinctive mark 
of the latter is the theory of development, the To iieri of 
Hegel. In England and America the line of demark- 
ation is not drawn; hence we have a school which is 
by different writers called now by one, again by the 
other title.2^ 
g'^^enits § 2iS' The Neo-Hegelian school is called an Idealistic 
representa- reaction. It has been charged, and with good reason, 

"^ Cf. F. E. Beneke, by Francis Brandt. 

37 Cf. Courtney Studies in Phil., ch. IX. 

38 Cf. Phil, in United States, by S. Hall, in Mind, vol. IV, 
p. 89. 

39 Ed. Caird's "Crit. Phil, of Kant," is considered "a 
transliteration of Kant, as seen in the light of Hegelianism," 
cf. Scottish Review, 1890, vol. XVI, pp. 68, 91. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. " 165 

with Pantheism. The leader of the movement is Mr. 
T. H. Green. A criticism of his teaching will furnish 
a conception of the new doctrine and of its tendency. 
Prof. Green draws from both Kant and Hegel. His 
fundamental position and claim on his followers is his 
transformation of Kant's theory of knowledge into a 
metaphysic of existence.^*^ Green identifies the self 
which the theory of knowledge reveals — the single, 
active, self-conscious principle — with the universal or 
divine self-consciousness, the one, eternal, divine sub- 
ject to which the universe is relative. Hence con- 
sciousness has a double character, unity and manifold; 
as a unity it is eternal, all-conditioning, an end realiz- 
ing itself in and through the manifold; as manifold it 
is subject to change, conditioned and is a means to an 
end. The eternal consciousness is manifested in the 
individual as' a " forecasting idea." ^^ 

§36. Criticism: The teaching of Mr. Green is an Panthe- 
idealistic Pantheism based on Kant and Hegel. He 
takes the notion of knowledge for the real Knower. 
Since the form of knowledge is one, he infers that one 
subject alone sustains the w^orld and is the real Knower. 
This knower is manifested in human consciousness. 
Hence consciousness, human and divine, is unified in 
one self. With justice, therefore, Prof. Seth and Mr. 
A. Balfour contend that Prof. Green's teaching is a 
thorough-going Pantheism.^^ Prof. Seth holds that 
the reaction to Hegel is only transitory, that it is not 

40 Cf. Philos. of T. Green, by W. Fairbrother, p. 157. 

41 Cf. Green Proleg. 182, Burt Hist, of Mod. Phil., vol. 
II, S. 166. 

42 Cf. Prof. Seth Hegelianism and Personality, p. 215; A. 
Balfour in Mind, Jan., 1884, Oct., 1893; nevertheless Prof. 
Seth is not free from criticism; for his peculiar Panthei-sm 
cf. Some Current Conceptions of Self, by Prof. John Dewey, 
in Mind, 1890, vol. XV. 



l66 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

satisfying.*^ Mr. Balfour says the English mind can 
never be the home of such a philosophy.** Hence we 
have an explanation of the efforts, also unsatisfactory, 
at a speculative Theism, as illustrated by Mr. Balfour 
in '* Foundations of Belief," by Martineau in '' Study 
of Religion." '^ 

IV. 
Criticism. 
§ 34. It is not necessary to take up and refute one 
after another the different forms of Pantheism. In all 
forms it is essentially the same whether it be Spinoza's 
Substance, or Fichte's Ego, or Schelling's Absolute, 
Hegel's Idea, Schoppenhauer's Will, Hartmann's Un- 
conscious, They have one element in common — the 
denial of the true nature of the soul. In this point they 
are a standing objection to our hue of thought. 
c?sm"rom § 35- W ^^ Pantheism human individuality is de- 
sonaut/.^^" stroyed. But the testimony of consciousness is ex- 
plicit and irrefutable. It tells me that I am myself and 
not another. There is an abyss between you and me; 
no fiction of the imagination can make us one and the 
same. Again consciousness bears witness to our per- 
sonality. This incontrovertible and elementary fact of 
human experience lies at the basis of our individual 
and social life. I am not only an individual, but I am 
sid juris: the responsible agent of my actions. 
thlmS^ § 36. (b) Pantheism controverts the first principles 

of reascm. o^ reason. The Principle of contradiction affirms that 

43 Cf. ib., p. 349. 

44 Cf. Foundations of Belief, p. 2, ch. 2. 

45 Falckenberg concludes his History of Phil, with these 
words: "The revival of Fichto-Hegelian Idealism by means 
of a method which shall do justice to the demands of the 
time by a closer adherence to experience, by making gen- 
eral use of both the material and the mental sciences, and 
by an exact and cautious mode of argument seems to us to 
be the task of the future," p. 632. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ! 167 

the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time. 
With Pantheists, however, we must hold that being is 
one and absolute, yet constantly changing; that it is 
and yet not is. It is one so long as it is a potency to 
become all things ; in becoming all things its unity dis- 
appears. It is one while it remains vague and indefi- 
nite; in becoming definite and concrete, it is no longer 
one, but many. 

§ ^7. (c) This one being: of Pantheists is either (c) ad 

" ^' ^ '' o hommem. 

material or immaterial, not the former, for my 
soul is immaterial, otherwise Psychology would not 
be a distinct science; not the latter, for my body is 
material, otherwise I should be compelled to deny 
Physiology and the Physical sciences: it cannot be 
both, because the properties of the material and of 
the immaterial are contradictory. 

§ 38. (d) Pantheism saps the foundations of (d^ its 
morality. The principles of morality suppose a 
subordination of persons for the existence and 
efficacy of a law. Hence the superior commanding; 
the inferior obeying; the bonds of intelligence and of 
free-will, the sanction upon its proper fulfillment — all 
conducive to the formation of a sound social organism, 
whether it be of the family, of the state, or of the 
church. But Pantheism makes subordination a fic- 
tion, denies liberty of will and responsibility. Again 
according to Pantheism, every thought and action 
springs from and is a manifestation of the eternal 
Divine energy; in this case, how make a distinction 
between good and evil? The acts of the thief and mur- 
derer, as well as those of the wise and good, are divine. 

§ 39. Finally it is repugnant to common sense to sup- ^l^nJ^^o"^" 
pose that I am one and the same being with the brute, f°?£ 
the tree, the stone. 



SOUL AND BODY. 

existence § I. The existence of the soul was proved to a cer- 
fact. tamty by the voice of consciousness. The method fol- 

lowed was experimental. We dealt with a fact, 
through the medium of testimony. Then by a process 
of reasoning from data the nature of the soul as a 
spiritual being was set forth. In its essence and in its 
activities the soul of man is totally dif¥erent from 
matter.^ 
existence § 2. It is a fact also, the knowledge of which conies 
fact? ^^ through consciousness, that we have a material body. 
Science has shown that the material elements of our 
body are of the same nature as the elements found in 
the world about us. These elements enter into our 
intimate constitution and form a part of our human 



em. 



the prob- § 3. The problem that now faces us is a most difH- 
cult one. How explain the existence in man of soul 
and body so diverse and apparently antagonistic, and 
at the same time account for the harmony of action 
and the unity of the organism? This unity in diver- 
sity lies at the basis of our conscious existence. It 
antecedes all experience. It is evident to the un- 
learned; the young child not yet attained the use of 
reason, supposes it; the thoughtful student pauses be- 
fore it as one of the deepest questions of human life. 

§4. The greatest philosophers of histor}^ have at- 
tempted to elucidate this question, ^"arious are the 

1 S. Aug. de quant, an. n. 2. 

2 August serni. 150, n. 5. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 169 

solutions proposed. We shall now classify and sub- 
ject them to a brief criticism. That hypothesis or ex- 
planation shall be considered the best which shall best 
account for the following facts: (i) the real existence 
of the soul; (2) the real existence of the body; (3) their 
opposition and mutual dependence. 

I. 

Theory op Exaggerated Spiritualism. 

§ 5. Led on by a mistaken zeal to render the spirit- J/^ted^ 
uality of the soul secure against the assaults of Mater- 
iaHsm, some philosophers denied the possibility of 
body acting on spirit or of spirit acting on body, and, 
therefore, there is no real but only an apparent union 
of soul and body. The reasons alleged in support of 
this theory are purely a priori. From the known prop- 
erties of spirit and matter so antagonistic to each other, 
they infer that there is no possible union between 
them. 

1°. Des Cartes. 

§6. (1°) The opinion was first proposed by Des Des Cartes. 
Cartes. He taught that body and soul are both com- 
plete and perfect substances. This is the basis of his 
reasoning, and is drawn from Plato.^ Des Cartes, how- 
ever, goes much farther. He maintained that the 
essence of the entire man was the soul alone ;^ that the 
soul was by its nature spiritual, and as such completely 
independent of the body. But how account for the 
belief that the soul exerts an influence upon the body 
and vice versa? This influence, he says, of one upon 
the other, is not real; it appears so to us; therefore, 

^ Cf. Alcibiades and Phaedo. 

^ Man is a unit, formed of both body and soul; cf. Augus- 
tine de Immort. An. c. 15; de Mor. Ecc. I, c. 4. 
22 



170 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



Sstancef" <^eceived by appearance, we believe in its reality. The 
true explanation he finds in God. Thus, when I have 
an idea in my mind, e. g., to move my arm, God inter- 
feres and directly moves the arm. The act of the will, 
i. e., to move the arm, is, therefore, not the real cause 
of the bodily movement, but only the occasion. God 
is the sole, immediate, and direct cause of all my bodily 
movements. His activity is exerted upon the occasion 
of ideas or of resolves in my mind. The same is true 
of the influence of body upon the soul. The influence 
is only apparent. The act of the body is the occasion, 
not the cause. God alone is the cause. This theory is 
called the theory of *' Divine Assistance," or of ''Occas- 
ional Causes," and is proposed by Des Cartes in his 
Medit., VI, § 8. 



occasional 
cause. 



Pre-estab- 
lished. 
Harmony. 



2°. Malehranche. 

§ 7. Malebranche developed more fully the doctrine 
of Des Cartes. He denies that the will can move a 
member of the body, because there is no relation be- 
tw^een things so different. The will is powerless of 
itself to influence any bodily movements; but it can 
determine the will of God, who thereupon produces the 
effect. He denies that we can have a clear concep- 
tion of a causal influence of soul and body or vice 
versa. Thus, therefore, reason and reflection show 
that the belief cannot be held.^ To this opinion Mr. 
Reid seems to incline. Mr. Stewart expressly pro- 
poses it.^ 

3°. Leibnitz. 

Leibnitz started from the principle of Des Cartes 
that no interaction can take place between matter and 



5 Cf. Malebranche Recherche de la Verite, 1. 6, p. 2, c. 

6 Cf. Hamilton Metaphys., L. XVI. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I7I 

Spirit. To account for what was called the apparent 
union of body and soul, he developed a theory which 
has become famous under the title of " Pre-established 
Harmony." He reproached Des Cartes for degrading 
God by comparing Him to a watchmaker who, having 
made a clock, is still obHged to turn the hands. A 
skillful workman, he says, would make it so that it 
could work itself without assistance. He holds that the 
soul and the body are entirely separated; that the 
soul's acts succeed one another and form a series; that 
the acts of the body form another series ; that between 
these two series there is no interaction. But God in 
the beginning foresaw what the actions would be, and 
established a harmony between the one and the other. 
Thus the soul and body can be compared to two 
watches, which were regulated and wound up. In 
both the minute and the hour hands point to the same 
identical place; but one watch goes entirely independ- 
ent of the other; the spring w^hich gives motion to one 
is not the same as that which gives motion to the 
other.^ 

§ 8. The fundamental error on which these various Criticism 

^ ^ ^ (1) from 

expositions have been raised is the doctrine of occas- nature of 

^ ^ cause. 

ional causes. That we have a true and real causal in- 
fluence on limbs of our body and on external objects 
is evident from consciousness and from daily expe- 
rience. I am conscious of the influence of will on my 
body, e. g., that I walk, speak, write, etc. So, too, I 
am conscious that external agents afifect me as causes, 
ex. gr., a blow from another, etc. The notion of cause 
is real. If I deny the true conception of causality, I 
should do violence to the voice of consciousness. This 

^Cf. Leibnitz Monadol, s. 50, Theod., s. 62; Wolff Psych. 
Rationalis s. 3, s. 13. 



172 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

conception of cause is at the basis of all experimenta- 
tion in the physical sciences. I reason from effect to 
cause, from properties to substance, with a view to 
obtain and formulate the laws which rule the inter- 
action of physical agents.^ If, therefore, there is a real 
causal efficiency in created things, I have no basis for 
the theory of Occasional Causes. It, therefore, be- 
comes a gratuitous hypothesis, 
basis^isan . §9* Again, Des Cartes argues a priori. Because 
Son^,^^' spirit and matter have contradictory properties he in- 
fers that there can be no union between them. But 
this position is contrar}^ to fact. The union of body 
and of soul is a fact. Thus, his starting point was an 
ideal difficulty, 
conse-"^^*^ § 10. Finally, the attempt" to save the spirituality of 
qiiences. ^^ g^^j j^y exaggerating the concept of spirit met 
with disastrous failure. The very opposite was the 
result. The explanation was artificial and mechanical; 
it was adverse to the testimony of consciousness, to the 
dictates of common sense. Therefore, time only was 
needed for its downfall. The protest came in the form 
of a Materialistic philosophy which spread and pre- 
vailed in France during the eighteenth century.^ It 
was in aim a vindication of our bodily existence and 
activities, but erred by reacting to an extreme. 

II: 

Theory of Accidental Union. 
§ II. Plato is considered the parent of this theory. 
He maintained that the soul was in the body after the 
same manner as a pilot was in a ship or a man was on 

8Cf. St. Thomas C. Gent. L. Ill, c. 6g; Rickaby General 
Metaphysics, chap. Causation. 
9 E. g. D'Holbach, De la Mettrie. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I73 

a horse.^° Thus, the soul, by using the body, was 
united to it. The union, therefore, consisted in the 
mutual action of body upon soul* and of soul upon 
body. To him the body is a prison in which the soul 
is confined for some crime committed in a state of 
existence prior to the present. Thus, his theory of the 
union of body and soul supposes the false and aban- 
doned doctrine of the pre-existence of souls.^^ 

2°. Locke. 
§ 12. The opinion of Plato was proposed by Locke Locke. 
in his essay on the Human Understanding.^^ With 
Plato he held that the body and the soul were two 
complete and perfect substances; that they were united 
into one human composite by the mutual influence of 
one upon the other. The soul possesses the power of 
thinking and of motion, and by acting upon the body 
determines the movements of the body. So, likewise, 
body, by acting upon the soul, determines it to per- 
ceive external objects. Hence, a physical efficiency of 
one upon the other whence resulted their union. In 
our own time this opinion prevails among those who 
champion a spiritualistic philosophy against the per- 
nicious doctrines of a materialistic science. 

3°. Lotze. 
§ 13. Lotze rejects the contention that a bond is nee- ^otze. 
essary to explain the reciprocal . action of body and 

1" Dr. E. Hamilton, professor of Mental Philosophy in 
Hamilton College, says that " the soul is in the bodv lil<;e a 
diver incased in strange armor." Cf. his Mental Science, 
p. 48. 

11 Cf. Alcibiades and Phaedo; St. Thomas C. Gentes, 1. 2, 
c. 57; Summa Theol., i q. 76, a. 3. c. 

12 BH. ch. 23, n. 28, 29. 



174 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



soul. Bonds, he says, are needed to unite things which 
do not of themselves act on each other. The bond has 
its binding power because its parts are attached 
to each other. We cannot be always explaining 
this fact by postulating new bonds, but in the 
last analysis must admit an immediate reciprocal 
action of the elements. Hence "the definite forms. in 
which the body would act on the soul, and the soul on 
it, would by no m.eans proceed from the bare concep- 
tion of the aforesaid bond, but only from the specific 
natures of the two elements bound together, and of 
their obligation to reciprocal action." He concludes 
as follows: " Instead of one such vain bond, we assert 
that the two are connected by very many peculiarly 
conistituted bonds; each reciprocal action to which 
they are by their natures necessitated, is such a bond 
which holds them tOR-ether.''^^ 



Ladd. 



' 4°. Ladd. 
§ 14. Prof. Ladd also holds that the relations of mind 
and body are those of causation. It is true, as he pro- 
ceeds to explain, that our first perception of the true 
nature of causation springs from the inner experience 
of mind acting upon body. Nevertheless, we hold that 
their union does not consist in causation; rather causa- 
tion is the result of their union.-^^ 



Rosmini . 



5°. Rosmini. 
§ 15. Closely akin to the doctrine of physical inter- 
action is that proposed by Rosmini. He maintains 
that body and soul are united by the mutual action of 



13 Cf. Lotze Elements of Psychology, ed. by Prof, Ladd, 
pp. loi, 102; Microcos, vol. I, b. 3, c. 4. 

14 Cf. Ladd Philosophy of Mind, p. 258. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I75 

one upon the other, but explains the nature of the ac- 
tion after a different manner. The soul, he says, is 
both sensitive and rational. The sensitive soul is 
united to the body by the fact that it feels the body 
through a certain fundamental sense. Thus the union 
consists in this fundamental feeling, which is consid- 
ered as a subjective modification. The rational soul is 
united to the body because it has an intellectual per- 
ception of this feeling. This perception is innate and 
enduring and thus forms the medium by which body 
and soul are united. 

§ 16. The theory of mutual interaction is much more Criticism, 
plausible than that of exaggerated spirituaHsm. It 
admits the distinction of the two substances and main- 
tains the action of one upon the other. But it is not 
a satisfactory explanation. It states a fact simply, but ^e state- 
makes no attempt to account for the fact. The fact fact, not 

^ _ its explan- 

that soul acts on body is not the cause of their union, ation. 
It is rather the effect. How can reciprocal action ex- 
plain the growth and development of the organism, the 
gradual putting forth of mental powers? Why, in this 
hypothesis, should not the inteUigence be keen and 
alert in infancy? Why should the powers of the soul 
gradually manifest themselves as the body becomes 
stronger? Mere reciprocal action cannot explain 
these patent facts. Furthermore reciprocal action 
cannot explain the close intimate union of soul and 
body. There is, so to say, a certain result in one sub- 
stantial composite. The fact that the one acts upon 
the other is not an explanation of that intimate union. 
Reciprocal action cannot hold them together. It is a 
fact, evident from individual experience that the soul 
striveth against the body and the body against the 
soul. Why in that case should they not separate? If 



176 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



reciprocal action be the only bond of union, they would 
certainly part company. Hence we must admit a 
closer and more intimate union than reciprocal action, 
a union by which one substantial composite is found, 
and which makes reciprocal action possible. 



Dualism 
and mon- 
ism. 



materialis- 
tic and 
Idealistic 
monism. 



Scientific 
monism. 



its history 
and de- 
fenders. 



III. 

The Monistic Theory. 

§ 17. The theories proposed considered the soul and 
body as two distinct substances. They differed only 
in the attempt to explain their union. Hence we may 
call them different presentations of DuaHsm. Others, 
however, deny the duality of substances. Among 
these some contend that the physical series can account 
for the mental; to them mind is but a function of the 
brain, ex. gr., Materialists with Huxley. Others hold 
that mind is the only substance; thus to Berkeley ex- 
ternal things are the product of the imagination; to 
Schoppenhauer the w^orld is a representation. 

§ 18. Finally others deny these suppositions. To 
them the mental and physical are manifestations or 
different " aspects," or " phases," or " sides," or 
'' faces " of the same reality. This is called the 
Double-Aspect theory. Its influence to-day is very 
great, its defenders are learned and powerful, and 
therefore calls for special consideration. 

§ 19. The Double-Aspect theory can be traced to 
Spinoza. It is the logical consequence of his doctrine. 
Spinoza held that there was only one Substance, which 
was infinite and self-determined. This one substance 
manifests itself in two known ways : the world of mat- 
ter and the world of thought. Thus two parallel or- 
ders exist, mutually independent, yet expressions of 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 177 

the one substance which is God}^ Now if, in place of 
God, we put the " unknowable " of Mr. Spencer, or 
the '' InexpHcable " of Mr. Romanes, we have the mod- 
ern form of Spinoza's Pantheism which has pervaded 
current English thought. Its teachers are Mr. Spen- 
cer,i6 Bain,!^ G. Lewes,i« Prof. Clifford,i^ Ferrier,^** 
Hofifding,^^ Fechner,^^ Huxley.^^ 

§ 20. The reason given for this theory is the sup- its reasons 
posed impossibility of mind acting on body or of body 
acting on mind. Mr. Romanes dismisses with con- interaction 
tempt the hypothesis of causality acting from nervous andbody. 
structure to mental processes. He says that it does 
violence to our faculty of reason and to our very idea 
of causation ; that in this case there is no perceived 
equivalency between causes and effect. To him also 
mental changes cannot cause physical changes; such 
a hypothesis is contrary to the law of the conservation 
of energy. Therefore there is no interaction.^* 

§ 21. At the same time they were forced to explain (2) J^^ 
the testimony of consciousness that there are two there are ' ■ 

•^ two classes 

classes of facts, viz., mental and physical.^ The solu- o« v^^- ^ 

' ' -^ •' nomena. 

15 Cf. Spinoza, p. XXXII. 

16 Cf. First Principles, Psychology. 

17 Cf. Mind and Body. 

1^ Cf. Physical Basis of Life, p. 341; Problems of Life and 
Mind. 
1^ Cf. Seeing and Thinking. 

20 Functions of the brain, § 88. 

21 Cf. Outlines of Psychology. 

22 Cf. Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, p. 262. 

23 " On Hypothesis that animals are automata." 

24 Cf. Romanes " Fallacies of Materialism," Contemp. Rev., 
vol. XII; cf. Hoffding Outlines of Psychology, p. 64; Bain, 
Mind and Body, p. 160; for opposite view cf. Ladd in Physiol. 
Psychology. In the following chapter the objection drawn 
from the law of the conservation of energy will be answered. 

25 For distinction of the two orders, physical and mental, 
cf. Clifford " Seeing and Thinking," p. 87; " Lectures and 
Essays," II, p. 35; Huxley " Science and Culture," p. 260. 

23 



178 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



tempt at 

reconcilia 

tion. 



tion adopted was an attempt at conciliation. They 
admitted the distinction of the mental and physical 
S^an*at^-°^^ Only as aspects of one unknown substance. Hence 
there are two corresponding sets of phenomena which 
are simultaneously unfolded each according to its own 
laws. Hence there is a parallelism and a proportionality 
between mind and the cerebral motions of the brain. 
But this supposes an identity at the bottom. The dif- 
ferences, we are conscious of, show that this one prin- 
ciple has found expression in a double form. Thus 
what inner experience reveals as thought or feeling, 
is represented in the material world by certain cerebral 
activities. It is the expression of the same thing in 
two languages. In this explanation they hold that 
the law of conservation of energy would remain intact; 
for it would be applied to and would rule the cerebral 
processes.^ 

Different Forms. 
§ 22. This theory has been proposed in different 
forms. We shall briefly present the most important. 
(i°) Prof. Clifford is an authoritative exponent of the 
''Mind Dust" theory .^^ Prof. Clififord holds that 
what we perceive as matter is in reality mind-stufif. 
Every molecule of inorganic matter possesses an atom 
of mind-stuff. In its separated elementary condition 
there is no mind or consciousness. The combination 
of molecules causes a combination in the elements of 
mind-stufif, which first appears in the faint beginnings 
of sentience. When this combination results in the 
complex structure of the brain and nervous-system, 



Its differ- 
ent forms, 
(1°) Prof. 
Clifford. 



" mind 
stuff." 



26 Cf. Hoflfding Outlines of Psychol., p. 66. 

27 This theory was proposed by Fick, 1862, is held by Taine 
" IntelHgence " Bill; cf. Clifford Lectures and Essays II, 71; 
Prince, Nature of Mind and Human Antomatism. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1/9 

the elements of mind-stuff combine into conscious 
thought and volition. Prof. Clifford, therefore, is an 
evolutionist. He postulates " mind-dust " as a certain 
property of matter, and explains the evolution of intel- 
ligence from lower to higher forms by the increasing 
complexity in which the material elements are 
combined.^ 

§ 23. (i) What is this " mind-stuff?" It is not con- gy^f^^^X 
scious in its ultimate analysis, as Prof. Clifford admits. ^inJ4tuff. 
Then it must be unconscious. Lewes holds that the 
nerve-process considered in its most general form of 
".rritability, is everywhere conscious. This is the posi- 
tion of Bain/^ and in a modified form, of Wundt. 
Others contend that a given degree of development 
is necessary before consciousness is found at all; this 
is the theory of Maudsley, James and Ferrier, and is 
generally accepted. " Those nervous actions," writes 
Mr. Bastian,^" " attended by conscious states, consti- 
tute in reality only a very small fraction of the sum 
total of nerv'ous states or actions."^^ Mr. Morgan con- 
siders man as " the self-conscious outcome of an activ- 
ity, selective and synthetic, which is neither energy nor 
consciousness; which has not been evolved, but 
through the action of which evolution has been ren- 

^ " Consciousness is only the flowering of mind, and be- 
low consciousness there is an unconscious mind-substance 
out of which consciousness is evolved. In its higher forms 
this unconscious mind-substance is correlative with nerve- 
force, and below nerve-force it still exists correlated with 
other forms of force. Hence matter is everywhere corre- 
lated with atoms of mind-substance, having laws exactly 
parallel to and the counterparts of material laws. Mind and 
Matter, a double-faced unity," Thomson Psychology, vol. II, 
p. 186 sq. 

29 Cf. Emotions and Will appendix A. 

30 In Brain as Organ of Mind, p. 145. 

31 Cf. Baldwin Handbook of Psychology PHI, ch. II, § i. 



l80 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

dered possible, which is neither subject nor object, but 
underlies and is common to both." ^^ But conscious 
mental life cannot evolve out of unconscious elements. 
The mistake of Prof. Clifford is to assume that our 
mental states are compounds. This is unwarranted 
and controverted by conscious experience. Impres- 
sions should not be confounded with sensations. There 
may be a combination of impressions or " shocks/' but 
there is no compound in the sensation produced. It 
may have different sensations, but we cannot say that 
one sensation as such is made up of different elements. 
In like manner the "notion" or the "judgment" are 
indivisible; they are not compounds of elementary 
units.^^ 

absurdo. §^4- (^) ^^ ^^^ " mind-dust " be conscious, why is 
not intelligence manifested in all material objects? In 
this case stone, grass, tree, etc., all should show signs 
of mind.^* 

Tm"?' §25. (3) M. Romanes rejects this explanation. He 

Romanes, considers it inadequate to explain the fundamental 
antithesis between subject and object. If by " subject," 
he means mind in one sense of the term, and by 
"object" he understands matter; we can readily per- 
ceive that the "mind-dust" theory would obliterate 
the fundamental antithesis of matter and mind.^^ 

2° Bain. § 26. (2°) Mr. Bain says that " a sentient animal has 

two sides or aspects of its being — the one all matter, 
the other all mind ; that the doctrine of two substances, 
one material the other immaterial, is now in course of 

32 Cf. Introd. to Comp. Psych., p. 332. 

33 Cf. Calderwood " Relations of Mind and Brain," p. 294, 
foil.; Guthrie Spencer's Unification of Knowledge, p. 231. 

3* On Double-Aspect Theory as Hylozoic Materialism, cf. 
Prof. Bowne Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 21 sq. 
35 Cf. Contem. Rev., vol. XII. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. l8l 

being modified at the instance of modern physiology; 
that, in company with all our mental processes, there is 
an unbroken material succession; hence no rupture of 
nervous continuity. He infers that the only tenable 
supposition is that mental and physical proceed to- 
gether as "undivided twins." Thus he speaks of a 
** two-sided cause," a "two-sided phenomenon," of 
"not mind causing body and body causing mind, but 
mind-body giving birth to mind-body," of " the proper 
physical fact being a single, one-sided objective fact;'* 
of " the mental fact being a two-sided fact."^^ 

§ 27. We deny that matter and mind are two " sides " Criticism. 
or " aspects " of the same one thing, if by this is meant 
the denial of the distinct substances. The reasons for 
the distinction of the substances are too strong to be 
obliterated after this fashion.^'' Modern Physiology has . 
given no proofs, as Mr. Bain and Lewes contend, 
which have modified the doctrine held from " the time 
of Thomas Aquinas to the present day." If by an 
" unbroken material succession " he understands the 
physical law of the conservation of energy, the reader 
is referred to the following chapter where proof is 
given that the law remains intact. The phrases " un- 
divided turns '' and " two-sided cause " denote strange 
confusion of thought. Or rather, they are terms in- 
vented to cover, under an apparently scientific form, 
the difficulties which cannot honestly be met. It seems 
strange that intelligent men would go to such lengths 
rather than admit the real existence of a soul, which 
"seems to me," writes Mr. James,^^ "the line of least 
logical resistance, so far as we have yet attained.'^ 

36 Cf. Bain Mind and Body, ch. VI. 

37 Cf. Prof. Bowne Introduction to Psychological Theory, 
p. 36. 

38 Psych., vol. I, p. 182. 



l82 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

8* Spencer. § 28. (3°) Mr. Spencer speaks of nervous changes 
which have "subjective aspects" and "objective as- 
pects," of " feeUngs as the subjective sides of nervous 
changes/'^^ of " mind and nervous action as the sub- 
jective and objective faces of the same thing." ^° His 
inference is : " This brings us to the true conclusion 
implied throughout the foregoing pages — the conclu- 
sion that it is the one and the same ultimate Reality 
which is manifested to us subjectively and object- 
ively."^! 

Criticism. ^29. Mr. Spencer champions the evolutionary 
theory of mind^ He explains mind by the correlation 
of mechanical forces. Elsewhere this theory is put to 
the test of criticism. At present his views on the rela- 
tions of mind and of matter demand our attention. 

consStent. § 3^- ^i". Spencer speaks of " feelings as subjective 
sides of nervous changes ; " nevertheless, a little farther 
on he says that " the distinction of subject and object is 
itself the consciousness of a difference transcending all 
other dififerences/' that "a unit of feeling has nothing in 
common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever 
manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition."^ 
§31. Again, why should we not hold that all phe- 
nomena have these subjective and objective sides. 
Finally, there "two faces'' are phenomena ; as such they 
are two facts or two things; they cannot, therefore, be 
merged into one. Thus, the difficulty is not solved by 
calling the material and mental " two faces ; " it is only 
hidden under an obscure phraseology.*^ 

39 Prin. of Psych., vol. I, ch. VI. 

40 lb., ch. VII, § 56. 

41 Vol. I, § 273. Sully speaks of the " subjective " and " ob- 
jective " sides of attention, cf. Human mind, vol. I, pp. I47r 
151. 

42 lb., vol. I, § 62. 

43 Cf. Herbert Modern Realism Examined, § 12; Mn 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 183 

Its Arguments. 

§ 32. The principal arguments which are advanced ^^y^X 
in support of the " Double- Aspect " theory, are: ^^y- 
(a) Physiology shows that physical and mental facts 
are parallel. It is assumed that there is a recipro- 
cal correspondence between a mental state and a neu- 
ral process. But this is not and cannot be proved. 
Even if we grant that it is so, we would have no ground 
to infer that the mental state is merely a concomitant 
or appendage of the neural changes. 

§ 33. (b) Physics shows, through the law of the con- (b) from 
servation of energy, that there is no reciprocal action ^^^^^' 
of mind upon body; therefore, this hypothesis seems 
better fitted to answer the facts. But, we answer that 
the law of the conservation of energy remains intact. 
Reciprocal action of body upon mind does not inter- 
fere with this law, as we shall see. Moreover, indi- 
vidual experience testifies that body acts upon mind 
and mind upon body. 

§ 34. (c) The hypothesis of evolution necessitates Jg^ory^^f 
this explanation. The answer is made that the theory evolution, 
of evolution cannot be sustained. Evolution supposes 
a gradual passage from inorganic nature to living be- 
ings who feel and think. But science is powerless to 
solve the origin of life. " The influence of animal or 
vegetable life on matter is infinitely beyond the range 
of any scientific inquiry hitherto entered on. Its power 
of directing the motions of moving particles, in the 
demonstrated daily miracle of our human free-will, and 
in the growth of generation after generation of plants 
frorh a single seed, are infinitely different from any 
possible results of the fortuitous concourse of atoms. 

Tyndall's vacillating position is stated by Mallock, Is Life 
Worth Living, p. 228. 



184 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

The real phenomena of Hfe infinitely transcend human 
science.^* If, therefore, evolution is powerless to solve 
the problem of life, how can it expect to account for 
thought? 

Consequences. 
structiveof § 35- W According to this theory bodily changes and 
nowe ge j^gj^^g^j States go on in parallel series; there is no inter- 
action. The result is that I am unable to learn your 
state of mind from your actions. The flush of shame, 
the heat of anger, the tears of sorrow give me no clue 
to your feelings. Moreover I do not know that you 
have a mind, for how can I infer its existence from 
your acts, if there be no reciprocal influence? But 
this is against consciousness and common sense. 

lers 
absurd. 



hiito?^^''' §36. (b) What can be 'said of the achievements of 



mind in the past? Mind has nothing to do with the 
progress of civilization, of the fine arts, or of literature. 
Man's activity consists in physical or neural changes. 
Therefore, if the original elements were given, the 
course of history could be antecedently determined. 
The mind is only the subjective aspect of these changes, 
not anything distinct in itself.^^ 

IV. 

Scholastic Theory. 

o?matt?r § 37* """^ ^^ ^ truth of physical science that there is no 
and force matter without force, and no force without matter. 

attested by ' _ 

observa^ This is a simple fact attested by ordinary observation, 
tion. ^j^(j confirmed by scientific experiment. It is a truth 

^ Lord Kelvin, Fort. Review, Mar., 1892. 

45 Cf. St. Thomas S. Th. I, q. 85, a;; 3- q. 69, a. 8, ad. 3; i; q. 
50, a. 4, ad. 2; Prof. Bowne " Metaphysics, a Study of First 
Principles," pp. 358, 376 sq. Herbert, Modern Realism Ex- 
amined, § 18. ; 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 185 

which obtains throughout the visible universe from the 
smallest particle of inorganic matter to the highest 
forms of organized existence. Materialism is based on 
this truth ; but it errs in giving to the formula " no 
matter without force " universal and necessary value, 
and affirming that all forces are of a material nature. 
As a logical consequence it denies a higher world of 
beings than the material, and destroys the difiference 
in nature of the forces which enter into play in the vis- 
ible world about us. Scholastic philosophy avoids 
either extreme. It takes the existence of matter and 
of force as facts, but draws no necessary law therefrom; 
it affirms that all forces are not of the same nature, that 
we must make a distinction between physical, vital, 
mental forces. 

§ 38. The fact that there is no matter without force t>yscien- ^ 

^ ^ ^ tificexperi; 

in the visible universe is not a truth known only from ment. 
ordinary observation. Approved results in all the de- 
partments of descriptive science affirm it. Physics 
formulates the law of inertia and of the conservation 
of matter. At the same time it teaches as a fact, veri- 
fied by experimental investigation, that forces are 
transformed, ex. gr., mechanical work into heat, etc., 
and enunciates the law of the conservation and dissipa- 
tion of energy. Every day progress is made in the ac- 
quisition of facts which illustrate the working of these 
laws. The same duality is revealed in Chemistry. This 
is seen in the decomposition of chemical compounds. 
Thus by voltaic electricity water is separated into its 
component parts of oxygen and hydrogen, e. g., the 
weight is the same whether the elements be consid- 
ered as decomposed or in their compound state.^ 

^ New Chemistry, by Cooke, Lect. V. 
24 



l86 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Nevertheless the specific properties are different. In 
the words of Mr. Cooke " water and the two gases, hy- 
drogen and oxygen, are the same matter under differ- 
ent forms." This fact is the basis of the laws of chemi- 
cal affinities and of multiple proportions. In crystalli- 
zation we must admit a force which arranges the ma- 
terial atoms in various forms. 
a duality in § -20. In every material substance, therefore, are 

every sub- ^ ^>' j 

stance. found two series of properties which are antagonistic 
in nature and point to a duality in the composition of 
the substance itself. Thus ex. gr., we find quantity and 
quality, permanence and change, inertia and energy. The 
inference, therefore, is, made that a substance is a com- 
pound whole, constituted by the intimate union of first 
this duality matter and of form. The first matter is the source of 
of the quantity, of permanence and of inertia; the form is the 
Matter and source of quality, of change and of energy. The first 
matter is the same throughout the visible universe ; the 
form is specifically different and by its union with first 
matter constitutes a specific type of existence with its 
specific qualities or energies.*^ 
Theory ii- § 40. We here speak of the ultimate constitution of 

lustrated . .7 ^ . ^ . ^ , 

from bodies. Experimentation, therefore, cannot give any 

direct evidence. The theory of first matter and form 
is based on ordinary and scientific inference. Illustra- 
tions, however, can be drawn from analogy. Thus, ex. 
gr., a rough block of marble may be compared to first 

*^ Cf.Fr. Harper S. J. Metaphysics of the Schools, vol. II, 
b. 5, c. 2, § 4; Abbe Farges " Matiere et Forme " " L'acte et 
Potencie." " No one," writes Mr. Cooke, " who has followed 
modern physical discussions can doubt that the tendency of 
physical thought is to refer the differences of substances to 
a dynamical cause," and confesses himself rather drawn to that 
view of nature which refers the qualities of substances to the 
affections of the one substractum modified by the varying 
play of forces." New Chemistry, pp. 118, 117. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 187 

matter; the chisel of the sculptor may form it 
into a statue of Washington. The statue in its com- 
pleted state may be considered as composed of marble 
and of the specific form which constitutes it in the like- 
ness of our country's hero. So, too, wood may be 
likened to first-matter, the form of a table to form. But 
in the examples of the statue and of the table the forms 
are only accidental. In these cases the word '' shape " 
would be more exact. Nevertheless we never perceive 
a material object which has not some definite shape. 
What these shapes are to material objects, the sub- 
stantial form is to substance itself; it constitutes the 
substance in a concrete existence.*^ 

§41. The concepts of "first-matter" and of " sub- of^ma?ter 
stantial form " are abstractions. But that is not to say areab^^ 
that they are figments of the mind. The warrant we but have a 
have for making these abstractions is had in the de- reality, 
scriptive sciences and in daily observation. First-mat- 
ter does not exist as a concrete entity; in combination 
with form only it exists in the concrete. The union of 
both is physical. We say substance is composed of 
first-matter and form. Hence, the union is a composi- 
tion. It is not a mixture as, ex. gr., water is a mixture 
of hydrogen and oxygen. But it can be compared to 
the union of potency and act; the first-matter is a pure 
potency, receptive of any form; the substantial form 
actuates, determines and perfects it into a complete 
concrete existence. The result is one substance essen- 
tially composed.*^ 

*8 The term " first-matter " is used in contradistinction 
to *' second-matter," or matter as it comes under the activ- 
ity of our senses, i. e., concrete matter or matter simply. 

*^ Cf. Aug. Confess., L. 12, c. 6; L. 13, c. 29; de Gen ad Lit. 
LI, c. 15; Aristotle's Psychology, by E. Wallace, BII, ch. I; 
St. Thomas C. Gentes L. 2, c. 56, 57, 71; L. 4, c. 81; Summa 
Theologiae I. q. 44, a. 2; I. q. 66, a. i; I. q. 76. 



i88 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



hierarchy 
of beings 
and of 
forms. 



based on 
fact. 



§ 42. But all beings are not of the same nature. A 
gradated series of existences in the world about us 
meets the eye. There are entities purely material, then 
living beings, ex. gr., the vegetable world, then ani- 
mals, and finally man, the crown of God's work, the 
apex of creation.^" The same law of duality persists 
throughout. Each substance has its material and its 
formal element. With this difference, that the material 
element is the same. The laws of quantity, of inertia 
and of the conservation of matter, are as true of the 
material particles which go to make up the human 
body as of those which enter into the formation of a 
crystal or a stone. A remarkable fact, however, is that 
the forces are dififerent in nature. The laws which gov- 
ern the material and chemical forces are not the same 
as those which prevail in the living world. Again, the 
laws of vegetative growth differ in kind from the laws 
of sensation, just as these in turn differ from the laws 
of mental life. These facts point to a difference in na- 
ture of the formal element. Thus, we have material, 
living, sensitive, intellectual energies; and as a natural 
inference material, living, sensitive and intellectual 
forms. These forms, therefore, so different in nature, 
joined in intimate substantial union with first-matter, 
constitute the hierarchy of beings we see about us. 

§ 43. The inference is logical, and is based on facts. 
Thus, we have the sciences of Chemistry and Physics 
which deal with material forces. Biology and Physi- 
ology, which explain the phenomena of life, Psychol- 
ogy, which investigates the nature and processes of 
sensation and of thought. Chemistry and Physics dif- 
fer from Biology and Psychology because the former 
deal with forces which differ from the latter. From the 



5° S. Thomas C. Gentes, liv, cap. 11. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I89 

difference of these forces we infer a difference in the 
nature of the beings. This difference is caused by a 
difference in the formal element. 

§44. Let us now apply this line of thought to man. ^an!*^^'^ 
Each of us has in his own organism two series of prop- 
erties which are antagonistic to each other. Thus, ex. 
gr., my organism is a certain quantity possessing dif- 
ferent qualities; it is composed of matter and of certain 
activities or forces; the law of the conservation of 
matter remains intact at the dissolution of the body, 
and the materal elements preserve their inertia. There- 
fore, I infer the forces in my body spring from a for- 
mal element, and the material properties have their 
source in first-matter. But the forces in my organism 
differ specifically from the forces which have play in 
the lower existences. Therefore, I infer a specific dif- 
ference in the form. The invesigation of the specific 
nature of the form which actuates the body is the sub- 
ject-matter of this essay. The activities Avhich are 
manifested as thought and will are in nature super- 
organic and spiritual.^^ Hence, their principle, i. e., 
the form of the body, is superorganic and spiritual. 
This principle or form is called the soul, because it is a 
principle of life, and by its union with the body con- 
stitutes a living organism. This union, is intrinsic, 
natural and substantial.^^ 

§ 45. There is no more difficulty in explaining the Hence 

. . r 1 , . .... union of 

constitution of the human organism than there is mt)odyandof 

. . , . . . soul, 

accounting for the constitution of the inorganic mole- 
cule. In both cases we have a union of first-matter 
and of substantial form. With this difference, how- 

51 S. Thomas C. Gentes, 1. ii, cap. 69. 

52 S. Thomas C Gentes, 1. ii, cap. 71 ; Sum. Theol. i q. 76, 
a. I, ad. 4. 



IQO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ever, that the substantial form of the human organism 
is of a spiritual nature, and can subsist by itself after 
its dissolution from the body. Thus, the acts of growth 
and of sensation are acts of the animated organism.^^ 
The animated organism is the "Adequate principle" 
of these acts. Therefore, the soul, the one source of all 
our activities, is essentially and immediately the sub- 
stantial form of the human body, and by its intrinsic 
union with the body constitutes man in the human 
species.^^ 

§ 46. The principles set forth furnish a ready an- 
swer to the question as to the place of the soul in the 
hum.an body. The soul is the substantial form of the 
body; it constitutes the body an organism; it commun- 
icates life and movement.^^ Therefore, it is whole and 
entire in every part. It is in every part of the living 
body, because it is the form of the body, and as such, 
the source and principle of bodily life; it is whole and 
entire in every part, because of its simple nature.^^ An 
illustration can be drawn from the magnet. Every part 
of the iron possesses the power of attraction. I may 
crush it into powder without detecting with the eye the 
force whence springs its peculiar power. In like man- 
ner the body may be dissected, yet the scalpel cannot 
dissect or touch the soul. In both the energy is known 

^ Cf. Following Chapter. 

54 Cf. St. Thomas C. Gentes, BIT, ch. 49, 68; Summa Theol. 
I. q. ']6\ q. 90, a. 4. That the soul is the substantial form of 
the body is an article of faith defined in the councils of Vienne 
and V. Lateran, cf. Denziger's Enchiridion. 

55 S. Theolog. I q. "/d, a. Z-J- 

56 " Tota igitur in singulis partibus simul adest, quae tota 
simul sentit in singulis," Aug. de Immort. an. n. 25; S. 
Thomas S. Theolog. i q. '/d, a. 8. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. IQI 

to exist by reason of its manifestations.^'' That the 
force in material bodies is essentially different from the 
soul has been shown.^^ The marvellous structure of 
the body explains the difference in the functions of our 
organic life. The functions are all related one to an- 
other, and in their action reveal a no less marvellous 
unity and harmony. One principle and controlling 
power is over all.^^ 

5^ S. Augustine illustrates this by comparing the body to a 
" word," the soul to the " meaning " of the word. De quant. 
An. nn. 65, 69. 

5^ Spirituality of the soul. 

^^ Per totum corpus quod animat non locali dififusione, sed 
quadam vitali intentione porrigitur (anima) ; nam per omnes 
ejus particulas tota simul adest, nee minor in minoribus, et in 
majoribus major; sed alicubi intentius, alicubi remissius, et in 
omnibus tota et in singulis tota est." Aug. Ep. 166, n. 4; 
cent. Epist. Manich., n. 20; S. Thomas S. Theol. I, q. "jd. 



THE BRAIN AND THOUGHT. 



question 
stated. 



solved by 
scientific 
methods 



§ I. In the preceding pages the nature of the human 
soul has been set forth and the special difficulties 
drawn from the Physiology of the brain examined and 
solved. A complete and satisfactory study, however, 
requires an explanation of the real positive relation 
which subsists between the brain and those activities 
of the soul embraced under the term thought. This 
question is proposed here as a complement to the chap- 
ter on the Union of Body and Soul, and serves as an 
illustration, deriving therefrom in return solid prin- 
ciples and a sound basis. But it is more than a sub- 
sidiary problem; at the present time the brain is the 
real battle ground between Materialism and a spiritual- 
istic philosophy; on this the issue depends. 

§ 2. It is a fact that we think with the brain, that 
the brain in some way concurs in the production of 
thought. MateriaHsts maintain that it is the organ of 
thought, e. g., as the eye is the organ of sight. This 
statement is simple and has a scientific appearance, and 
therefore seems to be strong. They hold that cere- 
bral functions can explain the phenomena which we 
regard as spiritual, and that as a consequence the soul 
is an unnecessary postulate. The question is a scien- 
tific one and can be solved according to the methods 
of science, i. e., by reasoning from data furnished by 
observation and experiment.^ 



1 Cf. Dr. Surbled Le Cerveau, ch. XXIII. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. I93 



I. 

Explanation op Terms. 

§ 3. First of all definition of terms is necessary; am- produced 
biguity leads to mental confusion and erroneous con- ^^ ^^^^^• 
elusions; the candid reader will be convinced that 
Materialism thrives in such conditions; statements in 
appearance very simple are in reality very complex. 
Thus in the phrase: Thought is produced by the brain, 
we must understand (a) what is meant by thought. 

§4. With modern writers from the time of Des j^^^^^^^' 
Cartes, the term is used to designate two orders of ^^^ught. 
phenomena essentially different, viz., sense and intel- 
lect. This is especially true of English Philosophy. pj^SkJophy 
From Locke to Mill and Spencer, the confusion of 
these two orders has been a fundamental error of the 
English mind. Too much stress cannot be laid upon 
this fact. 

§ 5. Scholastic philosophy, on the contrary, has ever inScho- 
taught that the phenomena of sense are essentially dif- philosophy 
ferent from the phenomena of thought. For proof it 
appeals to the testimony of consciousness. It is evi- 
dent to any one who carefully scrutinizes the facts of 
the inner life that the act of sense is totally different 
irom the act of thought. The object of sense is con- 
crete, material, extended; the object of thought is 
abstract, immaterial and unextended. Thus, for ex- 
ample I put my hand in the fire ; the sensation of burn- 
ing is not the same as the idea, they are different in 
nature, and altogether opposed.^ 

2Arist. de an L2 c2, § 10; Balmes Fund. Phil., vol. II, ch. . 
II; S. Thomas C. Gent. Lib. 2c, 66; Mivart Truth, ch. XV. 

25 



194 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



inffS^^^ § 6. (b) It is necessary to have a clear notion of the 
duced " word '' produced." It is true that the brain concurs 
in the production of thought, and can therefore in a 
certain sense be termed the cause. The real issue at 
stake is the manner of the concurrence, the reason why 
the brain is said to produce thought, the meaning of 
the word cause. In ordinary language the term, cause, 
has a very wide signification; it may mean the prin- 
ciple, or the instrumental, or the efficient or the final 
cause, or it may designate the circumstances or the 
occasion. Thus, ex. gr., in the statement: I chop trees 
for my health, I am the principle and efficient cause, 
the axe is the instrumental and health is the final 
cause, since the axe is the instrument I use, and my 
health is the reason why I perform the act. In like 
manner I often allege, as the cause of a conflagration, 
the existence of combustible material; whereas in pre- 
cise language such material is the occasion or condi- 
tion of the fire.^ 
the pur- § 7. These explanations put the question in clear 

chapter. ^ light, and we can now proceed in the effort to discover 
the true relation between the brain on the one hand 
and the acts of sensation and of thought on the other. 
The thesis, therefore, is directed against the school of 
cerebral physiologists, represented by Mr. James.^ 



11. 
The Brain and Sensation. 
P'^ssibie § 8, On inquiring into the cause or the subject of 

material- sensation, three hypotheses are possible : either the sub- 



^ For clear examples of the distinction between cause and 
occasion read Balmes Europ. Civiliz., ch. II. 

4 James " Prin. of Psychology;" J. Luys "Brain and Its 
Functions." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 195 

ject is the body, or it is the soul, or it is both united, i. 
e., the animated body. MateriaHsts hold that the body 
can account for sensation. Scholastic philosophy con- Scholastic, 
tends that the subject of sensation is in general the 
animated organism, or in particular the animated or- 
gan, as, ex. gr., the living eye, ear, etc. 

§ 9. (a) The opinion of St. Thomas rests upon in- ^}^\)\^gJ"P^® 
controvertible facts of consciousness, is sustained by iJ^<J|s^^^y- 

common sense and finds verification in the ordinary proved 

•^ (a) by con- 
language of daily hfe. Consciousness testifies to the sciousness. 

sensations which I experience. I come in contact with 
the external world through the senses of sight, of 
smell, of hearing, of taste, of touch with its particular 
sensations of temperature and of pressure. The gen- fact of gen- 
eral sensibiHty diiTused over the nervous system makes 
me aware of internal bodily feelings. All these senses 
can be in operation at one and the same time; in my 
waking state some always are, busy conveying their 
own specific message. Even when wearied by con- 
stant exertion I seek rest and refreshment in sleep, my 
senses are watchful. A loving hand laid upon my 
forehead disturbs my slumber; a noise, maybe a foot- 
fall, arouses me; a bright light penetrates the closed, 
heavy lids and my eyes open ; or the strange feeling of 
an unseen presence near awakens me noiselessly from 
the soundest sleep and I am conscious of every nerve 
alert to catch the slightest sound. Thus, through the 
swiftly running moments of the hour and of the day, a 
thousand impressions excite a thousand varying 
sensations. 

§ 10. Yet these sensations so different in kind and ^^"^^y* 
in the power of affecting me or in the length of time 
they last, do not hasten past into oblivion Hke the 
quickly moving figures of a panorama. In some won- 



196 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

derful manner they coalesce into a unity. It is / who 
see, and hear and feel. It is / who am the one indivis- 
ible subject which experience all and suffer all. From 
early morn until late at night I have been the same 
constant subject and agent of all the manifold impres- 
sions which go to make up the life of a day. It is not 
the organ of sight that sees, it is / who see; it is not the 
ear that hears, it is / who hear ; and so it is / who taste, 
or smell, or touch, or feel a shock from without or a 
bodily p^in within. This unity ot consciousness in the 
acts of sensation is an elementary fact of individual 
experience. It is something intangible, inexplicable, 
indivisible. I accept it as such because it is part of 
my very nature. I can only explain its existence by 
postulating a simple principle which vivifies my body 
throughout and thus becomes the one agent of my 
bodily activities and with my body constitutes the one 
subject of sensation, 
common §11- (t>) Common sense and ordinary speech reflect 
speech.^^ the undivided voice of consciousness. Thus I tell 
what / saw, not what my eyes saw, etc. The same 
unity of sense-consciousness is observed in the animal, 
conclusion, rj.^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ whatever part of the body I may 

touch a dog, he is immediately aware of the impres- 
sion. We, therefore, conclude that a simple subject 
is necessary for the act of sensation, in as much as a 
simple subject alone can explain the unity of con- 
sciousness in the sensitive life. 
<2)^8ensa- § 12. It is a fact of consciousness, evident upon care- 
tat!?e^' ^^^ observation, that sensation itself is quantitative. 
tJ^is^P^oved xhe properties of quantity are : that it occupies space, 
sciousness. j^ q^ extension: that it can be measured, i. e., intensity: 
that it is produced gradually, i. e., protensive magni- 
tude. All these properties are verified of the sensation. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 197 

(a) Consciousness testifies that sensation has an ex- ^|5;en^on, 
tended form. Not only the object felt is something 
extended, but the very feeling is extended also. Thus, 
ex. gr., in the sensation of sight, the organ is a certain 
extended part of the body, the impression made upon 
the eye is extended, as experiment shows, the sensa- 
tion is also extended, and its representation pictured 
upon the imagination has the form, color and appear- 
ance of the external extended object. 

§ 13. In like manner the sam.e can be said of the 
other senses. The sense of. touch, however, presents 
the most striking illustrations of this truth. The pain, 
ex. gr., which is caused by the needle piercing the 
flesh, is definitely localized and circumscribed; again, 
I hold a coin in my fingers, a Hmited surface of the 
skin feels the impression; or I Hft my hand to ease the 
racking headache which may be now in the temples, 
now on the side, or on the back of the head; or I can 
indicate the definite tooth that is to be extracted. 
Now only can the pain in the periphral organ be local- 
ized, but Physiology has traced the nerves which com- 
municate the stimulus and have located the nerve 
centres in the brain. Therefore, in the act of sensation 
the subject feeling, the manner of feeling, and the ob- 
ject felt are all extended. 

§ 14. (b) Sensation can be gradually produced; (m proten- 
- .. , .,,. sive mag- 

hence a certam tune may elapse m the production, mtude. 

which has been called protensive magnitude. Con- 
sciousness testifies that the sensation may be 'gradu- 
ally produced, e. g., from the thumb, to the hand, to 
the whole arm. (c) Individual experience testifies (9) inten- 
tliat sensations differ in intensity. Thus, ex. gr., we 
distinguish a difference of intensity between the can- 
dle and the electric light. Now an attempt has been 



tion. 



198 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

made to measure these differences. Hence the depart- 
ment of Psycho-Physics. The term is a misnomer. 
It is not a branch of Psychology; but rather pertains 
to Physiology. While Psycho-Physics has failed to 
establish a law which is universal or exact even within 
the sphere of sensation, nevertheless it can furnish 
some data which help our position. The law of Weber 
holds good within certain limits; hence the difference 
in intensity of, ex. gr., two definite sensations, can be 
measured. This is all we contend for in this place. 
We do not speak of the law; we question only the fact; 
can the intensity be computed? One sole instance 
sufifices.® 
fOT?lS£° § 15- Now if we take these two facts of conscious- 
ness as the data of our reasoning, the inference is in- 
controvertible. The unity of consciousness can only 
be explained by the existence of a simple, immaterial 
principle: the quantitative form of sensation requires 
that the feeling-subject be likewise quantitative. 
These two facts do not mutually exclude each other; 
they are found side by side as the two essential ele- 
ments in every act of sensation. 

§ 16. Thus sensation is simple and quantitative: 
simple because it is the act of a simple principle as is 
shown from the unity of consciousness: quantitative 
because the form of the actual present sensation is 
quantitative as consciousness also shows. The ele- 
ments mutually complete each other in the production 
of one perfect organic act. Thus we may say that 
the soul, i. e., the simple principle and the body, i. e., 
the organ when considered separately, are the partial 
causes of sensation, but when united in one compos- 

5 Cf. Sully The Human Mind, pp. 81-99. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 199 

ite principle form the one adequate cause; in other 
words, that the subject of sensation is the animated or- 
ganism in general, or the animated organ in particular. 
Now as the nervous system is the organ of sensation, 
and- as this is centred in the cerebral ganglia at the base 
of the brain, so that if the communication from the 
periphral organs to the cerebrum be broken, I should 
no longer feel the impression and sensation would be 
impossible, it follows that the brain is the central and 
fundamental organ of sensation. 

§ 17. In the name, therefore, of sound philosophy Thecon- 
and of true science Scholastics protest against the ex- in accord 
aggerated teaching of those who would either refer 
sensation to the activity of the soul alone, or would 
seek its cause in the cerebral activities independently 
of the soul. 

III. 
Brain and Thought. 
§ 18. We pass to the consideration of the second question 

. . , stated » 

part of the thesis; the relation between the brain and 
the phenomena of mind. The same method is fol- 
lowed, viz., from an analysis of thought, and as a logi- 
cal consequence its comparison with sensation. The 
relation between the brain and sensation has been 
shown to be organic, i. e., the brain is the organ of 
sensation. Now, if thought can be shown to be dififer- 
ent in kind from sensation, it follows of necessity that 
the relation between the brain and thought is not the 
same as prevails between the brain and sensation. 

§ 19. The phenomena of mind are essentially differ- Sntfatiy 
ent from the functions of bodily organs : (a) An from sen- 
analysis of thought shows that there is no extended s^^'^^- 
element; hence the thinking subject does not possess 



200 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

inlfysffof ^xtension.^ Thus, ex. gr., abstract thought has the 

thought, immaterial and unextended for its object, and in act 

not ex- it does not appear under an extended form. It has 

focaiizedor been shown also that all efiforts to localize or measure 

measuie . ^i-^Q^^g]^!- j^g^yg failed; whereas, on the contrary, I can 

localize or measure sensations, in some cases at least, 

approximately; and that it is of the essence of sensation 

that it affect a definite part of the body.^ 

§ 20. Now if we compare sensation and thought, we 
find that sensation has two elements, the simple and the 
quantitative; that thought has but one, the simple. 
Again we know that the quantitative element in sensa- 
tion comiCS from the intrinsic co-operation of the organ 
with the simple principle to form one adequate cause. 
Hence from the absence of this extended element in 
the act of thought, we infer that there is no intrinsic 
co-operation of the bodily organ in the production of 
thought; that the simple principle alone is the sole 
adequate cause; and by this very fact that the simple 
principle is in its nature spiritual. 

§21. (b) The acts of mind and body are essentially 
of mtod^^^ different, e. g., the acts of the mind are abstract 
body. * ^ thought, conceptions of spiritual objects, self-con- 
sciousness. The acts of the bodily organs belong to a 
different sphere, e. g., sensation, imagination, 
(c) from § 22. (c) The laws of matter, of organized matter, 
mind and and of mind are different. Thus the laws of matter 
are set forth in the physical sciences of Physics, Chem- 
istry, etc., as ex. gr., the laws of attraction, of gravita- 

6 Cf. Bain Logic BV, ch. V, p. 505. 

^ " Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, 
sed pars sensitiva subjacet tempori, et ideo per temporis cur- 
sum transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis 
et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas." St. Thomas Sum. 
Theol. I2, q. 53, a3 ad. 3. 



(b) from 
compari- 



of body. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 201 

tion, of chemical affinity, of multiple proportions. The 
laws of organized matter are explained in Biology, 
Physiology, etc., as, ex. gr., the law of growth, of as- 
similation, etc. Whereas Logic is a special science 
dealing with the laws of mind, and Ethics is a special 
science which examines the laws of right and wrong. 
Now the laws of mind and of will are different in kind 
from those which rule the growth and preservation of 
the body; just as they are different from the laws of 
Chemistry or Physics. 

§ 27,. (d) Finally, the organs of some animals are ^Sifiar°^ 
very much Hke those of man; ex. gr., the nervous- ^|n an? 
system and the brain ganglia show marvellous similar!- ^^^'^^^• 
ties. Nevertheless the mental operations are essen- 
tially different. In organic powers the ape is very Hke 
man; there appears to be but a slight difference 
between them. As an actual fact the difference is in- 
surmountable ; therefore, it is more than organic. 

§ 24. Therefore, we can conclude that the thinking conclusion, 
subject is not the animated organism in general, i. e., 
the body; nor the animated organ in particular, i. e., 
the brain. The spiritual soul alone is the agent and the 
subject of thought. There is no intrinsic dependence 
of thought on the brain as is had in the act of sensa- 
tion. The brain is not the total nor even the partial 
cause of thought.^ 

§ 25. It is not true, however, to say that the mind ^Jom'teiy 
is absolutely independent of the brain. The depend- ent^fThe 
ence denied is that of causation. To deny any relation ^^^'^y- 
between them would be to contravert the fundamental 
thesis which affirms the union of soul and of body in 
one composite. Hence Scholastic philosophy affirms 

^ Cf. Calderwood " Relation of Mind and Brain, p. 313 foil.; 
S. Thomas Sum. Theol. I, q. yj, a. 5; q. 118, a. 2. 
26 



202 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



This con- 
clusion in 
harmony 
with latest 
ascer- 
tained 
facts of 



question 
stated. 



Its im- 
portance. 



that the mind depends upon the brain as upon a con- 
ditio sine qua non of its own activity. 

§ 26. Thus cerebral activity is from man's very con- 
stitution a condition of thought. The teaching of St. 
Thomas is in harmony with the latest discoveries in 
Anatomy and Physiology. But cerebral activity does 
not produce nor can it explain the phenomena of in- 
telligence ; it is limited "to sensation and nervous action ; 
it is common to man and brute. Intellect is the pos- 
session of man alone; it has no organ of 
sense; but in its action it depends upon sense 
because all our knowledge comes from sense, and a 
sensitive faculty, i. e., the imagination furnishes the 
images from which intellect draws its store of thought. 
Thus the mind depends upon the brain indirectly or 
extrinsically, as Scholastic Philosophy phrases it, i. e., 
as on a condition, inasmuch as the brain is the organ 
of sensation. Hence St. Thomas says that the imagi- 
nation is the point of contact between the brain and 
the intelligence.^ 

IV. 
Thought is Not Cerebral Motion. 

§ 2y. A logical and inevitable inference from these 
principles in that thought cannot be considered as a 
movement of brain matter. At first sight it does not 
call for special treatment. But in late years some 
writers, who have a reputation with a certain class, 
have seriously proposed this as a hypothesis able to 
account for the phenomena of thought. 

§ 28. The scientific form in which it is proposed, the 
claim that it is in conformity with the latest discoveries 



9 St. Thomas I, q. 75, a6; I, q. 84 a 7, c; I, q. 85; al; c. Gent. 
1. 2, C76, 77; Aristotle's Psychology by E. Wallace, Bill, 
ch. IV. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 203 

of Physics, the fact that representative writers cham- 
pion it in the name of science, has given to it an ap- 
pearance of strength and conclusiveness. Thus Mr. 
Spencer says : " It is fast becoming a common-place 
of science that no idea or feeling arises save as a result 
of some physical force expanded in producing it.^" 
Given the state of the brain, the corresponding thought 
or feeling might be inferred; or, given the thought or 
feeling, the corresponding state of the brain might be 
inferred. But how inferred? It would be at bottom 
not a case of logical inference at all, but of empirical 
association." ^^ Prof. Clifford advances the same 
proposition ; ^^ and, in our own country. Prof. James is 
its recognized defender.^^ 

§ 29. It is true that in language I speak of the mo- ^aii^d^* 
tions of the soul; thus, ex. gr., ** I was strongly moved fl™°a-°^' 
by your exhortations," or " I was moved to do so," lively. 
etc. ; but the word '' moved " is used in a figurative 
sense; it does not indicate real motion, i. e., a quantita- 
tive or qualitative change. In this sense Aristotle says 
that joy and grief and reasoning are motions.^* The 
figure of speech is based on the fact that thought can 
be compared to motion; but we should not on that 
account identify the one with the other.^^ 

1° First Principles, p. 280. " Mind is a force, the result of 
nervous action." Dr. Hammond in " Physics and Physiol- 
ogy of Spiritualism." 

11 Cf. Tyndall Scientific Materialism in Fragments of 
Science. 

^^Cf. Seeing and Thinking, III. 

i^Princ. of Psych. 

1* De an. li. C4, § 11; S. Thomas Sum. Theol. I, q. 81, a i; 
" movetur anima non pedibus sed affectibus." Aug. de Joan 
tr. 48, n. 3. 

15 S. Augustine shows that the soul " grows " and " de- 
creases " in a figurative sense. De quant. An., n. ss, 36-40. 



204 CHRISTIAN PHILGiSOPHY. 



From^th?'* § 3^- ^i^d is not a physical force ; nor as Mr. James 
tkm of^^ contends, can appetition and feeling of efifort be traced 
energy. ^q simple muscular sensations, the reflects of motions 
already effected. This is proved from the law of the 
cannoTbe^* Conservation of energy, (i) According to this law the 
forcl^^^^^ sum of the physical forces in the universe is ever the 
same, e. g., the mechanical equivalent of heat is 772 
foot-pounds. Now this law cannot be applied to 
thought. Heat, electricity, etc., can be measured and 
transformed one into the other; not so thought or will. 
They are beyond the range of mechanical instruments 
and cannot be computed by physical processes.^^ 
noVa?eflex §31- (2) Again the thought is not as Mr. Spencer 
action. ^j^^ -^j.^ James maintain a reflex action following on 
an impulse from without. Very often there is no ex- 
ternal impulse, e. g., the thoughts and feelings which 
arise during meditation or examination of conscience 
or recollection of the past; often the impulse is had 
without however producing an effect, e. g., I try to 
rouse a lazy man to labor, or some one insults me and 
I repress my temper from a motive of Christian virtue; 
often there is no proportion between the impulse and 
the effect produced, e. g., a few words announcing the 
death of a relative move me deeply. The law of Weber 
is based on the fact that sensations are not equal to 
the excitation. Hence there is "no necessary correla- 
tion or rigorous proportion, 
conse-**^^ § 32. (3) But they maintain that there must be a cor- 
conserva^ relation between impulse and thought, although we 
cannot detect it, because the law of the conservation 
of energy suffers no exception; hence if thought were 
not equal to impulse or vice versa, some force would 

16 Cf. McCosh Christianity and Positivism, p. 210 sq. 



tion of 
energy 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 205 

be lost contrary to the great law of Physics.^^ This is 
their great argument. It seems peremptory. Never- 
theless the answer is as simple as it is complete. We 
do not here question the law of conservation; there is 
no necessity to do so. An impulse is received in the 
sensitive organ, e. g., of touch, with w^hat result? 
Thought follows as a natural physical effect, they 
plainly affirm. That thought may follbw on an im- 
pulse we do not gainsay, that thought is the only result, 
or that thought follows as a physical effect, we posi- 
tively deny. 

§ 33. It has been shown by careful experimentation of^^n*^*^*^ 
that an impulse upon a sensitive organ produces im- impulse, 
mediately two physical effects; it quickens the molecu- 
lar movements of the nervous substance, and as a 
consequence causes an increase of temperature. These 
molecular movements and caloric vibrations are always 
proportionate to the intensity of the external impulse. 
Hence the law of the conservation of energy remains 
intact. The movement coming from the outer world 
and striking the organ is exactly transformed into 
molecular changes and increase of temperature and 
thus restored to the external world in combustion and 
heat. The process has nothing to do with thought. 
Thought is outside the phenomena and the process of 
transformation.^^ 

§ 34. (b) The transformation of the external impulse opin£n 
into combustion and heat shows how baseless is the Barker* 
contention of Prof. Geo. Barker that " the heat evolved ^^"^^^®®^' 
during the reception of an idea is energy that has es- 

I'This is an illustration of the materialistic theory that all 
phenomena can be explained by molecular Physics, cf. Mi- 
vart Truth, p. 391 foil.; Bain Soul and Body, ch. VI. 

18 Cf. Farges Le Cerveau I'ame. 



206 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

caped conversion into motion." ^^ We have seen that 
the energy of the impulse is exactly converted into 
combustion and heat; this may be expressed in the 
formula: E=c-|-h; there is no loss, no spent energy; 
both terms of the equation are equivalent. 

§ 35- (c) We do deny that the law of the transforma- 
tion of forces embraces the organic world; thus, ex. 
gr., there is an equivalence between the heat expended 
by the muscles in performing mechanical work and the 
work done. Helmholtz has verified this by experi- 
menting on the muscles of a frog. Let us grant that 
brain heat is transformed into thought; hence the more 
profoundly I think, the more heat I should lose, and 
the cooler the brain should become. As Prof. Barker 
admits, " In addition to the production of thought, a 
portion of the energy appears as nerve and muscle 
power; less, therefore, should appear as heat, accord- 
ing to our law of correlation." ^" But the very con- 
trary is the fact, as individual observation and scientific 
experimentation has proved. The argument he ad- 
duces from Prof. Lombard, that " the amount of heat 
developed by the recitation to one's self of emotional 
poetry was in every case less when that recitation was 
oral," tells decisively against his hypothesis. The in- 
crease of heat in the latter case is due to nervous 
actions. 

increase of § 36. Thus it is a fact of experience that the increase 

po?ti?nate of heat is in proportion to the intensity of thought. 

tensitv^f The mind does not add to the sum of physical energy. 

thought, 'pj^gj-g ^j-g potential as well as actual forces in the 

19 Cf. The Correlation of Vital and Physical Forces by Prof. 
Geo. Barker in Half Hour with Modern Scientists, vol. i; cf. 
also, Ch. Bray Force and its Mental Equivalents; Spencer 
Chap. Materialism, p. 13. 

20 lb. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 20/ 

human system. The mind simply excites the potential 
forces to act. Thus it quickens the movements of the 
organs, e. g., the glance of the eye, the animated ap- 
pearance of the body; and consequently causes the 
blood to flow more rapidly. Hence I can account for 
fatigue felt after severe mental labor, for the perspira- 
tion which gathers in drops upon my forehead. 

§ 37. It is true also that spent condition of the body 
is proportionate to the severity of my mental labor, 
thus, ex. gr., the harder I study the more fatigued I 
become. But there is no mathematical or scientific 
equivalence. Daily experience proves that brain effort 
or organic waste is not index of the powers of mind, 
ex. gr., a dull child might distill perspiration like rain 
in the effort to solve a problem which a brighter child 
could easily work out. Fatigue of body only shows 
the power of will over the bodily frame, but that power 
is often exerted without much show of intelligence, 
ex. gr., in the effort to keep awake, or to concentrate 
mind when exhausted.^^ 

§ 38. (c) Finally eminent scientists admit that the (c^ from 
problem is insoluble to physical science. " When we of eminent 
shall possess the intimate knowledge of the brain," 
says Du Bois. Reymond, '' The intellectual phenomena guBois 
will be to us entirely as incomprehensible. The 
most intimate knowledge of the brain will reveal 
only matter in .motion. But no arrangement nor 
any movement of material parts can serve as a 
bridge to pass into the field of intelHgence. Movement 
can only produce movement or re-enter the state of 
potential energy. Potential energy in its turn can do 

21 Cf. Abbe' Farges Le Cervean L'Ame, ch. ill. IV; " Dar- 
winism and Other Essays," b}'- J. Fiske, p. 72; " Present Day- 
Tracts," No. 29; " Philosophy of H. Spencer," examined by 
Rev. J. Iverach. 



208 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

nothing save to produce motion, to maintain equili- 
brium, exercise pression or traction." A little farther 
on he adds : " What conceivable connection subsists 
between definite movements of definite atoms in my 
brain on the one hand, and, on the other hand, such 
primordial, indefinable, undeniable facts as these: I 
feel pain or pleasure; I experience a sweet taste, or 
smell a rose, or hear an organ, or see something red. 
It is absolutely and forever inconceivable that a num- 
ber of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen 
atoms should be otherwise than indifferent as to 
their own position and motion, past, present or future. 
It is utterly inconceivable how consciousness should 
result from their joint action." ^ 

Terrier . § 39. " How happens it," asks Mr. Ferrier, " that the 

molecular modifications in the cerebral cells coincide 
with the modifications of consciousness? How, for 
instance, do the light waves falling upon the retina 
excite the modifications of consciousness called sight- 
sensation? They are problems we can never solve. 
We can succeed in determining the exact nature of 
the molecular changes which are produced in the cere- 
bral cells w^hen a sensation is experienced, but that 
does not bring us an inch nearer the explanation of the 
fundamental nature of that which constitutes sen- 
sation." 23 

TyndaU. § 40. Mr. Tyndall is even more emphatic. " The 

passage from the physics of the brain to the corres- 
ponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. 
Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecu- 
lar action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do not 
possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any 

22 upon the Limits of Natur. Phil., Sept., 1875. 

23 Funct. of Brain, §§ 88, 89. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 209 

rudiment of an organ, which would enable us to pass, 
by a process of reasoning, from the one to the other. 
They appear together, but we do not know why. Were 
our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened and 
illuminated as to enable us to see and feel the very 
molecules of the brain, were we capable of following 
all their motions, all their groupings, all their electric 
discharges, if such there be, and were we intimately 
acquainted with the corresponding states of thought 
and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solu- 
tion of the problem, how are these physical pro- 
cesses connected with the facts of consciousness? The 
chasm between the two classes of phenomena would 
still remain intellectually impassible. Let the con- 
sciousness of love, for example, be associated with a 
right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the 
brain, and the consciousness of hate with a left-handed 
spiral motion. We should then know, when we love, 
that the motion is in one direction, and, when we hate, 
that the motion is in the other; but the ' why? ' would 
remain as unanswerable as before." ^* Again, " The 
utmost he (the materialist) can affirm is the association 
of two classes of phenomena of whose real bond of 
union he is in absolute ignorance." ^ In the Belfast 
Address we find: "You cannot satisfy the human 
understanding in its demand for logical continuity be- 
tween molecular processes and the phenomena of con- 
sciousness. This is a rock on which MateriaHsm must 
inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a complete 
philosophy of life." 

24 Cf. Scientific Materialism in Fragments of Science. 

25 lb. ] I 

27 



.210 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Prof. Ladd. § ^j^ Finally, Prof. Ladd sums up the discussion 
of the subject with these words: *' The phenomena of 
human consciousness must be regarded as activities 
of some other form of Real Being than the living mole- 
cules of the brain. They require a subject or ground 
which is in nature unlike the phospherized fats of the 
central masses, the aggregate nerve-fibres and nerve 
cells of the cerebral cortex; that the Subject of the 
states of consciousness is a real being, standing in cer- 
tain relation to the material beings which compose the 
substance of the brain, is a conclusion warranted by 
all the facts." ^s 

26 Cf. Ladd Physiological Psychology, p. 606. 



ORIGIN OF THE SOUL. 

§ I. Philosophy is an examination of the funda- ^t^ted?^ 
mental causes which determine the existence of things. 
It embraces the first beginnings, as well as the actual 
condition and development. A philosophy of soul, 
therefore, would not be complete without an effort to 
explain its origin ; the more so because attempts have 
been made which are not in accord with sound 
reasoning. 

I. 
Theory op Emanation. 

§ 2. According to this view, the soul is an emanation its advo- 
of the Divine Substance; in its essence, therefore, it is a 
part of God. We find this opinion in the writings of 
the Stoics and Neo-Platonists. Pantheists of ancient 
and modern times have proposed it, if we except the 
ideal or phenomenal Pantheists, who hold that there 
is only one reality and that the world is an illusion. 
Nevertheless, even they resort to the theory of emana- 
tion to explain the illusion, e. g., the Vedanta.^ 

§ 3. But this explanation is opposed to known criticism, 
facts. The reasons advanced by St. Thomas hold good 
to-day. He takes his stand on facts. It is a fact that 
the soul is finite or limited in its being and its powers; 
that it is changeable in as much as it is subject to modi- 
fications and is the subject of action and of passion, 
which vary with every passing moment; that it does 
not possess all its activity at one and the same time, 
nor is it always in act, but passes from potency to act.^ 

1 Ci. Gough Phil, of the Upanishads; S. Augustine de Gen. 
ad Lit. 1. VII. 

2 Cf. S. Augustine Ep. 166, n. 3. 



212 ' CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence he infers that such a being is not infinite, all- 
perfect, immutable; but is a distinct entity finite, 
imperfect and subject to change.^ 

II. I 

Theory of Traducianism. 

exposition. o o 1 1-1 r 

. §4. Some have sought m the parents a reason for 
the origin of the soul. They contend that the soul is 
propagated to the offspring in the act of generation. 
The manner of propagation is explained in different 
ways. With some it is by means of a material force, 
e. g., Tertullian;* with others the transmission is 
effected by a spiritual agency, e. g., Apollonius as 
Gregory of Nyssa relates.^ An illustration of this 
theory is seen in the way a taper is lighted from a 
candle. Or, from a materialistic point of view, the 
soul is considered as a germ or cell which was already 
precontained in the parent. 

§ 5. St. Thomas subjects this theory to a severe and 
judicious criticism. He holds that the soul is a 
spiritual and intellectual entity, as has been shown. 
But the act of generation is organic; whereas the 
activity of the soul is inorganic. Now no effect can 
transcend its cause, nor can a cause produce an effect 
of a higher order. Hence he concluded that the act 
of generation cannot be the sole cause which accounts 
for the origin of the soul, else we should have an 
effect of a nature transcending the cause. 

§ 6. It is not denied that the act of generation con- 
spires to the origin of the soul. The real point at 
issue is the nature of that relation. Scholastic phil- 

3 Contra Gentes. Ill, 085; St. Thomas I, q. 90, a I. 

4 Cf. S. Augustine de Gen. ad Lit, lib. X. 

5 Cf. also Augustine Epist, 165. ; 



criticism. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 21^ 

osophy maintains that it is not a casual relation. It 
teaches, as we shall see, that the act of generation is 
an occasion, but that the soul as an intellectual and 
spiritual entity is due to the creative act.^ 

III. 
Theory of Manifestation. 

§ 7. This seems to be the proper appellation of the Eadd's. 
view proposed by Prof. Ladd to account for the origin 
of mind or soul. He denies the theory of Creationism reasons. 
on the ground that it is without warrant and is unin- 
telligible. He says that we " cannot be consistent and 
yet accept an unknowable entity . in the form of a 
soul that has really not yet begun" to be a soul, as the 
cause of no-phenomena." He speaks of the absurdity 
in the conception of a " ready-made soul," and at the 
manner of its being "posited in the tenement of a 
body." 

§ 8. So much for his negative criticism. His posi- positive 
tive and constructive teaching, however, is peculiar 
and deserving of passing notice. "The origin of every 
mind," he writes, " must be put at the exact point of 
time when that mind begins to act; its origin is in 
and of these its first conscious activities. Before this 
first activity the mind is not." But he adds: "It can 
not be admitted that, properly speaking, any mind 
springs into full being at a leap, as it were." " It 
springs constantly into a fuller being originating in 
a higher meaning of the word in a perpetual process, 
as the development of these activities.''^ 

^Cf. C. Gent. BII, ch. 86, 89; Summa Theologiae I, q. 90, 
&2; q. 100, a i; I. Q. 118, a 2; I. 2, q. 81, a i. 
7 Phil, of Mind, p. 364. 



214 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

§ 9. Conscious, however, that this position was open 
to criticism, he proceeds to strengthen it by the state- 
ment that '* in a modified way the theory of creation 
affords the only inteUigible explanation of the first 
origin and of the perpetual process of originating 
which belongs to the individual human mind." His 
confusion and uncertainty becomes more apparent by 
the strange statement that " a vague reference to the 
order of nature as conditioning the rise and develop- 
ment of every stream of human consciousness would 
seem to be the last w^ord that can be said." He then 
continues: "Out of this Universal Being, without 
seeming wholly to be accounted for by it, does every 
stream of consciousness rise." He concludes by 
quoting approvingly from Lotze : " At the place where 
and at the moment when the germ of an organic being 
is formed amid the coherent system of the physical 
course of nature, this fact furnishes the incitement or 
moving reason which induces the all-comprehending 
One Being to beget from Himself, besides, as a con- 
sistent supplement to such physical fact, the soul 
belonging to this organism.^ 
by^hfsdoc- § ^^' ^he explanation of this theory is found in the 
soul! ^^ ^^^ strange view Prof. Ladd holds concerning the unity of 
the soul. To him the soul is a potential unity; it 
has the potency to become a unit and does so by a 
process of development. Therefore the origin of this 
unity is explained by the concurrence of the activities 
which go to form it into a specific entity. The same 
criticism which showed how unfounded and contra- 
dictory this assumption was can be applied to his 
explanation of the origin of the soul. The act of 

8 Outl. of Psych., third edition, § 81 ; cf. Lotze Outlines of 
Psychology, ed. by Prof. Ladd, p. 117. 



criticism. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2X5 

consciousness by which I recognize myself as a think- 
ing being does not make me so in fact. I was a 
rational creature before, and consciousness only 
testifies to the fact. 

§ II. He seems to recognize that the explanation as 
such is insufficient and has recourse to a modified view 
of creation. What that modified view is and how it 
differs from the Scholastic theory, he fails to explain. 
What his purpose is in recurring to the " order of 
nature" is difficult to perceive. If he means that 
bodily conditions influence the manifestation of mind, - 
he is undoubtedly correct. But it is strange that he 
should appeal to bodily influence or the development 
of mind in a question which wholly concerns its 
origin. Such an appeal in the present case betrays 
either vagueness and incorrectness of thought, or a 
fallacy of reasoning. Compelled to have recourse to 
God for the rise of consciousness, he does so grudg- 
ingly by a modified statement. Yet he has given no 
reason for the modification. And at last, to add to his 
confusion, he seeks refuge in an opinion of Lotze, 
expressed in words whose plain meaning is a kind of 
Divine generationism. 

§ 12. The manifestations of consciousness or of 
thought are the efifect of the mind or soul. The ques- 
tion at issue is not the explanation of these manifes- 
tations. The aim is to explain the origin of that 
being which produces these manifestations. We seek 
not the reason of the efifect, but the reason of the 
cause. An illustration can be drawn from the plant- 
world. We do not explain the origin of the life in a 
plant by pointing to the first buds or blossoms. It is 
necessary to go farther back, to seek in the seed, which 
for days lay in the ground, dead to all appearances, 



2l6 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

for the reason of that activity of which the bud and 
tendrils are only the manifestations. So likewise for 
the soul. 

• IV. 
Theory of Evolution. 
§ 13. No philosophical theory has ever made the 
deep and widespread impression on the minds of men 
as the theory of Evolution. Set forth by Mr. Darvvin 
in 1853, it immediately acquires a wide popularity. It 
was hailed by men as the universal solvent of all the 
riddles in the universe. Broached originally as a 
scientific theor}^, it soon assumed a philosophical 
aspect by an attempt to solve the origin of things. It 
was supposed to explain the beginnings of life. 
And in the hands of Mr. Romanes and Mr. Spencer it 
was elaborated into a theory which was considered 
capable of accounting for the origin of thought.^ 
aim of Mr. §14. In his First Principles, Mr. Spencer aims at 
shomng that all phenomena, even those of life and 
thought, are convertible, and thus explain all things 
in terms of matter and of force. In the Principles of 
Psychology he applies these Principles to the phe- 
nomena of mind, and by an elaborate process attempts 
to verify them.^° His task is to show that the 
phenomena of intelligence came from instinct, that 
instinct is developed by molecular movements, and 
thus to establish a unity in all these phenomena, and 
a continuity in their development.^^ 

9 Cf. S. Augustine de Gen. ad Lit. 1. VII, n. 12, 13; X, n. 7. 

^^ P. Tannery, in an article published in Rev. Phil., March, 
1882, p. 522, contends that the system of Spencer, the law of 
rythme, of successive integration and disintegration is noth- 
ing more than the hypothesis of Anaximandre on a little 
wider basis, cf. de Roberty "La Philosophie du siecle," p. 37. 

11 Cf. Ribot English Psychology, p. 124 sq.; Spencer Prin- 



Spencer. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 21*J 

§15. He thus explains the process. The funda-^^^^^®^^- 
mental trend of thought with Spencer is the denial 
of any precise line of demarkation between physio- 
logical and psychological facts, between the physical 
and the mental.^^ Hence there is a continuous series 
in the progression of life. The problem of Psychology 
is to determine the order in which one change follows 
another; i. e., to enunciate and explain the law of 
intelligence.-^^ 

§ 16. The law of intelligence follows successive JUj^gnJ" 
phases of development, e. g., reflex action, instinct, ^^^^^ 
thought and will. Reflex action is simply molecular action, 
motion ; it supposes an afferent nerve, an efferent sensation, 
fibre and a centre. Sensation is composite because 
made up of nervous shocks. The combination of 
nervous shocks into a unity of sensation is the first 
integration in the evolution of mind. Instinct is reflex 
action of a certain complexity. The simple reflex 
action is not accompanied by consciousness. This 
arises from the complexity, and is accordingly ex- 
plained in terms of mechanical motion.^* 

§ 17. From instinct he derives reason. The process ^®ason, 
is explained by an increase in the complexity of 
mental states. These states correspond to external 
relations, and as they increase the automatism of their 
movements is established with more difficulty, hence 

ciples of Psychology, p. 349; Guthrie "Mr. Spencer's For- 
mula of Evolution," 1879, and " Mr. Spencer's Unification of 
Knowledge," 1882. 

12 Prin. of Psych., p. 510. 

12 The evolutionary theory of soul is not new. S. Augustine 
refers to it: " omne quippe corpus in omne corpus mutari 
posse, credible est; quodlibet antem corpus mutari posse in 
animam, credere absurdum est." de Gen. ad lit. 1. VII, n. 26. 

1^ Cf. C. Morgan Introd. to Comp. Psychology, ch. XVIII, 
where the same teaching is found. 
28 



2l8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the action no longer possesses the mechanical infalli- 
bility of instinct, and reason is the result. The differ- 
ence between instinct and reason consists in this, that 
the acts of instinct are decisive and rapid, whereas 
those of reason are slow and apparently hesitating. 
But he adds that reason can be transformed into 
instinct when by frequent experience groups of ex- 
ternal impressions are allied to groups of mental states 
and habits result, and habits are acquired instincts. He 
thus infers that higher animals possess the faculty of 
special reasoning, that man possesses the faculty of 
general reasoning, and that between them there is no 
distinction. 
iSredfty. § ^^- ■'^^^ ^'^^^^^ explain the existence of the necessary 
laws and forms of thought, e. g., first principles of 
reason, which exist in the individual mind and are not 
acquired by experience? Mr. Spencer attempts the 
solution of this difficulty, and proposes a theory which 
is peculiarly his ow^n. He sees the insufficiency of 
evolution and supplements it by the law of heredity,-^^ 
He holds that these laws and forms of thought are the 
experiences of past ages accumulated and transmitted 
from generation to generation.^^ 
i^iJii^*^ § 19- Criticism: (a) Mr. Spencer speaks of a unity 
the unity. ^^ shocks to make a sensation, and calls instinct a 
complex group of shocks, etc. But how does he 
explain this unity? There is a marvelous harmony 
in his theory; probably this is its most attractive 
feature; but with him it is a pure and gratuitous 

15 Cf. Present Day Tracts, No. 29, " Philosophy of H. Spen- 
cer Examined," by Rev. J. Iverach. 

1^ By considering what is « prio7'i in the individual to be a 
posteriori in the human race, Spencer and Lewes depart from 
J. S. Mill, and form a new development in English Psychol- 
ogy, cf. Courtney Studies in Philosophy, ch. V. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2ig 

assumption. He utterly fails to tell us how and why 
it is so. Is it due to an innate tendency in the mole- 
cular motions? He cannot admit this, because he 
denies every vestige of finalty.^'' Is it due to a co-ordi- 
nating principle? He is silent because that would 
constrain him to admit the existence of a soul. Mr. 
Spencer is an Associationist; therefore he proposes 
a Phenomenal Psychology, i. e., mind to him is a 
series of states. He dififers from other Phenomenalists 
only in the systematic effort to explain this series by 
the correlation of physical forces. The strange feature 
is that he does not explain the unity of consciousness 
which gives harmony to the mental life. Now a theory 
which rests upon and is pervaded throughout by an 
assumption is not philosophical. 

§ 20. (b) Instinct is not the outcome of reflex action, (b) instinct 

•^ ^ ^ has not its 

At most we admit an analogy between them. How ^ource in 
can reflex action explain the fact that chickens, two action, 
minutes after leaving the tgg, will watch the crawling 
worm or answer the hen's call; or the dread in some 
birds of the hawk; or the fact that birds fly; or the 
devices of insects to protect their young and avoid 
danger to themselves. Reflex action is restricted to 
the present act; instinct is a definite plan of action 
which embraces the present and the future. 

§ 21. (c) He does not explain the origin of con- (c) origin 
sciousness. He admits that the simplest reflex action sciousness. 
is not accompanied by consciousness. Where, then 
and how, does consciousness arise? If the develop- 
ment from reflex action to instinct and to reason is 
carried on in the same plan, then consciousness should 
also be found in the nervous action contrary to Mr. 

^^ Mr. Morgan admits a " selective synthesis " in the 
grouping. Cf. Intr. to Comp. Psych., p. 351. 



220 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Spencer's express statement. As it is not, it must have 
arisen at some stage of the evolution.^^ 

of con-^^^ W Nor does he explain the unity of consciousness. 

sciousness. ^q^q indivisible unit-element is necessary to focus, as 
it were, all these impressions. But in the hypothesis 
of Mr. Spencer there is no such unifying force. The 
attempt to explain this unity, after the analogy of the 
composition of Physical forces is a failure.^^ The unity 
of many elements explains the quantity of the sensa- 
tion, but consciousness is something differing in quality 
from a nervous shock. He says consciousness implies 
a change in the subject; 'but he does not tell what the 
change is, and forgets that a subject cannot undergo a 
change unless we admit in it a permanent element.^ 

notion°o? ^22 (e) To Spencer mind is passive; it is a group- 
ing of impressions.^ But this is not true. The mind 
is an active agency. Consciousness testifies to this 
truth. How can a passive group of impressions under 
the action of physical force explain the boundless range 
of the intellect or the existence of a moral law binding 
on all. The imperative command of duty in face of 
opposition and contrary to utility is not a passive 

18 " The history of speculation has sufficiently shown that 
all theories which make consciousness ultimately dependent 
upon the evolution of unconscious forms of existence, succeed 
only by smuggling into their explanations something which 
the very essentials of the theories require them to leave out." 
G. Ladd " Consciousness and Evolution" in Psych. Rev., 
1896, p. 298. 

19 Cf. Lotze Psychology, ed. by Prof. Ladd, p. 94. Mr. 
Huxley is more modest than Mr. Spencer. In contending 
that the organic is the development of the inorganic he bids 
us " recollect that science has put her foot upon the bottom 
round of the ladder." cf. Huxley Origin of Species HI. 

20 Cf. Guthrie Spencer's Unification of Knowledge, p. 155. 

21 Prin. of Psych., vol. I, p. 626. 



mind. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 221 

state of physical forces. Nor is there any exact 
equivalence between the impression and the thought 
as he maintains.^^ He seems never to have perceived 
the real nature of substance and thus fails to grasp the 
true meaning of mind. 

§ 23 (f) The theory of heredity puts back the prob- ^9,*^®^^.? 
lem, but does not solve it. Even granting that hered- does not 
ity may explain the fact that I have necessary forms 
of thought prior to experiences, how will it account for 
the first possession of these principles? How can 
heredity explain the commencement of the difference 
between man and ape? The meaning of the word 
" heredity " is " transmission," not " acquisition." 

§ 24. Again his theory of heredity as applied to mind 
is gratuitous. It implies that there is no distinction 
between sensation and thought, between mind and 
matter. This is absolutely false. It is a refined form 
of Materialism, and Materialism as a theory is in oppo- 
sition to known facts. Again, how, according to the 
theory of heredity, can we explain the great difference 
between children of the same parents? Or how account 
for the fact that men of great ability fail to transmit 
their accumulated experiences to their children? Mind 
is not the product of individual or of race experience. 
How explain the creations of poet, artist, musician? 
Experience gives the stimulus of mental activity; but 
in the mind itself there is a creative and masterful 
power which moulds and fashions experience to finer 
forms and vaster issues.^^ 

22 Cf. Chapter on Brain and Thought. 

23 Cf. Welch "Faith and Modern Thought," p. 41 sq.; T. 
Green in Contem. Rev. beginning Dec, 1877; J. Caird Introd. 
to Phil, of ReHg., p. 10 sq.; Bowne Phil, of H. Spencer, 1874. 



222 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



(a) from 
nature of 
the soul. 



Soul is 
subsistent. 



(b) soul is 
spiritual. 



c) from 
refutation 
of other 
theories. 



V. 

Theory of Creation. 

§ 25. This is the theory of Scholastic Philosophy. 
St. Thomas sums up the arguments for it.^ The rea- 
sons are drawn from the nature of the soul, (a) The 
soul cannot owe its existence to pre-existing matter. 
It is a spiritual entity capable of existing independent 
of matter. Hence no necessary intrinsic dependence 
on matter. This consideration has the more force 
when we bear in mind that St. Thomas proposes the 
subsistence of the human soul as a distinctive charac- 
teristic, marking it off from the souls of brutes. They, 
he contends, are transmitted by generation, because 
they depend on matter and are involved in matter. Not 
so, however, the human soul. 

§ 26. (b) Again he maintains that it is impossible 
for a material force to extend its activity so far as to 
produce an spiritual effect. The intellective principles 
in man, i. e., the soul, entirely transcend matter. 
Hence the mind or soul must come from another 
source, i. e., creation.^ (c) Finally the theory of Crea- 
tion receives strength from the refutation of the other 
explanations advanced for the origin of the soul. They 
cannot be held. Known facts and sound reasoning 
are against them. Hence their rejection can be con- 
sidered as a negative argument in favor of Creation.^ 



2^ C. Gent. Ill, ch. 83-87; Summa Theol. I, q. 90, a 2; q. 118, 
a 2. 

25 Cf. Aristotle De Gener. Anim. 12 03; Cicero Tuscul. Dis- 
put. 1. I, 27. 

26 Aug. Contra Fortum, n. 12, 13; de actis cum Felice, 1. 2, 
n. XX; De An. et ejus Origine 1. I, n. 24; Ep. 166, n. 8; Ep. 
190, al. 157 ad Optatum; de quant, an., n. 2; de Gen. ad Lit. 
L. VII, X. 



IMMORTALITY. 

§ I. The Immortality of the soul is a theme which 
possesses a singular and fascinating- power. It has 
inspired some of the most beautiful passages in litera- 
ture; it awakens great and noble thoughts, and rouses 
to a consciousness of our dignity; it has strengthened 
the soul to attempt sublime deeds of heroism. The 
hope that somehow after death man shall yet live on 
lies deep in the breast of the savage, brings comfort 
and strength to the heavy labors of lowly life, or shines 
like a beacon of Hght and cheer on the solitary medi- 
tations of the student. Belief in Immortality is indis- 
solubly connected with our notions of God, of morality, 
with our convictions of moral freedom, of the sacred- 
ness of Right, of the majesty of Truth. We shall here 
investigate the nature and the grounds of this beHef. 

I. 

Method. 
§ 2. The belief in Immortality finds expression in 
many forms. Various also are the considerations pro- 
posed by different thinkers as reasons for the faith 
that is in them. The method to be followed, therefore, 
considers the question under all aspects and draws 
from all sources of knowledge. Literature, the mirror 
of thought, reflects the varied forms in which the 
human mind clothed its belief that the soul was immor- 
tal. History, Philosophy, Psychology, Ethics, the 
Physical sciences, each has its own considerations 
which serve as proofs or as analogies to substantiate 
this conviction. 



224 CHRISTIAN PHILdSOPHY. 

11. 

Theories. 

of.Mate^^^ § 3- (i°) Materialism assumes that matter and force 
nahsm. ^lone exist, that at most the soul is only an organic 
function of the brain. Hence it concludes that this 
life is all; that beyond the grave there is nothing. 
Many reasons can be given to account for the fact that 
some have denied the life after death, 
rtlson of § 4- (a) There is the reason alleged by the free- 
ThinkerT thinker. His consists in a protest against false, exag- 
gerated or superstitious views of revealed religion. 
The result is a revolt from revealed truth and a fall to 
the other extreme of hostility and total unbelief. The 
notion of a future life, therefore, becomes a myth or 
fiction of the mind. To maintain that we shall live 
after death would be to hold some element of religious 
behef.i 
(b) worldly § 5- (b) The reason of the worldly-minded comes 
also as a protest. To them the future life is clouded 
with dread and gloom. Its belief means a restraint 
upon the pleasures and joys of life. Happiness is thus 
destroyed and life is not worth living. Hence life after 
death is rejected as something visionary; the present 
alone is real; and the aim should be to catch the pleas- 
ures of the fleeting day. This is the position of the 
Epicure in ancient as in modern times. It appears in 
the poetry of Horace as well as that of Heine. 
Cc) ^^^^ a § 6. (c) There are those whose low degraded life has 
i^6" quenched the hope of immortality. This happens 

either because a life given over to sensual pleasures 

1 Cf. Bowen Materialism and Eth. Science, p. 2, chapter 9; 
Courtney Future States. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 225 

carries its own curse; the body becomes surfeited and 
falls a prey to disease; the misery of existence itself 
becomes unbearable; death is looked to as the end of 
all and as such is hailed a blessing. Or the mind and 
heart made beastly by sensualism give no intimation, 
emit not the faintest beam of another life. Their 
higher, nobler nature has been deadened by inter- 
course with what is lowest and most vile. 

§ 7. (d) Scientific Materiahsm, however, seeks (d) scien- 
^ ' ^ ^ ' ' tific Mate- 

stronger and more cogent arguments. Thus they con- riaiism. 

tend that the soul is not a separate entity; that what we 

call the soul is only the result of the combination of 

brain-cells and cerebral activities. Hence with the 

death of the body, these elements or parts separate, 

and in consequence the soul vanishes.^ This reasoning 

has been shown to be false.^ Consciousness testifies 

that the soul is a substantial entity. Its unity is not a 

collection of parts.^ 

§ 8. (e) Finally resort is had to the fact that death (e) death 
is to all appearances the end of individual existence, aif.^'^ 
We admit that with death the body dissolves into dust. 
The problem, however, concerns not the body but the 
soul. To assume the death of the soul, from the actual 
dissolution of the body is a fallacy, which in Logic is 
termed '' begging the question." 

§ 9. The theory of materialism has been called the ^J^JjJ^^"^ 
theory of Annihilation. It is to be rejected because theory. 
the principles from which it springs are false. Mater- 
ialism, as has been shown, is not a rational or satisfac- 
tory theory of life. It is a partial and one-sided view. 
In attempting to solve the problems of human life, it 

2 Cf. Dr. Mandsley Physiology and Pathology of Mind. 
2 Cf. Substantiality of Soul. 
* Cf. Simplicity of Soul. 

29 ;1 



226 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



S° Theory 
of Panthe- 
ism. 



criticism 
of this 
Theory. 



8° Scepti- 
cism. 



destroys the highest, nobl.st attribtites of man, and 
presents as the result a mutilated humanity. 

2°. Pantheism. 

§ 10. Pantheism denies the existence of the indi- 
vidual soul. It admits that there is in us a divine 
something. This divine self is an emanation from or a 
transient phase of the one great Soul which envelops 
all and is all. Just as the ripples sink into the calm 
surface of the lake; just as my breath is part of and 
mingles with the atmosphere which envelops me, so 
my soul melts into or fades into the all-pervading 
Spirit.^ 

§ II. This theory keeps the shadow of the soul and 
the vesture of immortality. But if death brings a loss 
of consciousness; if I am no longer a person with the 
capacity to enjoy a rational existence; then there is no 
future life for me. Death means the end for me; what- 
ever survives, it is not /. This differs from annihila- 
tion only in name. Again this theory is a false presen- 
tation of what is true. We come from God, but not as 
parts of His substance nor as manifestations or modes 
of His essense. The soul is destined to return to God 
and reach the fullness of happiness by union with Him, 
but this union is not an absorption into God's essence, 
nor does it infer a loss of consciousness. Christian 
Theodicy sets forth the true nature of our dependence 
on God. The theory of Pantheism has been called the 
theory of Absorption. It differs in name only from the 
Materialistic hypothesis. 

3°. Scepticism. 
§ 12. Another theory, or rather aspect of Immortal- 
ity is presented by Scepticism. It maintains that we 

5 Cf. Emerson, Schleiermacher. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 227 

cannot prove a future life, therefore, that the proper 
and rational state of mind on such a question is one 
of doubt and suspense. Allusion is made to the modern 
spirit of scepticism. The generation which is now 
passing has been deeply imbued with its fatal poison. 
It has blighted minds of great gifts and promises; it 
has lowered the standard of life; it has brought unhap- 
piness and gloom to many a heart. 

§ 13. Thus J. S. Mill in summing up his criticism of ^^^ headers, 
the proofs for immortahty calmly declares that there J s. Mm. 
is no clear evidence for or against.^ Mr. Emerson tells Mr.Emer- 

^ son. 

US that man fails in attempting to teach separately the 
doctrine of Immortality; that from the very nature of 
man a veil shuts down on the facts of to-morrow.'' Mr. 
Matthew Arnold holds that belief in Immortality is in 
excess of the evidence. To him death is 

The stern law of every mortal lot 
Which man, proud man, finds hard to bear, 
And builds himself, I know not what 
Of second life, I know not where.^ 

The poems of Tennyson show that its influence had Tennyson, 
hold on his mind.^ 

But what am I? 
An infant crying in the night; 
An infant crying for the light; 
And with no language but a cry. 

Here and there, however, signs of a returning hope 
are seen. The gloom of doubt hangs over the writings 
of Carlyle and Froude,^^ of Morley and Renan. The 

^ Cf. Mill Three Essays on Religion, p. 197 sq. 
^ Cf. Emerson Essays, " the Over-Soul." 
^ Cf. Hutton Modern Guides of English Thought in Mat- 
ters of Faith, p. 125. 
9 Cf. In Mem. 54. 
i"^ Cf. Essay on Progress; the Nemesis of Faith. 



228 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

French novel of Zola, of Manpassant; of Daudet," of 
Bourget, ex. gr., *'Mensonges;" have helped to spread 
its influence.^2 It is revealed in the work of Thomas 
Hardy, of Mrs. H. Ward's '' Robert Elsmere," and of 
G. Eliot's " Middlemarch." ^^ 

HI. 

Substitutes for Immortality. 

§ 14. The hope of a life beyond the grave is too 
deeply imbedded in the soul of man to be totally eradi- 
cated. The voice of human nature will make itself 
heard. Immortality is only the expression of that 
longing and hope for better things than what this life 
affords. If the true conception of Immortality is de- 
nied, man is constrained to invent some artificial sub- 
stitute, 
(a) immor- § 15. Thus (a) some base Immortality on the scien- 
themate- tific truth of the Conservation and indestructibility of 
ments of matter. They maintain that all things possess immor- 
al Cf. "The Ave Maria," Jan. 29, 1898, p. 150. 
^ Cf. " Neo-Christian Movement in France," in Amer. Jour, 
of Psych., 1892-93, p. 496. 

12 " I remember," writes Mr. Myers in an essay on G. 
Eliot, " how at Cambridge I walked with her once 
in the Fellows' Garden of Trinity, on an evening of rainy 
May, and she, stirred somewhat beyond her wont, and taking 
as her text the three words which have been used so often as 
the inspiring trumpet-calls of men — the words God, Immor- 
tality, Duty — pronounced, with terrible earnestness, how in- 
conceivable was the first, how unbelieveable was the second^ 
and yet how peremptory and absolute the third. Never, per- 
haps, had sterner accents affirmed the sovereignty of imper- 
sonal and unrecompensing law. I listened, and night fell; 
her grave, majestic countenance turned towards me like a 
Sybil's in the gloom; it was as though she withdrew from my 
grasp, one by one, the two scrolls of promise, and left me the 
third scroll only, awful with inevitable fate." cf. Hutton 
Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith, 
p. 271. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 229 

tality, in this sense that the elements are never de- 
stroyed, but constantly combine into new forms. 
Hence the individual disintegrates, but the elements 
of his being enter into other combinations. Nature 
presents the constant and unending process of redinte- 
grations and recreations. Man himself comes under 
the sway of the universal law. He is part of the 
totality of being.-^^ 

§ 1 6. (b) Others confound Immortalitv with the Cb) of the 

'^ \ y ^ conserva- 

scientific truth of the conservation of Energy. To tion of 

. enei-gy. 

them man is a certain force; this force is the sum of his 
character and his life ; it is manifested in every thought 
and action. His activity shall never die, but shall go 
on exerting its influence on the course of subsequent 
history. Thus a good or bad act, a good or bad Hfe 
have physical effects in uplifting or lowering the lives 
of those who are my contemporaries and through 
them influence those who shall come after me. The 
influence of my life shall ever go on and shall never 
cease. In this sense, therefore, they contend that man 
is immortal. 

§ 17. (c) Closely akin to this view is the teaching of ^^^tfdhism. 
Buddhism. Orthodox Buddhism maintains that man 
has no soul in our sense of the word.^^ Nevertheless it 
must offer some sanction for a good Hfe, and on the 
other hand would do violence to human nature if it did 
not preserve some shadow of a future existence. 
Hence the doctrine of Karma. 

§ 18. Karma is not a separate entity. It is another Karma, 
word for moral character ; it is the sum of all the moral 
activities and influences which have shaped my Hfe. 
Death causes the dissolution of the body. My body 

14 Cf. Lucretius De Nat. Rerum III, No. 78. 
1^ Cf. Chapter on Substantiality of the Soul. 



230 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

no longer exists, but on this account I do not cease to 
live. My character, the influences which have formed 
and moulded me into an individual distinct from other 
men — in a word, my Karma yet lives on. The mo- 
ment it is freed from this present existence by the dis- 
solution of the body, it enters in all its totality into 
another corporal existence lower or higher in the scale 
of being according as my hfe has been bad or good. 
In the former view, my character or moral influence 
was scattered with death and mingled with the totality 
of force in its perpetual motion. According to the 
teaching of Buddhism, however, my character whole 
and entire enters into and determines some new indi- 
vidual form of being. This teaching can be well 
termed the Transmigration of character, and is a 
shadow of the Transmigration of soul, a doctrine held 
by Brahmanism from which Buddhism sprang, 
(d) immor- § iQ. (d) Finally there is the immortalitv of sflory 

talityof , ^, ^ ^ , ^ . . 1- ', 1 

glory. and of a good name. As poets immortalize themselves 
in song; as heroes by their glorious deeds; so should 
we by a noble Hfe seek a name that shall live forever. 
The great and good Hfe we led wih exert the moral 
influence of example on those who come after, and 
generations yet unborn will rise up to caU us blessed.^^ 
nKfrtaSty § ^o. This is the immortaHty of Positivism. Thus 
itMsni. Compte contends that " Positivism greatly improves 
immortality and places it in a firmer foundation by 
changing it from objective to subjective; this sub- 
jective immortality, he says, exists in the brains of the 
living.^^ The immortality of character is weH put by 
G. Eliot. 

16 Cf. Cic. Ques. Tusc. bl, ch. 14, 15. 

17 Cf. Compte Catec. of Positiv. ReHg. con. 3; A Posi- 
tivist Primer, by C. G. David, p. 18. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 23I 

Oh, may I join the choir invisible 

Of those immortal dead who live again 

In minds made better by their presence; live 

In pulses stirred to generosity, 

In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn 

For miserable aims that end with self, 

In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars, 

And with their mild persistence urge men's search 

To vaster issues. So to live is heaven, ^^ 

IV. 

The Fact. 
§21. It is not necessary to make an assumption in 

The basis 

the effort to prove the immortality of the soul. The of our 
basis of our reasoning is a fact. This fact becomes the for immor- 
strongest of arguments when thrown into logical form. Ait^ 
It may be thus stated: It is a fact that all nations, at 
all times, have always believed in the existence of the 
soul after death. This belief prevails among the most 
civilized as well as among barbarous nations.^^ The 
progress of education and the march of civilization far 
from destroying only strengthens and perfects the be- 
lief. It is a belief inseparably connected with the moral 
and religious convictions of mankind.^" 

§ 22. Now it is a law of sound reasoning that a con- 
viction concerning a moral or religious truth, which m^nf? J"^ 
has always prevailed among all peoples, which grows "^^^®^- 

1^ Legend of Jubal, 

1^ Cf. Cicero Disp. Tusc. I ; Tyler " Primitive Culture, vol. 
I, p. 425: II, p. 18; H. Spencer First Principles, p. 4, 13; 
Chateaubriand Genius of Christianity B VI, ch. III. 

20 " However degraded these people may be, there is no 
need telling them of the existence of God or of a future life. 
These two truths are universally admitted in Africa. If we 
speak to them of a dead man, they reply ' He is gone to 
God.' " Livingstone Explorations in S. Africa. Quatrefages, 
commenting on this, says: "All the testimony collected upon 
points the most remote by different travelers confirm this." 
cf. Quatrefages "The Pigmies, ch. VII; "The Human 
Species," " Hommes Fossiles et Hommes Sauvages." 



232 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



objection 
that na- 
tions differ 
in their 
concep- 
tions of a 
future life. 



objection 
that indi- 
viduals 
have de- 
nied im- 
mortality. 



Stronger with the advance of civilization, is not due to 
a temporary or accidental cause, but must have a rea- 
son for its existence as sound and as universal as the 
belief itself; and that this reason can be no other than 
our common human nature. Therefore, the belief in 
immortality, inasmuch as it possesses all these charac- 
teristics is the voice and the heritage of our own com- 
mon humanity. 

§ 23. It is by no means true, however, to hold that 
all peoples have held the same conceptions of the 
future life. A cursory acquaintance with literature 
and history shows that the contrary is the. case. Thus 
the Elysium of Homer and Virgil ^^ difters totally from 
the Paradise of Dante.^^ The happy hunting-ground 
of the American Indian is not the Wandalla of the 
Norseman or the future state of the Egyptian.-^ These 
differences are due to the accidental causes of temper- 
ment, of occupations during life, etc., and with Dante 
to the light of Christian Theology. Nevertheless the 
same universal fact, that we live after death, prevails 
throughout. 

§ 24. Nor is the strength of the argument weakened 
by the assertion that some have denied a future life. 
We contend only for a moral universality. This admits 
the possibility of individual exceptions. Individuals 
have been found who from one reason or another 
have refused to believe in immortality. Their isolated 
stand only emphasizes the fact that all others do accept 
it. iNIoreover, in denying the true conception, they 
are constrained to hold a substitute. They cannot blot 
it completely from their lives. 



21 Cf. Odyssy B XI: Eneid B V. 

22 Paradise XXXIII. 

23 Cf. Book of the Dead. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 233 

§ 25, A difficulty of more weight is the contention ^hirna^^ 
advanced that there have been nations who have not ^^^1^.^^^ 
beheved in a future state. Two instances, e. g., the i^^^orj^j. 
Jews of the Old Testament and the Buddhists, have ^^y- 
been cited. Upon examination, however, it will be 
found that this objection has more apparent than real 
force. 

1°. The lezvs. 

§ 26. There is no doubt that the Jews, from the time examined 
of the captivity, have believed in a fifture state after t^e Jews 
death. The writings of the period give unmistakable captivity^ 
traces of this belief. The contention is that the Jews 
before that time had no such conviction; that the new 
doctrine was learned from other nations.^^ 

§ 27. Nevertheless a careful study presents reasons (i) from 

1-1 1 • 1- 1 r 11 • intercourse 

which strongly mclme to the fact that at all times the of Jews 
Jews held the same belief. Thus (i) Moyses is said to Egyptians, 
have been well versed in the learning of the Egyptians 
and we have indubitable evidence that the Egyptians 
held the existence of a future state. (2) It is hard to je^vs^were 
suppose that God would have left them. His chosen §?osen 
people, in ignorance of a truth which has so important p^^p^®- 
a bearing- on dailv life, (i) Express mention is made C3) the 

01, " ..;,.,, Sadduces 

of the Sadduces as a sect which denied the resurrec- denied this 

tion. Now how can we explain the fact that a few 

only, and for unsound reasons, denied future existence, 

while the rest of the Jews held the belief, unless for 

the same reasons which account for the prevalence of 

the doctrine with other peoples. (4) In the early books the pas- 

of the Bible there are indications which assure us that iariy 

belief in a future state was common. Thus divination 

is severely prohibited f^ Saul is instanced calling up the 

24 Cf. Mallock " Is Life Worth Living," p. 27. 
25Deut. XVIII: Leviticus XX. 
30 



234 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

witch of Endor;^^ the patriarchs are "gathered to their 
people " and " buried with their fathers." 
jews^^ § 27. (5) It is true that in the Pentateuch temporal 

tateJfch^^" blessings and menaces are the sanction for the observ- 
Theocmcy. ^^^^c of the law. But we must remember that the 
Jewish nation of the time was a Theocracy. Hence 
the temporal promises or punishments were addressed 
not to the individual, but to the nation as a whole. A 
nation's prosperity and destiny are earthly; so like- 
wise are its laws and means of government. To 
transfer these to the individual would be an egregious 
error. ■ 
The con- § 28. The conclusion therefore is beyond doubt. 

elusion. '^ ^ ^ _ -^ ^ 

Only a partial view or falsification of facts could induce 
the statement that the Jews of ancient times denied a 
future life. 

2°. Buddhism. 

Buddhists! It IS uccessary to draw a distinction between the 
tinction philosophical creed of Buddhism and the common 
creed of belief of Buddliists themselves. To confound one with 
and the ^ the Other is to commit a logical blunder and open the 
Buddhists, way for confusion and error. The goal of Buddhism is 
Meaning of Nirvana. The philosophical meaning of the term is dis- 
puted. Some writers incline to the view that it means 
total extinction of life or being. Others, e. g., Cole- 
brooke,^^ Wilson, Hodgson, Vans Kennedy, Williams,^'^ 
maintain that it is a state of apathetic calm. 
Prof. Davids,^^ Kellogg^" and Childers,^^ however, say 

26 1. Kings, XXIV, 7. 

27 Essays. 

28 Buddhism. 

29 Cf. Buddhism. 

30 The Light of Asia and the Light of the World. 

31 Pali Dictionary. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 235 

that Nirvana sometimes means a mental state of abso- 
lute calm attainable in this life, a state which infallibly 
issues into total and everlasting extinction of being, 
i. e., into Parinirvana. Finally some, e. g., Brahmo- 
Somaj, by Nirvana mean the peace and rest which 

comes from the subjection and conquest of carnal 
self.^2 

§ 30. But if we examine the practical belief of the Bucfdhists. 
Buddhists themselves, there is no doubt that they 
accept the doctrine of a future life. Gotama himself, 
who preached the gospel of annihilation, is worshipped 
as a God. The heaven of the Buddhist is an abode 
with Buddha, attainable after a long series of transmi- 
grations. Their descriptions of it are very fanciful and 
often ludicrous. Nevertheless it is a contribution 
which swells the universal accord in the existence of 
another life. Thus Max Muller sa3''s : " Even if Nir- 
vana, in its original meaning, were an utter blank, then 
out of that very nothing human nature made a new 
Paradise." '' 

§ 31. Plence we may safely conclude to the fact that of^the^^*°° 
belief in the immortality of the soul is universal. But Sfm^ni* 
this universal belief is not inconsistent with the fact ^®^^^^ ^^^*- 
that some have denied it. Moreover, the belief has 
been fashioned and colored by circumstances of race, 
of time, and of place; but in most cases it appears as 
a belief in a shadowy existence in some under-world. 
Finally the belief has been purer and more in accord 
with truth, in proportion as peoples have held a purer 

32 To P. Deussen Nervana is the goal of morality. His 
works is a blending of Kant, Schoppenhauer and the Vedante. 
cf. Elements of Metaphysics by P. Deussen. 

33 Cf. Muller Science of Religion "Buddhist Nihilism;" 
Chips from a German Workshop, vol. I, Lecture XI. 



236 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

conception of God and possessed a more perfect 
standard of morality.^* 

V. 

Reasons for the Belief. 

aM E? § 3^- Scholastic writers make a distinction between 
mOTtaiity^," ^^^ intrinsic and an extrinsic immortality. Thus the 
soul is said to be intrinsically immortal because its 
nature is such that it cannot cease to exist by a disso- 
lution of parts or by its separation from the body. 
It is extrinsically immortal because it cannot be anni- 
hilated by another power, i. e., God. 

1°. Intrinsic Immortality. 
FnSinsic^^ The considerations which are brought forward to 
tSi?*^^' prove that the soul is immortal are drawn from various 
nature^f sources and have a cumulative force, (a) From the 
the soul, nature of the soul: The first proofs proposed by St. 
S^no?"^ Thomas for the immortality of the soul are drawn 
S^^artf from its nature as a spiritual entity .^^ He says that the 
The soul ^^^^ ^^ ^ simple spiritual entity not made up of 
dependent P^^^^ ; hence it is not corruptible, because decay has 
on^the effect Only in compounds which are dissoluble. Again 
he says that the soul is a subsistent entity, i. e., it is a 
spiritual being independent of the body; hence it does 
not cease to exist by its separaton from the body. The 
conclusion, therefore, is evident that by its nature the 
soul is capable of an immortal existence. The immor- 
tality of the soul is therefore the logical and inevitable 
consequence of its spiritual and inorganic nature.^® The 
latter leads to the former. Now, as the spirituality has 

3* Cf. Alger, Doctrine of a Future Life. 

35 c. Gent. Ill, ch. 55, 79; Sum. Theol. I, q. 75, a 6. 

36 S. Thomas S. Theolog. I, q. 105, a 4. < 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 237 

been placed be3^ond doubt, we must also accept the 
immortality.^^ 

§ 34. Prof. Ladd approves the Hne of reasoning. He £i"of . 
holds that all inquiry into the reasonableness of the position. 
belief in immortality should take its ^start from the 
psychological point of vew.^^ Yet he maintains that 
immortality of mind cannot be proved from its nature 
as that of a real, self-identical and tmitary being; nor is 
its permanence, as known to itself, of an order to allow 
the sure inference of its continued and permanent ex- 
istence after death.^^ 

§ 35. The reasons alleged for this view are princi- His 
pally (i) the existence which we call '' Mind " is never ^®^^'^"^- 
known — even when observed in its most exalted 
states and in the exercise of its most highly spiritual 
activites — as released wholly from bodily conditions.*" 

(2) The deniers of immortality are strongest in their 
appeal to facts of physiological psychology and 
Psycho-Physics. For the fact appears to be that under 
certain material conditions the mind ceases from all 
that in which its only known and intelligible being 
actually consists. Hence he concludes that in the 
arena of Psycho-Physics it is a drawn battle.*^ 

§ 36. These two reasons have no real weight against The value 
our thesis. They were carefully examined in treating reasons, 
the spirituality of the soul. Their force was seen to be 
more apparent than real. If they could not weaken 
that thesis, a fortiori they have no power to overturn 

37 We do not, therefore, as Lotze seems to think, draw the 
immortality from the S'uhstantiality of the soul. cf. Outlines 
of Psychology, ed. by Ladd, p. 112. 

3^ Ladd Philosophy of Mind, p. 397. 

39 lb., p. 398. 

4'^Ib., p. 400. 

^1 Pp. 402, 403. 



238 . CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

our present contention. The source of Prof. Ladd's 
difficulties is the failure to grasp the true nature of the 
soul, to see it as a simple spiritual entity, 
the moral § 37- (b) From the moral order: The existence of a 
order. nioral Order in the world is a fact which cannot be 
conscience! denied. There is in the soul of every rational creature 
a hidden monitor which proclaims the ineradicable dis- 
tinction between good and evil. Its voice is heard at 
every waking moment, directing, urging, constraining 
us to good acts; restraining from, forbidding bad 
actions; praising, rewarding for work well done with 
peace and buoyancy of mind; or reproaching and 
punishing with the sting of remorse and sorrow. It is 
the judge of our every thought and act, and its deci- 
sions are the promulgations and applications of an 
eternal law which is grounded in the very depths of 
our being. We may fly to the ends of the earth, we 
cannot escape its vigilance or its sentence. Hence the 
commands of " duty," the consciousness of moral obli- 
gation — the " ought " or "ought not " which is never 
absent. Kant felt the force of this categorical impera- 
tive, and from it reasoned to the existence of God.*^ 
In the laws s og. What the conscience of the individual so clearly 

and cus- '' •-' • • 1 

tomsof reveals pervades the laws, literature and religious be- 

mankmd. ^ , . . . . 

liefs of mankind. Everyw^here is found the distinction 
between good and bad; everywhere the indelible marks 
of a morally constituted world. If peoples differ as to 
the morality of individual acts, the difference is due to 
the difference of circumstances or to an error of judg- 
ment. The great fundamental distinction between 
good and bad is never obliterated.*^ 

42 Chateaubriand Genius of Christianity B VI, ch. II; cf. 
Knight " Essays in Philosophy," p. 300; Newman Grammar 
of Assent, p. 106 sq. 

43 Cf.. Mivart Truth, p. 282. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 239 

§ 39. But a law so universalj so imperative is its be- "1^^ sane- 
hests, must have a sanction. Ethics show that sane- ^^o'^- 
tion is an element which is of the essence of a law. 
Now in this case our present life contains no sufficient 
sanction. The distribution of the goods of this world 
is not just. The virtuous suffer throughout life and 
the wicked are prosperous. The reader can recall 
instances where noble and pure lives go down to the 
grave unrewarded, or perhaps aspersed by calumnious 
and envious tongues. The conditions under which 
men enter life are unequal. Worldly advantages of 
wealth and social position, endowments of body and 
of mind, opportunities for education and self-improve- 
ment are not the same for all. So, too, we pass through 
life at times under great disadvantages. To many life 
is an arena of tentative, bailed and incomplete effort.^'' 

xr 1 1 1 r 1 • 1 This found 

§ 40. How can the moral order of the universe be in another 
true, if those who violate it prosper and those who 
strive to obey its commands suffer miserably? Hence 
we infer the existence of another life where virtue shall 
receive its full and just reward, where the inequalities 
of the present existence §hall be removed. sopWcaf 

§41. (c) Philosophical: Under this heading are ^^^j^ 
grouped all those considerations which arise from the gj-nd''^ ^^' 
study of the great powers with which man is endowed. 
Of all creatures inhabiting the globe man alone pos- 
sesses intelligence. Mind is a supreme and unique 
gift. Its powers can never be exhausted. The thirst 
for knowledge is never satisfied; the capacity for it is 
infinite. Swifter than the flash of light is the course 
of thought. Boundless is its range. It penetrates the 

**Cf. the Psalms; Martineau "Study of Religion," vol. II, 
p. 370; Newman " Grammar of Assent; " Mivart Truth, pp. 
487, 251. 



will 



240 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

heavens above and the earth beneath. In restless ac- 
tivity it ever seeks new worlds to explore and to sub- 
due.*^ The material universe does not furnish sufficient 
food for thought. The mind passes its bounds, con- 
templates and puts into consistence the great truths of 
the moral order, e. g., justice, goodness, merit, reward, 
punishment, morality; nay even rises to God and dis- 
courses on His infinite perfection.^^ 
po°5^rs of § 42. Again man has a will which tends to and seeks 
the good. He is capable of love in all its forms and 
fullness. These higher emotions common speech lo- 
cates in the heart. Here is found the meaning, the 
depth and the perfection of a Hfe. Whence come the 
beautiful and noble emotions? The objects we see 
about us only occasion their exercise. They can never 
satisfy us. The heart is too great and deep to find in 
the passing pleasures and objects of life the satiety 
which it longs for. The author of Ecclesiastes had 
sounded all the sources of life's pleasures, and they 
brought him " sorrow and affliction of spirit." " Ad 
altiora nati! " was the exclamation of a Pagan.*' The 
aspirations of a life so vari^ in passing forms, reach- 
ing back to the earliest childhood, increasing in vigor 
and definiteness as the years turn into youth and man- 
hood, taking color maybe and affected to some extent 
by the circumstances of our condition, standing out 

^5 Aug. Soliloq. 1. II, n. i. From the perpetuity of truth 
S. Augustine draws an argument for immortality of the soul. 
cf. SoliL, n. 3, 4, 24, 33. 

^ lUuc (i. e., ad Deum) perge, anima," exclaims S. Aug., 
" contemptis ceteris vel etiam transcencis; illuc perge. Nihil 
potentius ista creaLura, quae mens dicitur rationahs. nihil hac 
creatura subHmius; quidquid supra ipsam est, jam Creator 
est." In Joan tr. xxiii, n. 6; S. Thomas S. Theolog. I, q. 75, 
a 6. 

47 Cicero de Finibus 1. II, n. 113. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 24I 

like stars which guide our footsteps and incite us ever 
onward — all tell with persistent and increasing force 
that this world is not an abiding dwelling-place; that 
life is only a pilgrimage; that the fruition and rest lie 
beyond. 

§ 43. Finally there is implanted in our souls a desire ^^°^*^| 
for happiness. Instinctively and irresistibly we seek happiness, 
what shall make us happy. This yearning is not blind 
and irrational; it is the bloom of our inteUigent nature. 
The longing for happiness is universal with mankind, 
and appears in strongest and purest light with those 
who try to lead a noble and virtuous life.*^ 

§ 44. But the happiness of this world is fleeting and true happi- 
partial. Individual experience is proof that a heavy found in 
load of sorrow presses upon the children of men. We 
may strive for days and for years in the hope of en- 
joying a little happiness; when it comes some new care 
dispels the purity of our joy. The truth of this is seen coi^ciusion. 
in the philosophy of Pessimism, which has taken a 
deep hold on the minds of the present century; in the 
fact that the aim of our Christian religion has ever been 
to make men truly happy; in the conduct of our Divine 
Redeemer, who appealed to this insatiable desire of 
the human heart in the beautiful opening of the Ser- 
mon on the Mount, his first authoritative promulgation 
of "The Kingdom.'^ « 

§ 4S. Unless, therefore, the desire for happiness be a This con- 

^"^ ^^ elusion 

delusion and folly, we must admit a future existence strength- 

. . . . ened. 

where it can be realized. That it is not a delusion is 
shown by the fact that it is the common possession of 
humanity. If to these considerations we add the slow- 
ness of human growth, the difficulties attending on the 

*8August Serm. 150, n. 4; Card. Newman Apology, p. 267. 
*8 Cf. Matthew, ch. V, " Blessed are the poor in spirit," etc. 

31 



ture. 



242 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

development of our higher powers, the shortness of the 
period during which they can be exercised, the argu- 
ment derives a strength and cogency which convinces 
an impartial mind.^^ 
o? LiSra-^ § 46. Thcsc thoughts find expression in the most 
beatiful passages of Literature. Socrates on the eve 
of death strengthens his soul with these reflections. 
Plato has preserved them for the delight of future gen- 
erations.^^ Cicero tells that Plato seems to have con- 
vinced himself and to have made others wish he were 
right.^^ It comes out in Miss Proctor's '' Incomplete- 
ness; " in Longfellow's " Psalm of Life; " in Words- 
worth's "We Are Seven " and '' Intimations of Immor- 
tality; " in Addison's " Cato; " in Gray's " Elegy." It 
faintly shines through Emerson's essay on Immortality 
and lines on death of his child.^^ Tennyson reasons 
that we cannot conceive of love as perishable,^^ ex- 
presses the comfnon aspiration of the human race in 
'' The Tw^o Voices," and faces death with the hope 
strong, though vague within him. 

" That I shall see my Pilot face to face 
When I shall cross the bar."^^ 

It has inspired Mrs. Browning's " Sleep," and im- 
parts the subtle magic charm to the most beautiful 
hymn in the English language, " Lead Kindly Light. '^ 

50 Cf. Knight " Essays in Philosophy," p. 289 sq. 
5iCf. Phaedo, Republic. 

52 Quest. Tuscul. I, 21. " Ut enim rationem Plato nullam 
afferret (vide quid homini tribuam) ipse auctoritate me 
frangeret. Tot antem rationes attulit, ut velle ceteris, sibi 
certe persuasisse videatur.'" 

53 Cf. Brownson's Quarterly Rev., vol. I, p. 262, new series. 

54 Cf. "In Memoriam;" cf. Rob. Browning's "Evelyn 
Hope," " Reverie." 

55 Q{ '' Crossing the Bar." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 243 

§ 47. (d) From Analogy — The Physical sciences ^^Jjjy 
do not give proofs properly so-called for Immortality. 
They move in a different sphere. Nevertheless they 
present some striking illustrations which to^ some 
minds add a certain weight to the main Hne of thought. 
Thus science has shown that there is no such thing as f^jf^J® ^Jt 
death in the sense of annihilation. Death is only a gJcifword 
dissolution, a transformation, a change in the mode of the^Jeme^^ 
existence. The conservation of matter and of force gfiatio^* 
are truths of science. In the vocabulary of science, 
therefore, there is no such word as annihilation. 
Now the soul is a spiritual entity having its own sub- 
sistence. Hence to affirm that it ceases to exist at the 
dissolution of the body is a gratuitous assumption un- 
supported by a single fact and directly opposed to the 
known truths of science. This is the line of argument 
followed by Bishop Butler in his " Analogy ;"^^ and 
more recently was set forth by H.'Drummond in his 
suggestive work, " Natural Law in the Spiritual 
World." '' 

§ 48 (e) Finally the belief in Immortality is not iso- ^^l int? 
lated. It permeates our intellectual and moral life; u J^ctfon^of 
is inseparably connected with other truths, e. g., God. J^^^J"^^^* 
Liberty, Justice, Providence, Morality. To suppress truths, 
one is to suppress all. They stand or fall together. If I 
admit one, I must admit the others. This very con- 

56 Ch. I " Of a Future Life." 

5'' Some writers draw an argument for Immortality from the 
theory of evolution. To them man's place in nature is the 
last and best; all lower creations lead up to him; he is the 
crown and the explanation of the whole. Hence they argue 
that the whole process loses its meaning by the denial of the 
persistence of the spiritual element in man. Thus they are 
led to accept Immortality not as a demonstrable truth of 
science, but as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of 
God's work. (Cf. Fiske's " Destiny of Man; " Tennyson 
" In Memoriam; " T. Hunger " The Appeal to Life." P. 245, 
281 sq.) 



244 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

nection adds a special force to the independent argu- 
ments. 

2°. Extrinsic Immortality. 
conclusion 8 40. We therefore conclude with absolute certainty 

for intnn- '^ ^^ J 

sic immor- that the soul shall survive its dissolution from the body. 

tality. -^ 

But shall its existence be eternal and immortal; i. e., 

can we infer that God will not annihilate the soul? The 
reasons which go to prove the eternal duration are 
drawn from the nature of immortality, and from the 
attributes of God. Immortality means eternal felicity. 
The desire for happiness so strong and insatiable could, 
not be satisfied with less.^^ To suppose that God 
would have created man with a nature which in every 
way and form seeks an eternal existence/^ and would 
then annihilate him is to affirm that God, who is Wis- 
dom itself, w^ould do things foolishly, that God, who is 
all Justice, would deprive man of what He has given 
intimations and hopes.^" Everything we know of man 
demands immortaHty; everything we know of God as- 
sures us that the demand is not futile and will have 
fumilment.^1 

58 S. Thomas S. Theol. I, q. 75, a 6. 

5^ S. Thomas C. Gentes 1. II, ch. 55. 

^° " Quae (ImmortaHtas), si nullo modo dari homini posset, 
frustra etiam beatitudo quaereretur; quia sine immortalitate 
non potest esse." Aug. de Trin. 1. XIII, n. 10. 

^1 Prof. Ladd's conclusion, therefore, is not correct. He 
says " The so-called arguments for the immortality of the 
human soul really consist of a variety of considerations which 
tend to render reasonable the faith or hope that it is so; to 
say that they demonstrate the soul's power to exist after the 
bodily substrate has been removed, is to af^rm of them more 
than they can sustain. But to deny that they suggest the pos- 
sibilities, or even the probabilities of this continued existence, 
is to deny to them more than there is need. And so we may 
return from the discussion of the question on grounds of 
science and metaphysics of mind with a faint but reasonable 
confidence in the possibility of its affirmative answer as one 
net result." Phil, of Mind, pp. 397-403- cf. Fr. Hecker Aspir- 
ations of Nature, ch. X, XI. 



PERSONALITY. 

§ I. Personality is a term of peculiar and significant Person 
force. We speak of animals as beings, of inanimate man alone, 
creation as things; man alone is called a person. There 
is a reason for this constant and characteristic use of 
the word, since language is the expression of thought. 
Now mind is the mirror of matter. Therefore, words 
tell of external objects, and the nature of the object 
explains the peculiar use and meaning of the word. 

§ 2. In a general way, personality seems to express i^g general 
all those attributes which mark man as different in na- "^®^^i°s» 
ture from the brute. At times also it is employed to 
designate a man's character; thus, ex. gr., we speak 
of an attractive personality. Nevertheless it has its 
own special philosophical meaning; it expresses the 
true worth and dignity of man, the highest perfection 
of his rational nature. 

§ 3. The problem of personality is a very difficult its 
one. The history of its development; the various ex- 
planations advanced especially by modern writers; the 
danger of confounding conceptions of things closely 
connected show the difficulties attending its solution 
and at the same time invest the subject with a certain 
charm. 

TI16 work 

§ 4. The examination and solution of the notion of of Ohris- 
Pei^sonality is the work of Christian Philosophy. In PhUoso- 
the Pagan writers we find no discussion bearing upon ^ ^* 
it. Aristotle and Plato do not touch the question. 
With the Incarnation of the Son of God new light was 
thrown upon the problems of mind, as well as upon the 
principles and motives of life. The great task of the 
early Christian Church was to prove that and explain, 



246 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

as far as human reason could, how the Second Person 
of the Blessed Trinity assumed our human nature. 
For four centuries the conflict between truth and error 
raged; one after another the false views were exposed 
and condemned; until in the Council of Calcedon, 451 
A. D., the full truth was defined amid the plaudits of 
the assembled Fathers. The definitions of the Church, 
the explanations scattered through the writings of the 
Fathers were collected by the Schoolmen and thrown 
into systematic form. The teaching is found in the 
writings of St. Thomas in all its precision, lucidity and 
fullness 

I. 
Locke. 
Looke. g 2^ Locke is called the '' Father of Modern Psy- 

chology." ^ In the Essay on the Human Understand- 
ing, his aim was to investigate the sources of knowl- 
edge, to account for its certainty and extent, to ex- 
plain the grounds and degrees of beHef, opinion and 
assent.^ The purpose here is not to inquire whether 
his work was well done, and satisfactory. We are con- 
cerned only with his definition and exposition of 
Personality. 
PersoS-^^ § 6. Locke holds that personal identity consists in 
**^' consciousness, but especially the consciousness which 

consists in reaches back in memory to what has passed. "As far 
memory. ^^ ^^^.^ consciousness," he writes, " can be extended 
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches 
the identity of that person ; it is the same self now it 
was then." ^ Hence personality is constituted by con- 

1 Transcendentalism in New England by O. B. Frothing- 
ham, p. 3. 

2 Essay BI, ch. L 

3 Essay BII, ch. 27, n. 9. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 247 

scious memory, i. e., " by the present representation of 
a past action." ^ He holds that if the same conscious- 
ness be preserved whether in the same or different sub- 
stances, the personal identity is preserved.^ Con- 
sciousness alone can unite remote existences into the 
same person; therefore, whatever has the conscious- 
ness of present and past actions, is the same person to 
whom they both belong. Hence self is not determined 
by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot 
be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness.^ 

§ 7. Consciousness of the past does not constitute critcism. 
personal identity; on the contrary it supposes this 
identity. How could I be conscious of past acts as 
mine if they were not united by a bond which made 
my recognition possible? My mind does not make 
truth, it finds truth. So my personality is a fact pre- 
supposed by conscious memory. I may remember or 
forget the past; that does not change what has actu- 
ally taken place. Again, if personality depends on 
memory, what happens in case the power of remem- 
bering the acts of my past life be lost? Yet, according 
to Mr. Locke, I should become a different individual. 
Again, how could I advance in a court of justice or 
even to any sensible person that I did not commit a 
certain action, because I have no memory of having 

4 lb., n. 13. 

5 lb. 

^ lb., 16, 23, 24. Mr. James Mill says that the Self is " a 
train of ideas which run as it were, into a single point." This 
point is memory, cf. Jas Mill Analysis I, p. 331. J. S. Mill 
holds that " The phenomena of Self and that of Memory are 
merely two sides of the same fact, or two different modes of 
viewing the same fact." cf. Jas. Mill's Analysis with notes 
of J. S. Mill, vol. II, p. 175. The difficulty of this position 
he himself recognizes, and attempts a solution which is a con- 
fession of its weakness, cf. Exam, of Hamilton, p. 263. 



248 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

done so? Yet I could use this argument, if I were a 
consistent upholder of Mr. Locke's view.^ 

11. 

Kant. 
jj.^ §8. The efforts of Locke, Berkeley and Hume to 

system. form a theory of knowledge had failed. Kant felt 
that the problem should be placed on a different 
basis. He attempted in Philosophy a revolution 
analogous to that brought about by Copernicus in 
Astronomy.^ Kant held that the failure of the English 
writers was due to the subordination of mind to the 
external world. He proposed to turn attention from 
the objects of knowledge to the constitution of the 
human mind, to make mind the centre around which 
external things should revolve, to make "things con- 
form to cognition, not cognition to things.'' Hence, 
the system of Transcendental Philosophy, " which con- 
cerns itself not as much with objects as with our mode 
of cognition of objects." That the mind may obtain 
knowledge of things through experience, Kant pos- 
tulated certain categories or subjective conditions. 
He called them the forms of all knowledge. With 
these forms the mind invests or clothes the objects 
it conceives. The mind never sees the pure objects, 
i. e., the objects in themselves as they really exist. It 
perceives the objects only as they are clothed by the 
ideal forms. Hence the proper objects of the mind 
is the ideal appearance, or phenomenon, as he terms 
it. This will enable the reader to rightly estimate the 

^Cf. Butler Analogy, "Disser. on Personal Identity," p. 334. 
^ Cf. Preface to 26. Edition of Critic of Pure Reason, Mul- 
ler's Trans., p. 693. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 249 

definition Kant gives of Personality and his criticism 
that it is a paralogism of pure reason. 

§ 9. To him consciousness constitutes the essence cSSuteS 
of Personality. '" Whatever is conscious of the nu- sJiouSaess. 
merical identity of its own self at different times is 
in so far a person." He says that in his own con- 
sciousness the identity of person is inevitably present. 
What makes me a person, therefore, is consciousness 
and the possession of consciousness is the constitutive 
element of my personality.^ 

§ 10. But he contends that consciousness proves ^^* con- 

'^ ^ sciousness 

only the logical identity of the I, not the numerical proves only 
identity of my subject. The subject, he maintains, ^JP^^' 
may change. The consciousness I have is not the 
consciousness constitutive of real ego, but only of a 
logical ego; hence, I cannot infer the identity of the 
person or the real ego. 

§11. It is false to hold that consciousness consti- ^^i*^<^^sm. 
tutes Personality. Else how explain the fact that per- 
sonality abides despite the loss of consciousness, e. g., 
in sleep? Or how is it that I am the same person, al- 
though consciousness may testify to the so-called 

® " The consciousness of self and the knowledge of self, i. e., 
* The synthetic unity of apperception,' which binds our states 
of consciousness together, which enables, that is to say, the 
series to be aware of itself as a series, is the underlying unity 
produced by the knowledge that these states successively and 
altogether belongs to me." cf. Courtney Studies in Phil- 
osophy, ch. VII. 

1° '' The concept of Personality is transcendental, i. e., a 
concept of the unity of subject which is otherwise unknown 
to us. In this sense such a concept is necessary for practical 
purposes, and sufficient, but we can never pride ourselves on 
it as helping to expand our knowledge of our self by means 
of pure reason which only deceives us if we imagine that we 
can concluse an uninterrupted continuance of the subject from 
the mere concept of the identical self." (Cf. Critic of Pure 
Reason, Muller's trans., p. 294 sq. 

32 



250 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



The error. 



change of one personality to another or to the phe- 
nomena of double personality? 

§ 12. The mistake is made in confounding the Per- 
sonality with the means by which I am made aware 
of it. Thus consciousness testifies to my personality, 
but by no means constitutes it. The personality is 
supposed as already existing, and consciousness in 
stating the existence of the fact does not thereby make 
it exist. The peculiar distinction between the logical 
and real ego on which rests the paralogism of Person- 
ality is the result of Kant's peculiar theory on the con- 
stitution of knowledge. The influence of this theory 
on subsequent philosophy has been most deleterious. 
Even the ardent sympathizers of Kant acknowledge it 
as the least satisfactory part of his system. 



Modern 
writers. 



The 

Bampton 
Lecturer 
of 1891. 



III. 

Bampton Lectures of 1891. 

§ 13. Later writers seemed content in reproducing 
the thoughts of the two great thinkers whose opinions 
have been criticised; or in exposing the defects in their 
definitions, ex. gr., Butler,^^ or in confessing their ina- 
bility to give a logical definition.^ 

§ 14. But the subject is too important to be passed 
over in silence. The defects pointed out in the current 
explanations of Locke and of Kant; the Theological 
necessity of setting forth the doctrines of the Trinity 
and the Incarnation, demanded a clear and precise 
definition of Personality. This was attempted by the 
Bampton Lecturer of 1891.^^ 



11 Cf. Analogy. 

12 Cf. Stewart Phil, ess., p. 77- 

13 Cf. Personality Human and Divine by lUmgworth, M. 



A. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2^1 

§ 15. At the outset the writer gives a general no- ofM?n- 
tion of what he means by Personahty. To him Per- lingworth. 
sonaHty is " the unifying principle, or, to use a more 
guarded expression, the name of that unity in which 
all man's attributes and functions meet, making him 
an individual self." ^^ From these words it is evident criticism 

"the name 

that he is aware of the delicate e^round on which he is ot a 

° umty." 

treading. Yet it is difficult to understand how " the 
name of a unity " is a more guarded expression than 
" the unifying principle " itself. Is the writer a Nomi- 
nalist in his theory of intellectual notions, and does he 
imagine that by considering Personality as a tag mark- 
ing out a thing as distinct from other things, he is 
shielding himself the more from adverse criticism ?^^ 
The very contrary is the case. 

§ 16. Indeed the unity he speaks of is not a simple ^^^.^^^^ 
but a synthetic unity. This he himself acknowl- thetic. 
edges.^^ Personality, therefore, in his definition, is not 
a distinct perfection in man, it is only a sum of certain 
attributes, or " to use a more guarded expression," the 
name of this sum. 

§ 17. In the analysis of the notion the author adopts ^g^thodto 
the correct method in appealing to the historic develop- gf^anlng of 
ment of the Incarnation. Nevertheless his acquaint- ^^^ ^°^^- 
ance with the important contributions on the expo- 
sition of the notion scattered through the writings of 
the Fathers and of the Schoolmen, seems to be very 
superficial. He fails to expose their teaching on Per- 
sonality. On the contrary he hastens to Kant, in 
whom he finds the most satisfactory and complete ex- 
position in the evolution of the concept. 

14 P. 6. 

15 On nominalism cf. Fr. Clarke's Logic Stonyhurst Series. 
1® Cf. p. 29. 



252 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



His 

analysis. 



The bond 
of this 
synthesis. 



criticism. 



§ 1 8. He finds the fundamental characteristics of 
PersonaHty to be self -consciousness, desire, self-determi- 
natio7t; hence the three elements which constitute the 
notion are thought, desire, will}'^ But, he continues, 
these faculties are never separated in act; they more or 
less interpenetrate ; they are found more or less united. 
Thus as an actual fact, he says, there is a synthetic 
unity in Personality which is further emphasized by 
the sense of personal identity.-^^ 

§ 19. How comes this unity and what is the bond 
uniting these elements? He proceeds to tell us. " I 
am one," he writes, " in the sense of an active unifying 
principle which can not only combine a multitude of 
present experiences in itself, but can also combine its 
present with its past." ^^ To him character is the issue 
of personality's growth, being the result of the living 
interaction of its elements.^*^ For he writes that Per- 
sonality is at first a mere potentiality which gradually 
develops or realizes itself.^^ It is not necessary for the 
present purpose to follow the writer in his appHcation 
of this conception of Personality to the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. That would take us into a question of 
Theology. We confine ourselves simply to the analy- 
sis he gives of the notion itself. He has made a new 
attempt at a definition, or to speak more correctly, he 
has thrown old explanations into a new form. 

§20. (i) He considers Personality as a synthetic 
unity, whose elements are reason, desire and will. 



17 P. 29. 

13 lb. " Our personality is a synthesis, an organic unity of 
attributes, faculties, functions, which presuppose and involve 
and qualify each other, and never exist or operate apart." 
P. 75- 

19 P. 38. 

20 P. 41. 

21 P. 70. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 253 

But reason, desire and will are activities of the soul. 
From the nature of these acts the proof for the spiritu- 
ality of the soul is drawn. Again it has been shown ^lity ^o^t^^' 
that the soul is not a synthetic unity but an indivisible *^® ^°"^- 
entity. Its activity is manifested in various ways. 
Desire, reason and will are only modes of its manifes- 
tation. They are not different activities which com- 
bine into a synthetic whole. Now the soul is not the 
same as Person. We cannot explain the concept of 
Personality by explaining the nature and meaning of 
soul. They are different words and they have different 
significations.^^ 

§ 21. (2) He considers reason, desire and will as ele- (2)person- 

^ ^ ality not 

ments of Personality. But why could they not be con- nature, 
sidered as activities of our human nature? In point of 
fact I ascribe the difference between man and brute to 
the difference of their natures. I say that a man exer- 
cises the higher powers of reason and of will because 
he possesses a nature of a higher order than the brute. 
If, therefore, these activities can be referred to nature, 
why are they considered to be the characteristic ele- 
ments of Personality? Human person is not the same 
as human nature. There is a distinction between these 
concepts. Personality is a perfection and the highest 
perfection of our nature. But it shows a confusion of 
thought to explain personality, which is one perfec- 
tion of human nature, by the attributes which are com- 
mon to hum.an nature. The mention of one may call 

22 Dicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei, Et ideo 
licet separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis, non 
potest dici substantia individua, quae est hypostasis, vel suh~ 
stantia prima; sicut nee manus, nee quaecumque alia partium 
hominis. Et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae 
neque nomen. St. Thomas Sum. Theol. I, q. 29, a. I. ad 5. 



(3) he 
unites 



254 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the Others to mind ; it does not give us sufficient reason 
to identify them. 

§21. (3) Since. PersonaHty is a synthetic unity, he 
L??ke^'''^ fii^ds it necessary to explain the bond uniting these ele- 
ments into a whole. The explanation advanced can lay 
no claim to originality; it is rather an attempt to recon- 
cile the opinions proposed by the two thinkers already 
mentioned. Mr. Illingworth finds in Kant an advance 
on all that had been written concerning personality. 
Nevertheless he is an EngHshman, and more or less 
acquainted with Locke. Kant placed personality in 
consciousness; Locke finds its essence in conscious 
memory. Mr. Illingworth unites the two and main- 
tains that his personal identity consists not only in the 
combination of present experiences but rather in the 
combination of the present with the past.^^ But by 
uniting these two theories he exposes himself to the 
criticisms urged against both. The main defect is in 
holding that consciousness and memory constitute the 
person; they do not constitute it, they only make us 
aware of our personality, 
aiity n?t*a § ^^- (4) Finally, he assumes that personality is a 
growth. growth, and that character is the result of this growth. 
But this is not true; it betrays confusion of concepts; 
and their natural consequence, false views. The child 
of one year is a person, as well as the man of eighty. 
In the young man we find personality, nature, char- 
acter. But one is not the other. Nature is the fun- 
damental concept; personality is a perfection of na- 
ture and character is nothing more than the sum of 
the habits acquired in living. Character is not, there- 
fore, a direct modification of personality but rather of 
nature. We may say that a person possesses a cer- 

23 P. 38. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 255 

tain character; but upon examination we find that 
character bespeaks certain habits of mind and of will; 
now mind and will are faculties of our human nature. 
We do not deny that a person has a human nature, 
i. e., mind, will, bodily faculties, and also an acquired 
nature, i. e., a character; but we maintain that these 
in themselves do not constitute personality, that over 
and above them there is an element or principle which 
is their natural perfection, and which in union with 
them forms the human person. 

IV. 

Theory of Evolution. 
§ 23. The theory of evolution has been advanced Mr. Ribot 

1 1 • 111 11 r 1 • r 1 r on Persou- 

m our day to explam all the problems of life and of aiity. 
mind. It was reserved for M. Ribot ^* to apply it to 
the notion of Personality. To him personality is an 
aggregate whole made up of organic emotional and 
intellectual conditions.^^ It is not, therefore, a tran- 
scendental entity; nor is it a mere "bundle of sensa- 
tions," as Hume's followers hold.^^ M. Ribot com- 
pares personality to an orchestra composed of many 
pieces which nevertheles unite in maintaining a 
harmonious tone. Yet it is not so much the aggre- 
gate of pieces as the consensus and harmony of the 
whole. The parts and functions of the body are the 
elements; their harmonious consensus is the personal- 
ity itself.^'' In this way he accounts for the charac- 

24 Diseases of Personality. 

25 Cf. M. Ribot, pp. 3, 84. 

26 P. 85. 

27 P. loi. This opinion is criticised by St. Thomas, who 
attributes it to Empedocles and Dinarchus. cf. Contra Gen- 
tus II, 64; St. Augustine de Gen. ad Lit. lib. x, n. :i^']. 



256 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

teristic trait of personality, viz., its continuity in time 
or permanence, which is called identity,^ 
method. § ^4- According to the teaching of evolution the 

the higher forms of individuality must have proceeded 
from the lower.^^ Thus the elements of personality 
are to be sought f9r in the most elementary forms of 
life. Hence, the ruHng idea of his study.^° The fun- 
damental form of personality he finds in the sense of 
the body or general sensibility; hence he speaks of 
physical personality.^^ The sense of the body or 
coenesthesia is the great woof which sustains and 
unifies every^thing.^^ He denies that physical con- 
sciousness or memory constitute personality.^^ To 
him coenesthesia is the general consciousness of the 
organism/^ hence, rather a vital feeling.^^ This vital 
feeling or organic individuality is the basis of all the 
highest forms of personality, which are only the pro- 
ducts of its perfection .^^ 
ces^so?" ^^5* ^^ ^^^ lowest stage of the process there is a 
formation, mass of elements; gradually the common vital feeling 
is formed analogous to the development of a strong- 
centralized power in an association of states in the 
political order.^'' The factor of co-ordination is the 
nervous system, its development is a sign of progress 
to a more complex and harmonious individuality.^ 
" The co-ordination of the nervous actions of the or- 

28 p. 85; cf. Chapter on Positivism, § 14. 

29 P. 139. 

30 p. 19. 

31 P. 21. 

32 P. 105. 
36 P. 90. 

34 P. 89. 

35 P. 88. 

36 P. 90. 

37 P. 143. 

38 P. 144. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 257 

ganic life, by means of the spinal chord is the basis of 
the physical and psychical individuality; all other co- 
ordinations rest upon and are added to it; it is the 
inner man, the material form of his subjectivity, the 
ultimate reason of his manner of feeling and acting, 
the source of his instincts, his sentiments, his passions 
and his principle of individuation."^^ 

§ 26. Psychic individuality is only the subjective ex- Phy^cai 
pression of the organism,^" nor is it a complete expres- ^^^^^^' 
sion ; it is rather an extract or synopsis of all that takes 
place in the nervous centres.^^ The consensus of con- 
sciousness is subordinate to the consensus of the or- 
ganism; therefore the problem of the unity of the ego 
is, in its ultimate form, a biological problem.^^ Con- 
sistently with these principles he maintains that to the 
normal individual the idea of the ego is always an 
effect, a result, terminus.*^ 

§ 27. Thus personaHty is a progress from below and ^^J^mary. 
completes itself in full consciousness.^* He compares 
the complete ego to a piece of tapestry, of more or less 
intricacy, woven over the organic sense, which is at 
once its basis and bond of union.*^ Hence he con- 
cludes " The unity of the ego is but the co-ordination 
of a certain number of incessantly renascent states 
having for their support the vague sense of our bodies.*® 
In a psychological sense, it is the cohesion, during a 
given time, of a certain number of clear states of con- 
sciousness, accompanied by others less clear, and by a 

39 Pp. 148, 149. 
*" P. 145. 
'' P. 53. 

*2 p. 157. 

43 p. 118. 

44 P. 121. 

45 Pp. 89, 156. 

46 Cf. Mandsley Physiology of Mind, chap. I. 

33 



258 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



'Criticism, 
(i) false 
definition. 



The error. 



multitude of physiologic:.! states, which without being 
accompanied by consciousness Hke the others, yet 
operate as much and even more than the former." *^ 

§ 28. (i) He defines Personality as a consensus or 
harmony of the organism; a feeling which results from 
the co-ordination of all our activities. But this is false. 
The ego is not a result. The infant of a day is a per- 
son, yet there is no organic feeHng or harmony of 
which he is conscious ; nor is there any opportunity for 
a co-ordination of elements to take place and constitute 
a distinct personality. 

§ 29. M. Ribot confounds the ego with the states of 
the ego. The former is the real subject; the state of 
the ego is the apparent subject. He overlooks the 
real subject and tries to explain the apparent subject. 
Thus to-day I am sad, to-morrow joyful, next day I 
may, in a fit of insanity, look upon myself as another 
person. But there is no change in the real person; I 
am- the same throughout; there is, however, a change 
in my states; they succeed each other constantly. 
Ordinary language and common sense bear witness 
that a person may become insane and yet be the same 
person. The fact that the insane man forgets his for- 
mer states and imagines himself to be other than he is, 
does not make him a different person. M. Ribot's 

^^ P. 157. Akin to this is the opinion of Hoffding: "The 
unity of mental life has its expression not only in memory and 
synthesis, but also in a dominant fundamental feeling, charac- 
terized by contrast between pleasure and pain, and in an im- 
pulse, springing from this fundamental feeling, to movement 
and activity." Thus, the nervous system and consciousness, 
i. e., coenesthesia are the uniting bond. cf. Hofifding Outlines 
of Psychology, p. 49. For Mr. James' opinion the reader 
had better consult his Psychology, vol. I, ch. X. It would 
be impossible to do justice to the writer in a brief summary. 
It is hard to conceive how a thinker could formulate such 
teaching. He goes to any extreme rather than admit the 
existence of a soul. Ch. also vol. I, ch. IX. 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 259- 

" Diseases of Personality " inay be more properly 
termed *' Diseases of Memory." ^^ 

§ 30. (2) In considering Personality as the outcome (g) con- 
of Evolution these writers fall into the vital mistake of thought 
making thought of the same nature as organic activity, organic 
Reason and volition are higher powers of man, differ- ^^"ct^<^^^- 
ent in kind from organic functions. This has been set 
forth already.^^ Again the theory of evolution cannot 
explain the origin and nature of reason. Thought 
does not differ from organic acts in complexity only.^*^ 
There is a difference in kind. Evolution has failed 
miserably in the attempt to solve man's nature. It is 
based on assumptions, its arguments " beg the ques- 
tion " to be proved : its conclusions are wide of the 
premises. 

§ 31. This is the judgment upon the evolutionist ex- conclusion, 
planation of Personality. Its initial point is " Ignoran- 
tia elenchi," in as much as it confounds the states of 
the ego with the ego itself, and instead of proving the 
latter, sets forth a theory to account for the former. 
The method of investigation runs on the lines of evo- 
lution ; it thus assumes that intelligence is only a higher 
form of feeling; it seeks in the lowest form of life for 
the germs of man's highest perfection ; and this without 
giving the slightest proof for its position. 

V. 

Theory of Christian Philosophy. 
§ 32. St. Thomas defines Person in the words of ?/|?;"°° 
Boetius '' A singular substance of a rational nature." ^^ Thomas. 

^^ Griesinger in " Mental Diseases " confounds the phe- 
nomenal with the real ego. cf. Amer. Society for Psychical 
Research, vol. I, pp. 366, 552. 

49 Ch. V. 

^^ Ribot, p. 139. 

51 1, q. 29, A. I. 



26o 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



At first sight the definition seems somewhat obscure. 
To grasp its full meaning it is necessary to examine it 
in parts. 
Its ex- §33. Person, therefore, embraces (a) a rational 

planation. ti 1 / ■ ■, 

(a) rational iiature. i he elements of a rational nature are intelli- 

nature. . . , . , . . , 

gence, i. e., the higher powers of mmd, and wUl, i. e., 
the higher aiTections and emotions. Now rational 
natures are not all the same; they can differ one from 
another; in matter of fact they do so differ. Thus 
there is the Divine Nature, the Angelic Nature, the 
Human Nature. The nature of God is purely spir- 
itual, infinite and uncreated; the angelic nature is 
purely spiritual, but created and finite; rational human 
nature is not purely spiritual but composite, in the 
sense that it has a spiritual soul intrinsically destined 
to animate a material organism; this union of 
body and soul constitutes our human nature. The dis- 
tinction of nature is very important. It is not ex- 
pressed in the definition of St. Thomas. The reason 
is that the Angelic Doctor gives a definition of 
person in general; he does not aim at explain- 
ing human person only. On the contrary, in the 
passage cited he is dealing with divine personality. 
But in as much as person supposes a rational nature, 
it will readily be understood that a difference in the 
rational natures is the cause of the difference in the 
person 
iiduaf " § 34- (b) Person embraces also " an individual sub- 

substance. g^^j^^^g ?5 'pj^-g jg ^j^^ characteristic element in the 

notion; by it person is distinguished from rational 
nature. By " individual " is understood a singular 
concrete entity. By " substance '' is meant not 
essence as, ex. gr., if I ask you to give me the " sub- 
stance" of a sermon, I should expect to hear the 




CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 261 

main ideas or lines of thought which made the sermon 
what it was ; but by "substance " is understood the 
supposition or subject or the thing itself of which we 
were speaking; thus, ex. gr., when I say the " stone was 
very valuable," I simply mention a thing, about which 
we were speaking, and do not enter into an examina- 
tion of its essence or constitution, by reason of which 
it becomes valuable. " Individual substance," there- 
fore, means a concrete actually existing substance, or 
a substantial individuality 

§35. After this exposition of the meaning of the its mean- 
words, Person may be defined as " a rational nature 
possessing its own individual subsistence." The " indi- 
vidual subsistence" is the distinctive element of person- 
ality; it constitutes the rational nature in its actual 
concrete existence; it imparts to the rational nature 
a principle by which this nature has the control of its 
own acts, is std juris, and as a result is held account- 
able or responsible. 

§ 36. Thus Personality is distinguished from rational illustrated 

^ , -^ ^ in the In- 

nature. Rational nature may be considered as the carnation, 
thing itself; personality as the mode of its subsistence. 
This distinction has its source in the revealed doctrine from^Sf^ 
of the Incarnation. The Second Person of the Blessed 
Trinity assumed our human nature, not the human 
person. In Christ there is a perfect human nature with 
its attributes of intellect and will; nevertheless, in Christ 
there is only one mode of subsistence, only one subject 
acting, only one principle which controls His actions, 
giving to them a value and merit; and this subject or 
principle is the Personality of the eternal Word.^^ 

§37. The exposition of Personality just set f orth (2) in civu 
finds an illustration and also a confirmation in lan- 

52 S. Thomas Sum. Theol., p. 3, q. 2. 



262 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

guage. Thus the civil code speaks of PersonaHty; in 
fact passes special legislation for those whom it does 
not consider as persons. Let us examine what is 
understood by a person in the sight of the civil law. 
The fact is better grasped if the concrete case be taken. 
A boy of ten years, ex. gr., is not regarded as a civil 
person. Yet the boy has inteUigence and conscious- 
ness; he possesses also a rational will or motive power 
of action and a memory. The law, however, does not 
consider these to be sufficient. It regards the child as 
dependent upon others, as under the guidance and 
control of others. As long as the child is in this con- 
dition, it is not a person before the law. Over and 
above intellect and will, the civil law requires that the 
person should have the dominion of his own actions, 
should be, sui juris, his own master, 
from this § 38. Personality, therefore, means the possession of 

fact 

a principle which gives to a man the control of his own 
actions and renders him accountable for them in a 
court of justice. When he obtains this power of acting 
he enters upon the full exercise of his civil manhood 
and is considered a perfect man before the law.^^ 
personai^^^ § 39. Again wc use the expression " moral person- 
*^y-" ality." By this is understood a community which 

53 " In general only those human beings are by law denomi- 
nated Persons who can be the subjects of rights. According 
to the law of nature every man is capable of rights, and is, 
therefore, a person in a technical sense. Positive law may 
change this. Thus, the slave is a man; yet, by the Roman 
law he was incapable of rights, therefore, tvas not a person, 
cf. Mackeldey Roman Law, 14 ed., §§ 128-133, who cites as 
authorities § 4 I. i. 16, of Theophilus ad §2 I. 2 14; Nouvel. 
Theod. Const. 24, § 2; Cassiodorus Var. VI 8; Gaius I, § 9; 
fr. I 3; frag. 3 II. I. 5. Austin admits that in modern juris- 
prudence the term Person is limited " to human beings con- 
sidered as invested with rights." cf. Austin " Jurisprudence,'^ 
ed. by R. Campbell, vol. I, Lect. XII; cf. also Savigny 
" Roman Law." 



CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 263 

possesses intelligence and will, by reason of the mem- the infer- 
bers composing it, and also has the power of ruHng this fact, 
itself, of making its own laws, of determining their 
sanction, and of acting more or less as an independ- 
ent body.^* 

§ 40. Finally Rhetoric mentions a figure of speech (4) in 
called '* Personification," We are said to personify 
things, when we attribute to inanimate objects the at- 
tributes of a person. Thus, ex. er., in the fables of inference 

^ . 1 1 . from this 

Aesop plants and animals are represented as actmg fact, 
like human beings, so also this figure of speech is 
found in some of the noblest productions of genius, ex. 
gr., Dante. Now in personification we give to inani- 
mate creatures not only a human nature, e. g., intellect, 
will, but we also attribute a personality, i. e., we con- 
sider them as distinct individuals having the guidance 
and control of their actions and as a consequence, re- 
sponsible for what they do. 

§ 41. In explaining the notion of nature, it was Human 

1 1 '1 1 • rv rr^t f ^^^ Divine 

pomted out that rational natures differ, ihereiore. Personality 
as Personality is the mode of subsistence of a rational 
nature, the difference in the nature will cause a differ- 
ence in the person when nature and personality are 
viewed in their concrete actual existence. Thus 
Divine Personality, which is a perfection of Divine 
Nature, is by no means the same as Human Personal- 
ity, which is only the highest perfection of human na- 

54 " The positive Roman Law applied the term Persona to 
such men only as had the capacity for rights, and at the sam.e 
time extended it to all those things and corporations which 
are regarded as subject of rights, ex. gr., municipalities." 
Note to Mackeldey Civil Law, 12 ed., § 116. ''In legal lan- 
guage the word person is applied to those things and cor- 
porations which are regarded as the proper subjects of 
rights, such as collegia, municipia," 7c. cf. Rathigan Roman 
Law of Persons. 



264 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ture. Personality is a perfection; where the nature is 
infinite, the personaHty is infinite; thus it is false to 
maintain with Schelling, Hegel and Schleirmacher that 
personality of itself means limitation.^^ But human 
Personality is the subsistence of a human nature. 
Human nature is composed of body and soul, hence the 
human person implies a body and soul. If, therefore, 
one should deny the existence of a personal God, be- 
cause he cannot admit a God with a body, he errs by 
considering human personality to be personality itself; 
as, ex. gr., I call all existing things by the name of 
being, but I do not mean that all beings are alike. In 
like manner I say God is a person, and man is a per- 
son, but I do not mean that the personality of one is 
identical with the personality of the other. On the 
contrary the appellation, person, is true of God in a 
way far exceeding that of the creature.^" 



^5 Cf. German Philosophy bj^ Stuckenberg, p. 87. 

^^ Respondeo dicendum, quod persona significat id quod est 
perfectissimum in tola natura, scihcet siihsistens in rationali 
Qiatiira, Unde cum omne illud quod est perfectionis, Deo sit 
attribuendum, eo quod ejus essentia continet in se omnem 
perfectionem, conveniens est ut hoc nomen (persona) de Deo 
dicatur, non tamen eodem modoquo dicitur de creaturis, sed 
excellentiori modo. St. Thomas I, q. 29, a 3 c. 



christian philosophy. 265 

Conclusion. 

Such, therefore, is the teaching of Christian philos- christian 
ophy concerning the human soul. Clear and definite ^ ^ ^^^^ 
it appeals to men of to-day with the same force as to 
the minds of Justin and Augustine. The advance of 
time has made no change in its fundamental tenets. 
It has seen the rise and fall of system after system. 
Its vitality is due to the power of truth. Progress in 
knowledge, and especially in the physical sciences, has 
served to make its outlines bolder and to add new 
arguments to its well-known conclusions. 

This has been called an age of transition. Lines of character 

° of our age. 

demarkation are no longer drawn hard and fast. 
What has satisfied the past generation is insufficient 
for the present. The mental unrest is expressed in 
various forms. Men have outgrown the teaching of 
the past generation. They seek something more per- 
manent, more in consonance with mind and heart. 
The marvellous progress of the physical sciences has 
drawn attention to the material side of life. The study 
of the forces of nature, of the human body has taken 
possession of the field of thought. Man has been 
considered a mere animal. Works like Huxley's 
" Man's Place in Nature " and Romanes, " Mind in 
Man and Animals " have attempted to set forth this 
position in a scientific form. Such teaching cannot be 
lasting. It stifles the highest, noblest aspirations, it 
lowers man. 

To our times Christian philosophy brings its mes- chrfs^fan^ 
sage of light. It tells us what man really is. Its view fo^ophy. 
is comprehensive, not partial. It proclaims that man 
is a spiritual being. It emphasizes the fact that we are 
creatures of God, and are made in His likeness.^'' 

^^ S. Thomas I, q. 93, a 4; Aug. in Joan. tr. 3, n. 4; de Gen. 
ad Lit. 1, 6, c 12; de Civ. Dei xii, ch. 23. 



266 



'-- CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

These pages contain nothing new. The outlines 
and main trend are famihar from childhood. The 
sublime philosophy of Christianity is unfolded in the 
catechism. The only effort made is to show that the 
teaching of our early years is in harmony with the 
results of scientific thought. Hence, when we grow 
to manhood and mingle in the great world, whether 
in high schools, universities or in the busy walks of 
professional life, we should not forget or throw aside 
the beautiful lessons of our nature and dignity. True 
progress is not had in asserting that we are on the 
same level with the brute. True philosophy is Chris- 
tian philosophy. The true philosopher is one who 
understands and lives up to the teaching of the cate- 
chism ; who holds firm and fast the truth so simple and 
profound that we are creatures of God, composed of 
body and soul, that our soul is made in the likeness 
of God, because it is a spirit endowed with intelligence, 
and free-will and is immortal, that is to say, it can 
never die.^^ 

^ 58 Nunc tamen de anima; nihil confirmo nisi quia ex Deo 
sic est ut non sit substantia Dei; et sic incorporea, id est, non 
sit corpus, sed spiritus, non de substantia Dei genitus, nee 
de substantia Dei procedeus, sed factus a Deo; nee ita factus 
ut in ejus naturam natura ulla corporis vel irrationalis animae 
verteretur; ac per hoc de nihilo: et quod sit immortalis secun- 
dum quemdam vitae modum quern nullo modo potest amit- 
tere." Aug. de Gen. ad Lit. 1. VII, n. 43; 1. VI, c 12; In Joan 
tr. 3, n. 4; S. Thomas S. Theol. I, q. 93, a 4. " Fecerat homi- 
nem ad imaginem suam; quod utique secundum animam ra- 
tionalem fecisse intelligitur." Ep. 166, n. 12; de quant, an., 
n. 3; S.Thomas S. Theolog. I, q. 93. 



INDEX 



Abnormal acts, 11. 

Abstract sciences, 110. 

Accidents and substance, 25, 29, 

Affections, Psycholgy of, 17. 

Agnosticism, 40, 58, 95. 

Agraphy, 137. 

Ambiguity, danger of, 15. 

Analogy and immortality, 243. 

Anatomy, 9, 12. 

Animated organism the principle of 

sensation, 190. 
Annihilation, theory of, 325. 
Aphasia, 136. 
Apperception, 43, 48. 
Association of ideas, 13, 15 ; school of 

association, 26, 44. 
Atoms, 65. 



B. 



Bain. 44, 52, 61. 

Bampton Lectures, 250. 

Barker, Prof , on thought and mo- 
tion, 205. 

Being, 27, 30. 

Blindness, verbal, 138. 

Body and Soul, 168; the problem, 168; 
theory of exaggerated spiritualism 
169 ; of accidental union, 172 ; mon- 
istic theory, 176; its reasons, 177; its 
different forms, 178 ; scholastic the- 
ory, 184. 

Brain 63, 66; brain and thought, 121 ; 
quantity of matter of, 121 ; qual 
ity, 129 ; brain of woman, 124 ; of 
different races, 124 ; of different 
individuals, 126; growth of brain, 
127 ; physical qualities, 132. 

Buddhist theory of soul, 47 ; view of 
man, 48,49,239,234. 



Catechism, 32, 264. 
Chemistry, 40, 55. 
Christian philosophy, 364 sq. 
Classification of mental phenomena, 

14. 
Classification, tendency to, 115. 
Cognition, Psychology of, 17. 
Comparative philology, 10. 
Compte, 4, 85. 



Conscience, 116, 238. 

Consciousness, 2, 3, 15, 30, 43, 74; 
stream of, 44; testimony of, 58, 72; 
unity, 76; with Spencer, 319; and 
personality, 348. 

Conservation of energy, 389; of mat- 
ter, 338, 343 

Contradiction, principle of, 51. 

Creationism, 313, 214, 222. 



Deafness, verbal, 137. 

Death, end of all, 225. 

Degraded life and immortality, 234. 

Des Cartes, IG. 20, 51, 63. 169. 

Description and definition, 23. 

Determinists, 16. 

Double-aspect theory, 61-177; differ- 
ent forms, 178; of Clifford, 178; of 
Bain, 180; of Spencer, 183; its argu- 
ments, 183; its consequences, 184. 

Duality, in substance, 186; in man 
189. 

Du Bois, Raymond, on cerebral mo- 
tion, 307. 



Education and Psychology, 16. 

Ego, 30, 31, 33; its permanence, 47; 
reality, 47; unity, 70; of Positivists, 
75; states of Ego, 75; normal and 
hysterical, 75; with Compte, 94. 

Elementary concep ions, 33. 

Emanation, theory of, 811. 

Emerson, 160. 

Empiricism, 58, 67. 

Errors on soul, 36. 

Eternal duration of soul, 344. 

Ethics and Pyschology, 16. 

Evolution, 64; and soul, 216; and per- 
sonality, 255. 



Ferrier on cerebral motion, 208. 

Fichte, 20, 151. 

t orces, 66; simple material forces, 80; 

immaterial forces, 81, 89. 
Form and matter, 19; substantial 

form of body, 19. 
Free-will, 16. 
Free-thinker, 224. 



268 



INDEX. 



Gall, 93, 

Generation and Soul, 212-214, 215. 
Glory, immortality of, 230. 
Gotama, 47-48. 

Government, science of, and Psychol- 
ogy, 17. 
Green, Prof., 68, 165. 
Growth and mechanical motion, 55. 



Haeckel, 53-64. 
Hamilton, 4, 20, 84, 39. 
Happiness, desire of, 241. 
Hegel, 20, 154, 155 
Heredity, law of, 218-221. 
Hierarchy, of beings, 188. 
Hume, 20, 26, 44, 51 . 
Huxley, 20, 26, 40. 



I. 



I, the, 80, 31, 32, 70. 

Idealism of Berkeley, 20. 

Immortality of soul, 223; theories, 
224; substitutes, 228; a universal 
fact, 231; proofs, 236; and literature. 
242; not isolated, 243; eternal, 244. 

Impulse, its effects, 205. 

Incarnation, 245, 261. 

Individual substance, 260. 

Instinct Avith Spencer, 217, 219. 

Intelligence with Spencer, 217. 

Introspection, 4, 6, 13; and retrospec- 
tion, 5 

Intuitions, basis of knowledge, 33; 
meaning of the word, 35, note; with 
Kant, 38. 



Jamei on Introspection, 6; on value 
of introspection, 7; on Psychology, 
18: on soul, 26; o j potency, 31; on 
substance of soul, 32, 36. 

Janet, 67, 6^ 

Jews, and immortality, 233. 



K. 

Kant, 20, 86; his modern disciples, 37; 
his theory of soul, 37; his criticism 
of souPs substantiality, 38; criti- 
cism of Kant, 39; meaning of phe- 
nomena, 40; of intuition, 41; his 
critic, 51; and personality, 248. 

Karma, 230. 

Koelpe on Psychology, 8. 



Ladd, soul, 18; on definition of soul, 
24; on soul and body, 174; on cere- 
bralmotion, 210. 



Language, 10; of Psychology, 15; its 
roots, 120. 

Law and person, civil, 262, 

Leibnitz on soul and body, 170. 

Lewes and soul, 36-t3l. 

Life, grades of, 1; mental, 2; its prin- 
ciples and laws, 14; facts complex, 
15; partial conceptions, 16; mechan- 
ical theory, 55; chemical theory, 57. 

Localization, 7, 13, 15, 93 134; of Gall, 
134; of cerebral Physiology, 136; of 
sensations, 136; of nervous move- 
ment, 138; of reason, 139; and spir- 
itualiiy of soul, 140. 

Locke and soul, 26; on soul and body, 
173 ; on personality, 246. 

Logic, relation to Psychology, 16; 
logical definition, 23. 

Lotze, 55; on soul and body, 173. 

M. 

Malebranche, on soul and body, 170. 
Man in Christian philosophy, 264; in 

Buddhism, 48. 
Manifestation, theory of, 213. 
Material objects, how conceived, 110. 
Materialism, history, 49; ancient and, 

modern, 49; leaders, 52; scientific 

materialism, 54, 225; its doctrine, 59; 

two schools, 6-; its arguments, 61; 

criticism, 64; influence, 67; material- 
ists, 12, 16, 26. 
Matter, 54; and form, 19, 186, 187; 

and force, 59, 184, 185; not free, 118. 
Me, the. 30; and its modifications, 

30,31,43,73. 
Measurement of skull, 128. 
Memory and personality, 247, 
Mill, 4, 21. 44, 66. 
Mind, 2, 17; power of mind, 111, 239; 

mind and body. 62, 168; with Spencer 

220; in psychology, 2, 17. 
Mind-stuff, 178, 180. 
Monism, 176. 
Motion, 65; and life, 65; cerebral 

motion, 203. 
Movement, nervous, 138. 

N. 
Nature. 260; not personality, 258, 261' 
Neo-Hegelian, 21, 68. 
Neo-Hegelian School, 164; pantheistic, 

165. 
Neo-Kantian. 21, 68. 
Neo-Platonists, 211. 
Nervous movement, 188. 
Nirvana, 234 . 
Nouns abstract and concrete, 42. 

O. 

Objective and subjective, 2 
Objective, sour* es of. Psychology, 7. 
Object, proper, of Psychology, 12. 
Observation, internal, 13. 
Ontology, 41. 

O atory, relation to Psychology, 17. 
Order, moral, and immortality, 238. 



INDEX. 



269 



Pantheism, 148; modern pantheism, 
149; influence, 158; Pantheism of 
Emerson, 160; of Royce, 162; criti- 
cism, 166; Pantheists and soul, 211; 
and immortality, 226. 

Pathology, 10 

Personality, 245; problem of Christian 
philosophy, 245; with Locke, 246; 
with Kant, 248; with Illingworth, 
250; and Evolution, 255; physical 
and psychic, 257; diseases of, 259; 
with S Thomas, 259; human and 
divine. 263. 

" Phenomena" with Kant, 40. 

Phenomenal theory of soul, 43; phe- 
nomenal idealism, 47. 

Philosophy, modern, a failure, 20; its 
errors on soul, 25 

Physical science, 40. 

Physiology, 9, 12, 18, 63. 

Plato, on soul aod body, 169. 

Positivism 48; notion of ego, 75; 
origin, 88; doctrine, 90, 230; law of 
three states, 90; classification of 
science, 92; this teaching on man, 
93; on intellect, 94; relation to ag- 
nosticism, 95, 96; influence, 97, 98, 
99; criticism. 100, 101. 

Potency, 27-80. 

Principles of mental life, 14. 

Principles of reason, 41. 

Psychology, 1, 2, 4, *-, 12, 16, 22. 

Psychology without a soul, 18; scho- 
lastic psychology, 19. 

Psychology, English, 34. 

Psycho-Physics, 141; its basis. 142; its 
origin, 142; its value, 146, 147. 



R. 

Reason, its localization, 139; with 
Rpencer, 217; practical and specu- 
lative, 151. 

Reflex action, 217, 219. 

Relativity of knowledge, 89. 

Retrospection and introspection, 6. 

Ribot and personality, 256. 

Roots of language, 120. 

Rotsmini on soul and body, 194. 

Royce, 162, 



S. 



Scepticism of Hume, 20; immortality, 
226. 

Schelling, 152. 

Scottish school, 6, 7. 

Self-consciousness, 13, 112; not mat- 
ter, 113, 114; higher self, 158. 

Sensations differ in quantity and 
quality, 142, 145; intensity of, 143, 
197; and impulse, 144; duration of, 
145, 197; extension, 147, 197; quantita- 
tive, 196; its organ, 198; simple sub- 
ject of, 195. 



Simplicity of soul, 70. 

Skandhas, 48 49. 

Skull, weight of, 122: measurement 
of, 128. 

Soul, psychology of, 17, 22; impor- 
tance, 18; Ladd on soul, 18; sub- 
stantial form of body, 19, 189; a 
substance, 25, 32; and modern phil- 
osophy, 25; and scholastic philos- 
ophy, 25; a logical subject, 26; a 
heap of qualities, 26, 44; unknow- 
able, 26; does not exist, 26; errors 
on soul, 37? not extended, 77; Budd- 
hist conception of, 159; place in 
body, 190; origin, 211; nature of, 
286. 

Sources of psychology, 13. 

Speech, human, 119. 

Spirituality of soul, 106; spirit, 106; 
spirit and soul, 107; spiritual and 
immaterial, 108; proof, 109. 

Stability, 27, 31. 

Stories, 211. 

Substance, 25, 28, 42; and essence, 33. 



T. 



Thought; chemical theory, 129; and 
brain, 192; not sensation, 199, 200; 
and body, 201; imagination and 
thought, 202; not cerebral motion- 
not i-eflex action, 204; not a phy- 
sical force, 204; and heat, 206 ; not 
organic function, 259. 

Traducianists, 212. 

Transcendentalism, 33, 57; in America, 
163. 

Transcendental theory of soul, 37, 

Tyndall, 54, 208. 



U. 

Ulrici, 67. 

Unity, immaterial, 80; collective, 71; 
Compters, 94; Kant's objection to, 
78; kinds of, 71; of consciousness, 76, 
185; of positivists, 74; of soul, 70; 
simple unity, 70, 76; Spencer and 
unity of ego, 218, 

Upanishads, 156; problem of, 157; 
value of, 156. 



Vedanta, 156,211. 

Verbal deafness, 137; blindness, 138. 

Virchow, 66. 

Vogt, 52. 

W, 

Wallace, 68. 

Ward, Dr., 68. 

Weber's law, cubicism of, 143, 

Will, psychology of, 17; acts of, 115; 

free will, 117; powers of, 240, 
Worldly-minded and immortality, 224. 
Wundt, 36, 43, 68. 



